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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
RICHARD S. UGELOW
On February 19, 2010, the American University, Washington College of 
Law hosted an event of historic dimensions. Employment Discrimination: 45 
Years of Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is unique 
for two main reasons. The symposium refl ected upon the fi rst forty-fi ve 
years of enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Title VII became effective in July 1965. As 
originally enacted, Title VII applied only to private sector employers with 
judicial enforcement authority residing in the DOJ. DOJ used this authority to 
bring, among others, groundbreaking litigation against the steel industry;1 the 
trucking industry;2 and the movie industry.3 
In 1972, Title VII was amended to cover state, local and federal government 
employees. The 1972 amendments transferred private sector enforcement 
authority to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
and conferred public sector enforcement authority in the DOJ. DOJ used 
its authority to bring pattern or practice lawsuits against state and local 
governments to challenge discriminatory recruitment, hiring and promotion 
practices. Many of these lawsuits focused on the employment practices of 
police and fi re departments. 
* The American University Labor & Employment Law Forum would like 
to thank Richard Ugleow for providing us the opportunity to publish this transcript 
   1. E.g., United States v. Allegheny Ludlum, 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. E.g., United States v. Trucking Mgmt. Inc., 384 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1975).
3. E.g., Int’l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emps. v. Ass’n of Motion Picture & 
Television Producers, Inc., C.A. No. 71-2630 (C.D. Cal.).
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2010 marked the forty-fi fth anniversary of the enforcement of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the DOJ. For the vast majority of the last forty-fi ve 
years, enforcement responsibility has rested with the Employment Litigation 
Section. The panelists who graciously contributed their time and wealth of 
experience to the symposium make this transcript unique for another, important 
reason. The transcript of this event serves as a history and testament to the 
work of the Employment Litigation Section over the past forty-fi ve years. The 
transcript vividly demonstrates the challenges—personal and legal—faced 
by the dedicated staff and attorneys and how overcoming those challenges 
changed employment patterns in the American workforce forever and gave 
meaning to the promise and spirit of Title VII. A reading of the transcript of 
the fi nal panel reveals that Title VII enforcement faces new legal and political 
challenges and that the DOJ will need to adapt its enforcement mechanisms 
to the times.  
I am not only grateful to the panelists who made this program so meaningful, 
but also to Tom Perez, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Tom 
fully supported this program and many Civil Rights Division employees were 
panelists or attended. In addition, Tom graciously agreed to be the keynote 
speaker at lunch. While a transcript of Tom’s remarks are unavailable, he 
reiterated the DOJ’s commitment to vigorous and fair enforcement of the 
nation’s civil rights laws. I am pleased to say that Tom has backed up his words 
with deeds. Today, the Employment Litigation Section possesses a new sense 
of mission and is effectively enforcing Title VII.  
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 Richard Ugelow is on the faculty of American University’s Washington 
College of Law, where he teaches clinical legal education. He also teaches a 
course on employment discrimination.  
Prior to joining the law school faculty in 2002, Professor Ugelow was a 
Deputy Section Chief of the Employment Litigation Section (“ELS”), Civil 
Rights Division, United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). There, he 
supervised investigations and litigation to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. During the course of his twenty-nine year career at the DOJ, 
he litigated complex pattern or practice cases of employment discrimination 
fi led against public sector and private employers pursuant to Title VII. He 
was also the government’s lead trial attorney in defending challenges to 
the constitutionality of federally-sponsored affi rmative action programs, 
particularly statutes and programs designed to provide contracting opportunities 
to minority, disadvantaged, and women-owned businesses.  
While at the DOJ, Professor Ugelow frequently spoke at conferences 
concerning the development of lawful and nondiscriminatory selection and 
promotional procedures for police offi cers and fi re fi ghters. He has published 
on the subjects of discrimination encountered by women seeking employment 
in physically demanding jobs and the role of expert witnesses in employment 
discrimination litigation.  
From 1969–1973, Professor Ugelow was a Captain in the Army’s Judge
Advocate General’s Corps. 
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WELCOME REMARKS: OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
 Susan Carle is a Professor of Law at American University’s 
Washington College of Law. Her teaching and research interests lie 
primarily in the areas of legal ethics, the history and sociology of the legal 
profession, employment discrimination, labor and employment law, and 
torts. She is currently at work on a project examining the many ideas about 
economic justice and strategies for advancing the cause of economic justice 
held by the generation of race leaders who constituted the forerunners of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”). 
She is the author of numerous scholarly works examining the transmission 
and transformation of ideas about public interest law practice, as well as 
other ethics topics, for which she has won several awards. In Spring of 2006, 
she served as Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Among 
other professional service commitments, she serves on the D.C. Bar Rules 
of Professional Conduct Review Committee and the Legal Ethics Advisory 
Committee of the National Disability Rights Network. She also served as the 
First Associate Dean for Scholarship at the law school from 2005 to 2008.
 David L. Rose has been engaged in the private practice of law since 
December 2, 1987 specializing in litigation, particularly in equal employment 
opportunity and other employment, environmental, and appellate law. Rose & 
Rose, P.C. (“The Firm”) was established in 1995, and has engaged in a national 
practice of equal employment opportunity law, primarily for employees and 
applicants for employment and organizations representing them. 
The Firm’s clients have included many individuals; the NAACP; the City 
of Detroit; the National Wildlife Association; the Neuse River Foundation; a 
Washington, D.C. law fi rm; the Braxton Citizens for a Better Environment; 
and the National Consumers League. Reported decisions in the Firm’s cases 
include Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008), affi rming 
the ruling for Plaintiffs in Holowecki v. Federal Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558 
(2d Cir. 2006) both cases briefed and argued by the Firm; Schuler v. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, 514 F.3d. 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Thomas  v. 
National Football League Players Ass’n, 273 F.3d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2001); NAACP v. Town of East 
Haven, 259 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2001); Adams v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 231 
F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass’n, 
131 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997); NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219 
(2d Cir. 1995); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994); City of 
Houston v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 24 F.3d 1421 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991); National 
Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988); Taylor v. Social 
Security Administration, 2006 WL 1310233 (EEOC May 5, 2006); NAACP v. 
New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety, 711 A.2d 1355 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1998); Payton v. City of Detroit, 551 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. 1996); 
Payton v. City of Detroit, 536 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Detroit v. 
Qualls, 454 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. 1990).
Mr. Rose has been a Fellow of the College of Labor and Employment 
Lawyers since 1996. He served as a member of the Committee on Assessment 
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and Teacher Quality of the National Resources Council of the National 
Academies from mid-1999 until 2001. The Report of that Committee is 
published as: Karen Mitchell et al., Testing Teacher Candidates, The Role of 
Licensure Tests in Improving Teacher Quality (2001).
From October 6, 1969 through December 1, 1987, Mr. Rose was the Chief of 
the ELS of the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ. As such, he was responsible, 
subject to the direction of the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights, for 
developing and implementing the Department’s litigation program to secure 
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other provisions 
of federal law requiring non-discrimination in employment and equal 
employment opportunity; and he directed the litigation activities of twenty-
fi ve to thirty-fi ve lawyers in federal courts throughout the United States. He 
participated personally in a number of landmark cases in equal employment 
opportunity law, including: Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Moody 
v. Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971); Contractors Ass’n. of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of 
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); and EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d 
Cir. 1977). He participated personally in major consent orders for the United 
States, including AT&T and those with the trucking and steel industries.  
 From 1972 through 1980, he was the DOJ’s representative and chairman 
of the interagency staff committee that developed the “Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures,” adopted by the DOJ, Department of Labor, 
Department of the Treasury, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), and the Civil Service Commission in 1978; and the interpretive 
“Questions and Answers” adopted by those agencies in 1979 and 1980. The 
Uniform Guidelines are still in force, at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2010).
From April 4, 1967 through October 6, 1969, Mr. Rose served as Special 
Assistant to the Attorney General for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
As such, he was responsible to the Attorney General for coordinating the 
efforts of federal fund-granting agencies to enforce the provisions of that Title, 
which prohibit discrimination in federally assisted programs and activities.
Mr. Rose received his A.B. with honors from Harvard College in 1953, and 
his LL.B. with honors from Harvard Law School in 1956. Mr. Rose served as a 
lawyer in the Civil Division of the DOJ from September 1956 to April 4, 1967, 
and, from 1967 through December 1, 1987, was an attorney and Section Chief 
in the Civil Rights Division. With the exception of a six month tour of active 
duty in the United States Army Reserve, he spent the fi rst three years handling 
litigation at the trial level. Thereafter, he was in the Appellate Section of the 
Civil Division, representing the United States and its agencies in the federal 
courts of appeals, some state appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. He 
became an Assistant Section Chief in 1965. He argued approximately eighty-
fi ve appellate cases while in that section, including three cases in the Supreme 
Court. His most recent argument in the Supreme Court was on November 6, 
2007 in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008).
Mr. Rose received a number of awards while in government service, 
including the Senior Executive Meritorious Awards, the Attorney General’s 
Distinguished Service Award in 1978, and the Younger Federal Lawyer Award 
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of the Federal Bar Association.
From 1977–1981, Mr. Rose was a member of the Adjunct Faculty of the 
Georgetown University Law Center, where he taught “Federal Courts and the 
Federal System.” He rejoined the Adjunct Faculty at Georgetown in 1991, 
where he shared the teaching of an Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
course with Douglas Huron through the 1993–94 school year.  
Mr. Rose is the author of Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on 
Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1121 (1989); and Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory 
Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 San Diego Law Review 63 (1988). He is also the 
editor of a chapter of Employment Discrimination Law (3d ed. 1996) for the 
ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law. He testifi ed before committees 
of the House of Representatives in 1990, 1991, and 1994.
Mr. Rose resides in Chevy Chase, Maryland, with his wife Ann. 
They are the parents of four adults and have ten grandchildren. 
 Vicki Shultz is the Ford Foundation Professor of Law at Yale Law School. 
Her areas of focus include employment discrimination law, civil procedure, 
feminism and law, and gender and work. Her publications include Vicki 
Shultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United States 
(Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 91, 2004) and Vicki Shutlz, The 
Sanitized Workplace, 112 Yale Law Journal 2061 (2002). Professor Schultz earned 
a B.A. from the University of Texas and a J.D. from Harvard University.
                ELS ENFORCEMENT 1965–1974 
 Joel Contreras earned a B.A. from the University of Oklahoma in 1965 
and a J.D. from the University of Texas in 1969. In 1969, Mr. Contreras was 
employed at the EEOC in Austin, Texas. From January 1971 to December 1973, 
Mr. Contreras worked at DOJ, Civil Rights Division, ELS in Washington, D.C. 
and in 1974 he worked for the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, also in 
Washington, D.C. From 1975 until 1980, Mr. Contreras worked for the Mexican 
American Legal Defense & Educational Fund as a Director Employment 
Litigation in San Francisco, California. Mr. Contreras also served as Chief 
Counsel from 1980 until 1982 at the California Employment Development 
Department in Sacramento, California. Since 1982, Mr. Contreras has worked 
for the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. He fi rst served as 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), then as a Chief ALJ, then as an ALJ I, and 
since July 2005 as an ALJ II.
Squire Padgett started at the DOJ in June of 1970. Late on the afternoon 
of the fi rst day of employment Mr. Padgett was sent to Birmingham, Alabama 
to investigate what became United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 
(5th Cir. 1975) and later the nationwide steel consent decree; United States v. 
Allegheny-Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2004). Mr. Padgett was also 
responsible for compliance in United States v. Roadway Express, Inc., 457 
F.2d 854 (1972); a case that integrated job sequences.
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 In 1974–1975, Mr. Padgett investigated, and was lead attorney for the 
United States in, a suit fi led against the City of Miami, Florida, United States 
v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case, he argued before 
an en banc Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That consent decree is still in place 
today.
Finally, Mr. Padgett was the lead attorney in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 
U.S. 385 (1986) before the Supreme Court. The case, among other issues, 
determined the standard for the use of regression analysis in employment 
discrimination cases. Mr. Padgett left the Department in July of 1982.
Robert Marshall became an Assistant U. S. Attorney in Colorado. Since 
then he has worked in civil litigation with various fi rms. Mr. Marshall is 
presently a civil litigator with the law fi rm of Carpenter & Klatskin in Denver, 
Colorado.
Mr. Marshall worked in the ELS starting in January 1970. He transferred to 
the Criminal Section of Civil Rights near the end of 1971. Mr. Marshall stayed 
with the Criminal Section until March of 1973. His fi rst case was to write a 
brief opposing Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v. Electrical 
Workers Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
943 (1970). At the same time Mr. Marshall was working with Bill Fenton on 
the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Case for the train porters; Howard v. St. 
Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 361 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1966). That case 
was tried in St. Louis, Missouri and ultimately was won on appeal to the 8th 
Circuit. Judge Roy Harper did everything he could to make it diffi cult to try 
the case but Mr. Marshall and the team persevered. The Train Porters received 
seniority and were allowed to transfer to freight trains. Mr. Marshall also 
handled the Electrical Union case in New Orleans; United States v. Electrical 
Workers Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970). In the deposition of the 
President of the union, when asked why there were no blacks in the union, 
the union President testifi ed that blacks were afraid of electricity. As a result 
of that comment Joel Selig was able to put together the New Orleans plan. 
The plan joined all the trade unions together in New Orleans in an affi rmative 
action program, and they built the Superdome. Mr. Marshall also worked on 
the D.C. Trucking case in which relief was provided to long haul truckers; 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Mr. Marshall also assisted 
Mr. Squire Padgett in the East St. Louis trade unions; United States v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968). In the Criminal 
Section, Mr. Marshall obtained guilty pleas on involuntary servitude cases and 
won a jury trial in Tulsa, Oklahoma on an 18 U.S.C. § 242 case of a police 
offi cer abusing his offi ce by beating an arrestee. Mr. Marshall also lost a jury 
trial in Lexington, Kentucky, against a deputy sheriff who shot and killed a 
high school basketball coach. Mr. Marshall considers that portion of his career 
as the most rewarding legal work he has ever done. 
Frank Petramalo, Jr., is a 1969 graduate of the Georgetown University Law 
Center. After graduation he joined the DOJ as a trial attorney in the ELS where 
he served until 1973. In that four year period, he handled Title VII litigation 
involving building trades unions in Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, St. 
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Louis, Las Vegas, Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Mr. Petramalo was 
also involved in litigation with city fi re departments in Chicago, Los Angeles, 
and Boston.
From 1973–74, Mr. Petramalo worked as a staff attorney with the District of 
Columbia Public Defender Service representing indigent criminal defendants.
From 1974 through 2004, he practiced labor and employment law with the 
Washington, D.C. fi rms of Bredhoff & Kaiser and Gordon & Barnett. His 
practice centered on representing employees, employee organizations, and 
labor unions.
After retiring from practice in Washington, D.C., Mr. Petramalo became 
the Executive Director and General Counsel for the Virginia Horsemen’s 
Benevolent & Protective Association (“VHBPA”) in Warrenton, Virginia. 
The VHBPA represents approximately 1,800 thoroughbred horse 
owners and trainers who race at Colonial Downs in New Kent, Virginia.
 Doug Huron has been practicing employment law for forty years, 
beginning in 1970 at the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ with the only break 
being a four-year stint in the White House Counsel’s offi ce during the Carter 
administration. While at the DOJ, he was the lead lawyer for the government 
in a trial before Judge Frank Johnson that resulted in the desegregation of 
the Alabama State Troopers; Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439 (M.D. 
Ala. 1979). Since entering private practice in 1981, his highest profi le case 
has been Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Mr. Huron has 
written several amicus curiae briefs for the Supreme Court, and he wrote 
the brief for the appellee in another Supreme Court case in 2007; Offi ce of 
Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511 (2007). He has also published 
articles on employment law in the Washington Post and other journals. Doug 
is currently with the D.C. fi rm of Heller, Huron, Chertkof, Lerner, Simon & 
Salzman and is married to Amy Wind, the Chief Mediator for the D.C. Circuit.
         ENFORCEMENT AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 Terence G. Connor serves as the Co-Head of the Labor and Employment 
practice of the Miami offi ce of Hunton & Williams. Mr. Connor’s practice 
focuses on all aspects of labor and employment law, including complex 
employment and employee benefi ts litigation, labor-management relations 
and labor disputes, railway labor act, and wage and hour laws. Mr. Connor has 
extensive experience in trying employment and employment discrimination 
cases in federal and state courts, and the counseling of employers on compliance 
with state and federal employment laws. Mr. Connor has extensive labor and 
employment law experience in several industries, including the airline and 
transportation industries and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. 
He also has substantial litigation experience in employment, employee benefi t, 
and labor relations matters in state and federal courts. 
Mr. Connor worked as a trial attorney with the DOJ Civil Rights Division 
where he prosecuted pattern and practice cases under Title VII. At the DOJ 
Civil Rights Division between 1973 and 1976, Mr. Connor developed and 
litigated cases desegregating the state police forces of Maryland, Michigan, 
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and New Jersey, each of which was ultimately resolved through Consent 
Decrees he negotiated with the states and that were entered by the courts. Prior 
to leaving government service, he had initiated similar actions in New York 
and North Carolina that were later successful. 
Additionally, Mr. Connor was a member of the litigation team in EEOC v. 
AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), an early nationwide gender discrimination 
case, and in the department’s desegregation cases against Jefferson County, 
Alabama. He has also negotiated a system-wide Conciliation Agreement on 
behalf of National Airlines with the Washington Headquarters Offi ce of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and tried, to a defense judgment, 
the cases of those who opted out of the Conciliation Agreement in Leonard v. 
National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
Mr. Connor has published numerous works and has been recognized as the 
Winner of The American Lawyer’s 2006 Litigation Department of the Year—
Labor and Employment Law, Member of Group award and was listed in The 
Best Lawyers in America (2006 & 2007), in Who’s Who Legal (2005, 2006 & 
2007); Chambers USA: America’s Leading Lawyers for Business (2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 & 2007); and was named among  the top lawyers in Florida by 
Florida Super Lawyers Magazine, a listing of the state’s “lawyers held in the 
highest regard” by their peers, for Employment and Labor, June 2007.
Mr. Connor earned his LL.M. from Georgetown University Law 
Center in 1975, his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of 
Law in 1967, and his A.B. from Georgetown University in 1964. 
 Michael Middleton  joined the law faculty of the University of Missouri 
in 1985 after working for the federal government in Washington D.C.  He 
served as a trial attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ and in 1977 
was appointed Assistant Deputy Director of the Offi ce for Civil Rights at the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
After serving as Director of the Offi ce of Systemic Programs for the EEOC 
and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at the Department 
of Education, he was appointed Associate General Counsel of the EEOC’s trial 
division. Mr. Middleton returned to St. Louis, where he served as director of 
the St. Louis district offi ce of the EEOC. 
Beginning in 1997, he served as the Interim Vice Provost for 
Minority Affairs and Faculty Development for the University of 
Missouri. In 1998, he accepted the position of Deputy Chancellor. 
 Marybeth Martin served in the ELS of the Civil Rights Division for twenty-
eight years as a research analyst, line attorney, and deputy section chief.
Ms. Martin graduated from Randolph-Macon Woman’s College in 
Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1966, with a B.A. in Philosophy. After working briefl y 
on Capitol Hill and for federal contractors, she began working as a research 
analyst in the Employment Section (now ELS) in 1970, where she served on 
a variety of Title VII pattern or practice investigations of private employers 
and unions, and assisted Section attorneys in litigation for over three years. 
Her assignments included assisting with trials under Title VII against U.S. 
Steel’s Fairfi eld (Alabama) Works, and the Texas and Baltimore locals of the 
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International Longshoremen’s Association. Through her work in the Section, 
she became interested in becoming an attorney, and earned a J.D. degree from 
Antioch School of Law, Washington, D.C., in 1976. For nearly two years, she 
served as a law clerk to Judge James A. Belson, then of the D.C. Superior 
Court.
Ms. Martin began working as a line attorney in ELS in 1978. Her Title 
VII work included referrals of individual charges from the Equal Employment 
Commission and pattern or practice matters against state and local governments. 
In addition, her assignments included representing federal agencies in 
challenges to the constitutionality of various disadvantaged business enterprise 
programs. Under Title VII cases against the State of Georgia, she worked with 
ELS paralegals and attorneys in developing a model for the Section to use 
in proposing remedial monetary and job relief for individual victims in large 
pattern or practice cases. She also worked on cases the Section brought against 
the City of Milwaukee, the City of Montgomery, the State of Alabama and 
other government entities in which issues arose in the enforcement of Tile VII 
consent decrees. 
After serving for fi fteen years as a trial attorney, she became a Deputy 
Section Chief in ELS, and, in that position, served as a reviewer of Title 
VII matters and cases assigned to Section attorneys and paralegals. She also 
worked with ELS, Division, and federal agency attorneys in coordinating the 
government’s response to challenges to the constitutionality of disadvantaged 
business and federal contractor programs. In addition, she coordinated Title 
VI (nondiscrimination provisions of federal funding programs) with other 
branches of the Division and Department. Beginning in 1995, she served as 
a representative on the Section’s hiring committee for experienced attorneys.
Since her retirement at the end of 2003, Ms. Martin has served as 
a volunteer on local high school and library projects, and has taught 
English as a second language to adults at the Dulin Methodist Church 
and the Literacy Council of Northern Virginia in Falls Church.
 Gerald F. George was an attorney in the ELS of the Civil Rights Division 
from 1969–88. While in the Civil Rights Division, he was lead counsel 
on a number of state and local government “pattern and practice” suits, 
including suits addressing hiring and promotion practices in the police and 
fi re departments of Los Angeles and San Francisco, fi re departments in St. 
Louis and the twelve largest cities in New Jersey, state-wide police and fi re 
employment in Louisiana, all city employment in the City of Memphis, and 
the State Police in Virginia and North Carolina. In 1988, he transferred to the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division and managed the Environmental 
Enforcement Section fi eld offi ce in San Francisco. He has been in private 
practice since 1995 and has specialized in environmental law.
Vivian B. Toler served in the ELS from 1971 until her retirement in 2007. 
For the vast majority of that time, she was the supervisor of a staff of paralegal 
specialists, formerly called Research Analysts. Ms. Toler either personally 
worked or supervised the work of her staff on every investigation or case handled 
by the Employment Section. The matters she worked on include the Las Vegas 
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gaming industry (which had no African American dealers), the motion picture 
industry (discrimination against African Americans in “behind the camera” 
jobs), and several cases against nationwide trucking companies (discrimination 
against African American applicants for desirable “over the road” jobs). She 
also provided important research support to the government’s defense of 
federal affi rmative action programs. Her responsibilities included analyzing 
applicant fi les; identifying the race of job applicants; interviewing witnesses; 
preparing statistical analysis to include standard deviations and correlation 
coeffi cients; preparing back pay calculations, which were used for settlement 
discussions or court proceedings; preparing trial exhibits; and testifying.
     ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE 
 William Yeomans joined the American University, Washington College of 
Law faculty in 2009. From 2006 until 2009, he served as Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy’s Chief Counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee. He has also been 
Legal Director of the Alliance for Justice and the fi rst Director of Programs for 
the American Constitution Society, where he spearheaded the launch of its two 
publications: the Harvard Law and Policy Review and Advance. Prior to that, 
he spent twenty-six years at the DOJ where he litigated and supervised civil 
rights cases in the federal courts involving voting rights, school desegregation, 
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, hate crimes, police 
misconduct, abortion clinic violence, and human traffi cking. He served as 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Staff, and acting Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights.
Robert Libman was born and raised in Chicago. He obtained his 
undergraduate degree from Stanford University in 1985, where he graduated 
with distinction and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Omicron Delta 
Epsilon (Economics) honor societies. He obtained his law degree from 
Stanford Law School in 1988, where he graduated Order of the Coif (top ten 
percent of his class).
From 1988 to 1990, Mr. Libman served as law clerk to the Honorable Joyce 
Hens Green of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Mr. Libman began his career in civil rights litigation as a plaintiff, bringing 
a constitutional challenge to the United States DOJ’s policy of suspicionless 
drug-testing of applicants for trial attorney positions in the Department’s Civil 
Rights Division in Libman v. Thornburg.
From 1991 until 2004, Mr. Libman held a variety of positions in the ELS of 
the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ where he litigated a wide variety of cases 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including claims of employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, national origin, and religion under both 
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Mr. Libman successfully 
tried a sex discrimination “failure to promote” case in United States v. Hancock 
Count Board of Education, No. 91-0149-W(S), 1993 WL 436490 (N.D. W. 
Va. Sept. 1, 1993); litigated and obtained a consent decree in the Civil Rights 
Division’s fi rst lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of sexual harassment by a 
public employer in United States v. McHenry County, 1994 WL 447419 (N.D. 
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Ill. 1994); litigated and obtained a consent decree resolving claims of systemic 
racial and sexual harassment in United States v. New Jersey Department of 
Corrections, 246 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001); and successfully argued the appeal 
in United States v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 
F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999), a case of fi rst impression interpreting the “consistent 
with business necessity” standard under the disparate impact provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Mr. Libman trained trial attorneys in the Civil Rights 
Division and the U.S. EEOC on trial advocacy and case management and 
spoke frequently on behalf of the DOJ at national conferences of employer, 
employee, and stakeholder organizations regarding Title VII. In 2002, he was 
selected by the Civil Rights Division to be its sole representative to the DOJ’s 
newly formed Employment Discrimination Task Force. Mr. Libman received 
numerous awards and commendations from the DOJ for his work as a Trial 
Attorney, Senior Trial Attorney, and Special Litigation Counsel in the ELS.
In 2004, Mr. Libman returned to Chicago to join the law fi rm of Miner, 
Barnhill & Galland, where he has been a partner since 2005 and has represented 
individual and class plaintiffs in a variety of civil rights and other public 
interest cases. He also represents and counsels individuals in negotiations over 
employment-related matters including employment contracts and severance 
agreements. Mr. Libman has served as co-counsel with the Mexican American 
Legal Defense & Education Fund’s  (“MALDEF”) Chicago offi ce in Vergara v. 
City of Waukegan, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2008) representing a group 
of Latino and African-American residents in their First Amendment claims 
against the City of Waukegan and its Mayor and Chief of Police by alleging 
interference with their rights to protest what they believe to be the Police 
Department’s racial profi ling and discriminatory enforcement of various City 
ordinances. Mr. Libman has spent a large portion of his time at Miner, Barnhill 
& Galland representing several States in civil enforcement actions against 
dozens of pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging pricing fraud in violation 
of state consumer protection, Medicaid fraud, and false claims statutes. He 
recently tried two such cases on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
secured judgments for damages and civil penalties in excess of $46 million.
Aaron D. Schuham  serves as Legislative Director for Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State, where he supervises legislative and policy 
activities with Congress and the Administration, and in all fi fty states. From 
1997 through 2003, Mr. Schuham served as a Trial Attorney, and later a Senior 
Trial Attorney, in the ELS of the Civil Rights Division. Mr. Schuham received 
his Sc.B. in Mathematics from Brown University and his J.D. from Stanford 
Law School. He served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Judith W. 
Rogers on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.
John M. Gadzichowski currently serves as the Chief of the ELS of the DOJ’s 
Civil Rights Division. Mr. Gadzichowski entered duty with the Department in 
July 1971 as an Attorney General’s Honors Program trial attorney appointee 
assigned to ELS, and he has been continuously assigned to ELS since then. Mr. 
Gadzichowski has extensive experience in the development and prosecution 
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of Title VII cases. Throughout his career in ELS, he has personally developed, 
tried, and supervised numerous Title VII pattern or practice cases. Mr. 
Gadzichowski received his J.D. from Marquette University School of Law in 
May 1971.
 Jocelyn Samuels has served as a Senior Counselor to the Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights at the DOJ. In that capacity, she oversees the work 
of the Employment Litigation and Educational Opportunities Sections of the 
Civil Rights Division and spearheads interagency policy projects related to 
combating discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity in education 
and employment. 
Prior to her tenure at the DOJ, Ms. Samuels was the Vice President for 
Education and Employment at the National Women’s Law Center in 
Washington, D.C., where she oversaw an active litigation docket and engaged 
in legislative and policy advocacy to promote enforcement of Title VII and 
Title IX. Her prior experience also includes work as a Labor Counsel to 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, then Ranking Member and subsequently Chair 
of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, and as a 
senior policy attorney at the EEOC. Ms. Samuels has additional experience 
in the private sector and as a law clerk to a federal judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Ms. Samuels received her law degree from Columbia University, 
where she was a Notes Editor of the Columbia Law Review, 
and her bachelor’s degree from Middlebury College, where she 
graduated magna cum laude and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. 
 Michael Selmi joined the George Washington University Law School 
faculty in 1996, after teaching at the University of North Carolina for two 
years. Previously, he litigated employment discrimination cases at the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the DOJ Civil Rights Division. 
He also served as a law clerk to Judge James R. Browning, then Chief Judge 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Professor Selmi teaches courses on 
employment law, employment discrimination, contracts, and civil rights 
legislation, and has also taught constitutional law. Professor Selmi has written 
extensively in the areas of employment discrimination, employment law, and 
constitutional law; his work often includes empirical analyses of litigation. 
He has co-authored casebooks involving employment law and civil rights. 
Professor Selmi worked on a number of Supreme Court cases, including the 
affi rmative action cases involving the University of Michigan. Professor Selmi 
recently served as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School and has been a 
commentator for the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, 
NPR, and MSNBC.
*  *  *
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
WELCOME REMARKS:
OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
 
 RICHARD UGELOW: My name is Richard Ugelow. I teach in the clinical 
program at the [Washington College of Law] (“WCL”). In my prior life, I 
was an attorney in the Employment Litigation Section (“ELS”) of the Civil 
Rights Division [at the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)]. Let me thank you all 
for coming today to celebrate and review forty-fi ve years of enforcement of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).1 
A special thank you to the Dean of the Law School, [Claudio] Grossman, who 
will be here later and to the [Program on Law & Government] who kindly 
sponsored today’s program.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment 
on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin.2  As originally enacted 
by Congress, judicial enforcement authority was the exclusive responsibility 
of the [DOJ]. Within the [DOJ], that authority was given to the Civil Rights 
Division and ultimately what became the Employment Section, the Federal 
Enforcement Section, and now today the [ELS]. 
Following the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which expanded the scope 
and coverage of Title VII, enforcement authority was divided between the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the [DOJ].3 The 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codifi ed as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2006). 
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
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EEOC was given enforcement authority against private sector employers and 
the [DOJ] responsibility against public sector employers. Today’s program is 
devoted to the [DOJ]’s enforcement of Title VII. 
In his recent State of the Union address, President Obama recognized the 
Civil Rights Division, and, in particular, he recognized the important work 
[performed by] the [ELS]. That work is indeed important and that’s what 
makes today’s program important as well. 
The [ELS] litigated seminal employment discrimination cases and has 
a distinguished record of achievement. Several of those cases will be 
discussed today by the people who worked on them. The work of the Section, 
unfortunately, [has become] controversial in recent years —and not just in the 
last eight years. Politically charged terms such as: “affi rmative action,” “hiring 
goals,” “hiring quotas,” “lowering qualifi cations for employment,” “racial 
preferences,” and the like became public and part of the public discourse. The 
speakers today will discuss those terms. And if they don’t, I hope the audience 
will ask questions about them.
Let me give you an overview of today’s program. The fi rst speaker will 
be my colleague, Susan Carle, who will provide an overview of Title VII. 
Professor Carle is also an alumnus of the Appellate Section of the Civil Rights 
Division. Following Professor Carle, Professor Vicki Schultz of Yale [Law 
School], and an alumna of the [ELS] will interview Dave Rose. Dave was 
the fi rst chief of the [ELS] and a mentor and teacher to many of us. Dave will 
discuss the origins of the [ELS] and the creation of a litigation strategy to the 
development of Title VII law. 
Following Professor Schultz’s interview of [Mr. Rose], the fi rst panel 
consisting of employment litigation attorneys that litigated the early Title 
VII cases will discuss those cases and their impact of desegregating jobs, 
industries, and unions in the United States. This panel will also discuss the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which recognized the 
disparate impact theory of Title VII liability.4 As we will see today, disparate 
impact litigation brought by the [DOJ] was the major vehicle for effecting 
workforce change. 
The second panel will discuss the uniform guidelines on employee selection 
procedures which were developed following the Griggs decision and the cases 
brought to enforce Title VII against state and local governments, particularly 
police and fi re departments. This panel includes former [ELS attorneys] and 
non-attorneys who were critical to the enforcement effort.
Finally, the last panel led by WCL Professor Bill Yeomans, also a Civil 
Rights Division alumnus and . . . my colleague here, will discuss the future of 
Title VII. This distinguished panel consists of former ELS attorneys including 
Aaron Schuham, Bob Liven, Professor Mike Selmi of George Washington 
University [Law School], and current ELS Chief John Gadzichowski. We are 
honored that Tom Perez, the current Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Rights Division will be our lunch time speaker. 
I also want to note the presence of Jim Turner. Jim was the career Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division for more than thirty 
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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years. He served as the acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights 
Division when the position of the Assistant Attorney General was vacant. [I] 
believe, in that capacity [he] served as the longest Assistant Attorney General 
in the Civil Rights Division. 
Finally, I want to recognize Loretta King, a WCL graduate, who succeeded 
Jim Turner as the career Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 
If she’s not here, she will be here later. I would like to mention two other 
[ELS] alumni, Ray Lohier, a recent alumnus of the Section, last week was 
recommended by Senator Schumer of New York to be nominated as a Judge 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Ray left ELS for 
the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in the Southern District of New York. And I might 
add that his wife is a clinical law professor at the City University of New York 
Law School. 
The second person is David Lopez. David is awaiting Senate confi rmation 
as General Counsel to the [EEOC]. He would’ve been here today had he been 
confi rmed. He promised me a future visit to the law school.
I am going to try to be a good moderator, just [and] fair as Dave Rose taught 
me. One of my goals is to leave time for questions at the end of each segment. 
Since I know everyone on the panels and I know that they are never at a loss 
for words, I face a stiff challenge, but I will do my best. So let’s begin with the 
history of Title VII with Professor Carle. Thank you very much. 
SUSAN CARLE: Thank you, Richard. Before I start I just wanted to take 
the opportunity today to say how lucky I feel we are at Washington College of 
Law that Richard has joined us here. I fi rst met him when I was a brand new 
lawyer in the Civil Rights Division longer ago than either of us wants to admit. 
And he was the Deputy Section Chief of the ELS and just a terrifi c person. He 
served as an informal mentor to a lot of junior people. Mike Selmi who will 
be here a little later was another contemporary of mine, and I think he would 
agree with me that Richard was a really inspiring role model in his fairness, 
and the care and precision that he put into his work. And so it’s just wonderful 
that we have him here now. 
So Richard asked me to discuss the legislative history of Title VII, I think 
particularly for the [benefi t of the] students in the audience. Some of this is not 
for people who are the old timers here. You would have a lot to teach me so I 
am really pitching this to students. And he wanted me to keep it brief and he 
gave me a very long list of questions he thought it was essential that I cover. 
So I will try to do both things. 
Title VII is, of course, part of a very important statute of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which had a number of titles addressing discrimination in a number of 
areas including public accommodations, education, federally funded programs, 
and employment. And as I was putting together my thoughts here I just could 
not help but [think] about the parallels between 1964 and the situation we face 
now with healthcare reform, which also, of course, is about a human rights 
issue and involves issues of race, class, gender, equality, and equity. So at the 
end of my remarks, I want to just very briefl y allude to those parallels. 
But fi rst, to take up Richard’s list of long questions, his fi rst question was: 
what led to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? And of course, the 
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Civil Rights Act—from my perspective—was very clearly the product of 
a social movement. A social movement that was very visible in the 1950’s 
leading to and then responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education and the outburst of direct action including nonviolent 
civil disobedience that came as a response to the lack of progress after Brown 
in dismantling Jim Crow’s segregation in all its forms.5 [T]hose facts are really 
imbedded in our national consciousness. But what’s not so deeply imbedded in 
historical memory is the fact that the Civil Rights movement has much, much 
longer roots, and since I write about that, I always want to focus on that. 
Title VII is really the result of activity and activism pushing for civil rights 
laws that extended all the way back into the nineteenth century. The fi rst 
statute to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and religion in private 
employment was the Ives-Quinn Act of 1945 in New York State.6  There were 
also efforts at the federal level in the ‘40s and ‘50s to use the President’s 
executive order power to enforce prohibitions on discrimination in businesses 
receiving federal contracts. And the fi rst of those executive orders was brought 
about in World War II as a result of the great labor leader A. Philip Randolph’s 
threat to President Roosevelt to call a massive march on Washington to protest 
discrimination in the defense industry while black soldiers were going off to 
fi ght and lose their lives in the war. 
In 1957, the Eisenhower administration attempted to pass a very weak, 
mild civil rights measure—but that attempt was defeated by the opposition 
of a coalition of southern conservative Democrats along with conservative 
Republicans. Then, of course, in the 1960 presidential race between Kennedy and 
Nixon, civil rights became an important campaign issue. Kennedy campaigned 
very hard for the African American vote by professing a strong commitment to 
passing civil rights legislation, but once in offi ce, he was criticized for seeming 
not to be in a particular hurry to prioritize civil rights legislation over the other 
reform legislation that he was pushing. And historians say that Kennedy was 
afraid that the coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans 
would defeat this measure and jeopardize the rest of his legislative agenda. 
But when the civil rights crisis in Birmingham, Alabama arose in the spring 
of 1963 where black demonstrators, including many high school students 
and even some elementary school children, were marching for civil rights in 
defi ance of a city ban and members of the police and fi re departments attacked 
the marchers with dogs and fi re hoses knocking people over, tearing off their 
clothes, and the TV images were broadcast around the country and around the 
world, Kennedy at that point realized that he really did need to go to Congress 
and get working on legislative action. 
[T]he legislative history of Title VII, which I take here mostly from a book 
called The Longest Debate by Charles and Barbara Whalen—which is a 
wonderful book; so my account may confl ict with others including people in 
this room who know more than I do about all of this.7 So the administration fi rst 
supported a bill that was introduced in the House by the chair of the Judiciary 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1955). 
6. N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 (McKinney 2002).
7. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985).
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Committee, Manny Celler, a liberal Jewish Democrat from New York City 
along with Bill McCulloch, a moderate Republican from a rural district in 
Ohio with a very small African American population but a strong abolitionist 
tradition. McCulloch believed in civil rights as a matter of principle. The 
administration had promised McCulloch and the moderate Republicans to 
support a very moderate bill. But Manny Celler’s strategy on the Judiciary 
Committee was to load the bill up with as many strengthening amendments 
as possible so that when the Republicans eventually extracted compromises to 
the bill on the fl oor it would still be a strong bill.
So his proposal copied the structure of the Ives-Quinn Act in New York State, 
and it created the EEOC as an agency like the National Labor Relations Board. 
It would have a prosecutorial arm and an adjudicatory arm with authority 
to issue cease and desist orders. So by the time the bill was reported out of 
committee, McCulloch and the moderate Republicans no longer supported it 
and Celler had put the Kennedy administration in the embarrassing position 
of being against the bill the civil rights community supported and trying in 
the background to broker an agreement that would keep the Republicans on 
board. But eventually the bill that was reported out and sent to the House 
Rules Committee was stronger than the initial administration bill. And, in the 
Rules Committee, it was promptly blocked by the conservative Republican, 
and former Judge, Howard Ward Smith of Virginia, who was the leader of the 
Conservative Coalition, an avid segregationist, and a powerhouse in Congress 
notorious for his ability to block all kinds of progressive legislation, so things 
did not look good at that point.
Then, in late 1963, the tragedy of President Kennedy’s assassination 
changed the dynamics in Congress, and Lyndon Johnson, [upon] assuming 
the presidency, used the memory of Kennedy and constructed an image of his 
legacy as a strong supporter of civil rights and began to call for moving the 
bill in honor of Kennedy’s memory and legacy. And Johnson, of course, had 
voted against the Civil Rights Bill in 1957 and was a segregationist himself at 
one point, but he had become convinced of the need for the bill. And being a 
brilliant legislative strategist, he put his authority behind [it and] push[ed] for 
it. [T]hrough procedural maneuvering the bill got to the House fl oor and at this 
point, Judge Smith, who was still seeking to defeat the bill, decided to offer 
an amendment including sex as one of the prohibited bases for discrimination. 
[W]hen he made this amendment he was literally met with laughter and 
guffaw from the fl oor as if this was a ridiculous idea. So you often hear people 
referring to the inclusion of sex in Title VII as a legislative accident.  
But [from another perspective] the idea was not so ridiculous. The Equal 
Pay Act8 had passed just the year before, and there was also a social movement 
perspective or story underlying the inclusion of sex in Title VII. It was supported 
by the fi ve congresswomen in the House; at that time both Republicans and 
Democrats, strongly supported by the National Women’s Party. And ironically 
enough, Manny Celler opposed the amendment because he was afraid it would 
lead to the defeat of his legislation. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (2006). The Equal Pay Act was enacted as an amendment 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
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So there are two ways of looking at this. One is the inside story, the cynical 
attempt to defeat the bill. And another is a social movement story—which is 
thinking about how the women’s rights movement seized on the opportunity to 
piggyback on the wave of support for civil rights to add their issue to the civil 
rights agenda as well. [I]n the end the bill passed the House overwhelmingly 
by a vote of 280 to 130 in a very strong bipartisan effort. But everyone knew 
the Senate was going to be a very different story and there, and this will sound 
familiar, the Democrats did not have a cloture proof supermajority—[at the] 
time that required sixty-seven votes. It’s been changed since then. And in the 
case of the Civil Rights Act, much more so than even the healthcare issue 
today, not all Democrats supported the bill. 
So the Senate Judiciary Committee had the bill for a long time, was ignoring 
it, and the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfi eld from Montana assigned the 
bill handling to the Democratic whip who was Hubert Humphrey, the Senator 
from Minnesota who had been fi ghting for strong civil rights legislation since 
1948 and had big political ambitions to stake himself out as a liberal Democrat 
who could get things done, and, of course, became Johnson’s vice president 
in 1965. And Humphrey was opposed by the Democratic opposition led by 
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia who directed the southern voting block. 
But Humphrey worked assiduously to get the votes and worked on cultivating 
the ego of the moderate Republican minority leader Everett Dirksen from 
Illinois and telling Dirksen that his help on this bill would be the source of his 
historical legacy. 
So together they avoided the bill going to the Judiciary Committee where it 
would have been sunk. And Dirksen, at the same time, was using his strategic 
position to negotiate for compromises to the bill. Then, of course, the Senate 
fi libuster began—and this was the longest fi libuster in the Senate’s history— 
[and] it lasted two and a half months [w]ith proceedings [that] continued well 
into the night. Our own alum Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia was one of 
the more notorious participants in the fi libuster, though I believe he later said 
he regretted his role in this. He gave fourteen hours of speeches on the Senate 
fl oor. [A]t the same time, Dirksen was trying to maneuver behind the scenes 
to change the bill, but Johnson was resisting him. And the public perception of 
what was going on in the Senate began to become more and more negative. So 
that public perception, the pressure from the public on the Senators engaging 
in the fi libuster, and the legislative handling skills by the bill supporters in the 
Senate eventually led to the votes for closure being there—seventy-one votes—
four more than needed, and, of course, this just got the bill up for discussion 
on the merits in the Senate. 
And at this point, two sets of compromises called the Dirksen-Mansfi eld 
Compromises in the form of a substitute bill modifi ed some aspects of the 
bill. And one of the things that the substitute amendments did was to give 
state and local governments more authority to enforce the bill to placate the 
Republican’s federalism concerns. But the most signifi cant compromise in the 
bill was to strip enforcement authority from the agency that was created under 
the statute, the EEOC, taking away its adjudicatory power, its power to issue 
cease and desist orders so that the EEOC only had authority to investigate 
and attempt to conciliate complaints, but had no litigation authority in the 
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courts, so that after the EEOC was done with its efforts the complainants were 
essentially on their own in terms of trying to seek enforcement of the bill’s 
provisions in court. [T]he only government litigation authority, of course, 
was granted to the Department of Justice in Section 707 of the Act and that 
power was limited to cases in which Justice detected a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.9 And as I’ve discussed in my course with my students, that’s 
why you see the early government-litigated cases against private employers as 
pattern or practice cases. 
[S]upporters [of the bill] also got some important things and one of them, 
I think, was the attorneys’ fees provision which allowed private litigants to 
get their attorney’s fees if they prevailed against a defendant in a case. So the 
passage of Title VII was a huge victory, but there were obviously signifi cant 
weaknesses in the legislation and the passage was by a very large margin, 
seventy-three to twenty-seven with forty-six Democrats in favor, twenty-one 
against, and twenty-seven Republicans in favor of the bill. Richard [has] already 
talked a little bit about the 1972 amendments. There were efforts to fi x some of 
the weaknesses in the bill that went on for some years unsuccessfully, and then 
in 1972 Congress was able to fi x Title VII. First of all by authorizing the EEOC, 
as well as individuals, to litigate in federal court and extending coverage of 
Title VII to the state and local employees and strengthening the coverage of 
federal employees. And, of course, as Richard has already mentioned, the 1972 
Act gave the DOJ the power to sue state and local employers for employment 
discrimination and it did a few other things as well that I won’t go into. 
But it occurs to me that when we look back on this [and compare it] to 
our situation today, we see how long it really took, and how inadequate or 
imperfect attempts and successes were, and how some of them, at least, were 
fi xed later—which I think are comforting thoughts when we think about our 
next big super statute initiative of today. But also there [are] really some 
signifi cant differences and those include the strong bipartisanship that was 
necessary to enact Title VII and the Civil Rights Act, the coalition building 
across the aisle, the idea of voting your conscience or voting on principle, and 
also the huge role of a President with enormous legislative experience and 
really tough, wily, hardball political skills. 
So when we look back at passage of Title VII forty-fi ve years ago from 
our current perspective and our concern about today’s legislative log jams, 
I think we can even better appreciate the importance, and the enormous 
accomplishment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and also the key need for having 
a working political system that allows us, as a country, to take . . . and make 
progress on pressing human rights issues. Thank you. 
RICHARD UGELOW: Thank you so much Susan. I wish I could take 
your course. It’s really a pleasure to welcome back Vicki Shultz to the law 
school. She was here about . . . two years ago, and [she] spoke at a faculty 
lunch on Friday and it was just wonderful. And she also, the next day, 
spoke at the fi ftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Division event held at 
another law school in town. Vicki is the Ford Foundation Professor of Law 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2006).
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at Yale University Law School. Her areas of expertise include employment 
discrimination, civil procedure, feminism in the law, and gender and 
work. I’m not going to read her list of publications because we’ll be here 
until tomorrow. Sitting next to her is Dave Rose. I mentioned Dave earlier 
in my remarks. Dave started in the Department of Justice in what year? 
 DAVE ROSE: 1956. 
RICHARD UGELOW: 1956 in the Civil Division of the Civil Rights 
Division. From 1969 to 1987 he was Chief of the ELS, and he’ll tell you how 
he got to that position. And at various points he was the Special Assistant to 
the Attorney General for Civil Rights. Some of the cases that Dave worked on 
include Griggs v. Duke Power which I mentioned and we’ll hear about, Local 
189, United Papermakers v. [United States],10 Contractors Ass’n [of] Eastern 
Pennsylvania,11 which involved the Philadelphia Plan,12—which I hope we’ll 
be able to touch upon —Albemarle Paper v. Moody,13 [EEOC] v. AT&T,14 and 
Bazemore v. Friday;15 and that’s only the beginning of the list for Dave. I’m 
going to turn this over to Vicki because you don’t want to hear me talk about 
Dave when Dave can talk about Dave much better than any of us can. So thank 
you very much. 
VICKI SCHULTZ: Thank you so much, Richard. I can’t tell you how 
honored I feel to be here. It’s one of the great honors of my life to be able to 
interview Dave Rose today—one of my greatest mentors and someone whose 
belief in me as a young person has really stuck with me and empowered me 
throughout my life. So with that, let’s start with your transition over from the 
Civil Division. You were recruited to work in the Civil Rights Division in 
1967 by John Doar, and hired as the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, 
then Ramsey Clark, and charged with coordinating the efforts of the federal 
agencies under Title VI. You did a lot of really important employment cases 
during that period, and I would just love to hear you talk about one or more 
of them. 
DAVE ROSE: I [was initially recruited] by Bob Bowen who [was] 
a contemporary of mine but died a number of years ago. [He was] a very 
10. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 1971).
12. See Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), as amended 
by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), reprinted 
as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (2006) (“[Government] contractor[s] will take 
affi rmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated 
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”); 
see also Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 442 F.2d at 163 (observing that the “Philadelphia 
Plan” was the Secretary of Labor’s implementation of Executive Order No. 11246 & 11375 
as to the fi ve-county Philadelphia area). 
13.  422 U.S. 405 (1975).
14. 36 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
15. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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important person in the Civil Rights Division and the person who recommended 
to John Doar that I be selected for some position. He tried once a couple of 
years before [1967], maybe in [1966], I’m not sure, the second time there was 
a position and it was a super grade. I had been a GS-15 at the advanced age 
of 34 or something like that. I had been in the Appellate Section for several 
years and argued a number of cases and those cases led to a case involving 
mandamus and that led to the Labor Department coming to Justice and asking 
us to represent them in contractor cases involving [the Offi ce of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs]— the executive order program. 
In any event, I got selected. I was told my job description was Title VI, 
which most of you know does not involve employment matters and expressly 
disclaims coverage of employment matters although the ultimate interpretation 
[of the] law sort of contradicts that. But whatever it was, Title VI was not 
employment. But there were two agendas for the Civil Rights Division. The 
stated objective was the coordination provision, but John Doar had told me 
that what he really wanted to do was to bring some employment cases. So I 
did both, even though that wasn’t the job description, and I had a very small 
group of two lawyers working for me when I was a coordinator—and Dave 
Martin was [t]here. He is here and was one of the two. In any event, I did a 
lot of different things, and I did do a number of Title VI [cases] but I also 
got involved with the Papermakers case because that involved the threatened 
strike by the white union against Crown Zellerbach in Bogalusa, Louisiana. 
And I had worked defending the decision of the Labor Department which 
Crown Zellerbach had tried to overturn so I was the logical person to deal with 
the threatened strike. And the long and short of it was one of the most exciting 
days I had in my career. 
There was a threatened strike. We talked about fi ling before the fi rst day of 
business in January because that was when the threatened strike was. I drafted 
the complaint. I showed it to John Doar. I brought it upstairs, and I forget who 
signed it, but I brought it upstairs and got Ramsey Clark to sign it, got on the 
airplane and fl ew to New Orleans. [W]e had called and told the Judge we were 
coming, and he said he wanted to see us [and] we notifi ed the Papermakers’ 
lawyer who was also from Washington. We met with him that evening and 
talked about the case. We had the argument the next day. Judge Heebe was 
not known for making quick decisions, but he was confronted with it and as 
he was about to sign the order, the [Temporary Restraining Order] (“TRO”), 
he said, “I’ve never enjoined the union before,” and I said something like, 
“Well you’ve never had a strike that was based on preservation of segregation 
in violation of Title VII before either” and he said, “I guess that’s right.” He 
signed it and we got it entered. Getting the TRO was the whole thing. We 
had a formal trial, I think, a couple of months later that lasted a day or two. 
We got a preliminary injunction and ultimately a permanent injunction and 
that case advocated the disparate impact theory partly because the employer 
wanted to do the right thing and partly because it was the logical thing to 
do. And no I didn’t invent the disparate impact theory. It was the [Harvard] 
Law Review article by Cooper and Sobol, I believe, a year or two before, 
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that laid it out, and we lawyers heard at least about the law review articles.16 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: [That’s] comforting.  
 DAVE ROSE: And I had fi gured out what the theory was by the 
time I got the job. So anyhow, that one worked very well, [and it was] 
very exciting, . . . because I was doing the Executive Order stuff [and] 
it was a bridge to Title VII, but it was a case that did both a Title VI-like 
contract and the purposes of Title VII, but we fi led it under Title VII. 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Okay, so Mr. Doar wanted you to focus on employment 
and [then] the Division fi les six employment suits in 1967, twenty-six 
more in 1968, and establishes very important precedents like Local 189 of 
the United Paper Workers and Local 53 v. Vogler17 and there are a couple 
of other really important cases that establish the disparate impact principle. 
And you say in your Vanderbilt Law Review article18— which I recommend 
if you haven’t read it—these cases are very important in establishing 
this principle by the time Griggs v. Duke Power goes up to the Supreme 
Court. So I wanted you to talk a little bit about that and talk about your 
involvement and the Division’s involvement in Griggs v. Duke Power. 
 DAVE ROSE: What I remember about the Griggs case was that Dennis 
Gordon and Frank Petramalo—Frank is here, I don’t know if Dennis is here 
or not—had written a memo to me when the Court of Appeals decision came 
down, or they visited me and said the government ought to be supporting the 
petition. And I said, “[w]ell write something” and that was my normal reaction. 
So they did, and I liked it, and it made sense, and so I talked to Jerry Leonard, 
and I gave him the memo. Jerry Leonard, the Assistant Attorney General, was, 
on the whole, a very good boss because he tended to look at your work and try 
to make a decision on it and do it promptly in contrast to a number of other 
Assistant Attorney Generals that we’ve had. So I gave him the paper and I 
didn’t hear anything. I may have asked him about it once or twice, but he 
didn’t tell me anything. 
So, it sat there on his desk or some place and nothing happened until April, 
or something like that, [and] the Supreme Court issued an order requesting 
participation of the government. And so we had the petition ready, Jerry took 
it out, looked at it, we talked about it for a few minutes, he signed it, brought 
it up to the Solicitor General’s Offi ce, and we sued. 
VICKI SCHULZ: I’m going to switch to affi rmative action now. So 
affi rmative action has a long history and it begins with a series of federal 
16. George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment 
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1598 (1969).
17. Local 53, Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. David Rose, Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1989).
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executive orders which leads to President Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order 
10,925, the precursor to 11,246, commanding federal contractors to take 
affi rmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities. 19 
So the executive order is given teeth and tested by the Philadelphia 
Plan. So, I think you were still Special Assistant [to the Attorney 
General] then. Could you tell us about your involvement?  
 DAVE ROSE: I’m not sure. No, I think I was the Chief of the Section 
although if you read the case you can’t [tell]; I’ve re-read it recently and I had 
a title that was not Section Chief, although I’m sure I was. I became Section 
Chief in September [1969] when Jerry Leonard and Dave Norman decided 
that we should have functional sections rather than geographical ones. So I 
was clearly the Section Chief. I’m not sure how that title got appended to the 
decision, but I did argue it. 
In any event, we had some fans in the Labor Department by then because of 
the Papermakers case, and I believe the Solicitor of Labor invited us to defend 
them again, and we did. It wasn’t a particularly diffi cult case to win. I believe 
that Judge Higginbotham in the District Court was the only African American 
judge and a very smart man. And drawing him was either very great good 
fortune or somebody was pulling some wires, but I believe it was just luck. 
In any event we had him. I was delighted to see him. He had us in chambers 
and he had no problems with the plan and the contractors appealed of course. 
That was not a diffi cult piece of litigation but was important because there 
was a series of other regional affi rmative actions plans like the Philadelphia 
Plan that helped a little bit to desegregate those unions. They remained 
very strong, and very resistant, and primarily white. And I really have not 
looked at any demographics for those unions in recent years so I don’t really 
know how much good we did but we tried and got some good law in.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: And was the Third Circuit precedent that upheld the 
Philadelphia Plan important to the Section in later being able to incorporate 
goals and time tables into the relief?
DAVE ROSE: Yes. It gave me enough intestinal fortitude to use goals and it made 
it hard for anybody to say no because we’d publicly taken that position. Thank you, 
that’s a very important transition. I had been very, very careful about pushing that 
envelope too far, and maybe I was overly conservative in that regard.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: So in [1969] you become Chief of the Section, which 
is now reorganized into the functional reorganization.  And the next fi ve or six 
years [after this reorganization] are an extraordinarily productive time in which 
the Section successfully prosecutes path-breaking pattern or practice cases 
against several major industries including trucking and the steel industries. 
Could you tell us a little bit about the trucking lawsuits and how this early 
industry-wide litigation infl uenced the climate of enforcement for Title VII? 
19. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
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DAVE ROSE: The fi rst trucking case I had was Roadway Express,20 and 
I learned there that there were city drivers and over-the-road drivers and, in 
some parts of the south, the city drivers were black and the over-the-road 
drivers were white. But in some parts of the south, where the pay was very 
good, the whites had both jobs. Places like Memphis had a number of black 
drivers but almost all of them had been hired before ‘57 or ’58; so they were 
sort of merged into seniority lists. In any event, Roadway was a suit we tried to 
get—and did get—a preliminary injunction in Cleveland. We prevailed in the 
lawsuit. The numbers were thousands and thousands of white drivers and zero 
or, almost zero, black over-the-road drivers. One didn’t have to be a whiz at 
math to fi gure out what was going on. And it was somewhat akin to the voting 
cases. I mean it was an unspoken rule, but it was almost universally followed 
by the interstate carriers. So we had one trucking case. We could’ve had as 
many trucking cases as we did, and we brought several, and then we decided 
to [go] amass [the] rest of the major companies in one suit. 
Bob Moore, who is not here, was doing the steel industry and had the case 
against U.S. Steel,21 and he had, I think, proposed doing it, and that was a 
much smaller number of employers, a handful of steel makers —the national 
case—and I think I took his idea, but I’m not positive of that. So those are the 
only national cases that we had. The law had been changed and we retained 
authority to bring new suits through ‘74 under the ‘72 Act, but we were being 
put out of the private sector business. And that was disappointing for me; and 
Vicky and I think that was at least, in part, a mistake. But I do think it would’ve 
been a bit much to have [DOJ] do all of the pattern [or] practice cases, but I 
don’t think it was necessarily bad that EEOC could do it, but I think it was a 
mistake to put us, the Justice Department, out of business in that area. 
Clarence Mitchell was the long-time sponsor of the Civil Rights Act and a 
very great man, but he had worked for the War Labor Relations Board during 
World War II, I believe, and therefore, his model [was] the NLRB and [a 
policy of] administrative review. So what we got in Title VII, [as] previously 
explained, was a dual system—a sort of mixture. 
VICKI SCHULTZ: So I’m going to skip over some really important cases 
against police and fi re departments and state agencies because I know that’s 
going to be the subject of a panel later this afternoon. And I would like to 
skip to, I think, the late ‘70s. Now, when I joined the Section, which was 
in 1983, I would hear Section lawyers say that at some point prior to that 
time, Section lawyers had “rolled like Sherman through the suburbs.” So, 
I was just wondering if you could tell us about how the emphasis on suing 
suburban government employers such as the Chicago and Detroit suburbs 
or even the St. Louis or Houston suburban school districts developed, and 
whether you think the Section’s suburban initiative was successful? 
 
20. United States v. Roadway Exp., Inc. 457 F.2d. 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
21. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
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 DAVE ROSE: Well, let’s start with the word Cicero, and not the person, but 
the town that is adjacent to Chicago and you have the answer. 22 Cicero had 
a resident requirement and Cicero kept out black residents. So you had to be 
a resident to be a municipal worker and no black residents allowed means no 
black employees. Anyhow, I was asked about the Cicero case by somebody who 
brought the housing case, Sandy Ross, and I saw him in the hall one day and he 
said, “Dave, I got a question for you” and I sa[id], “What?” He said, “What do you 
think about having a Title VII count against Cicero?” And I said, “I think that’s 
a good idea.” Bill Yeomans is here. I think he worked on the Cicero case, and he 
argued once, I remember once to my annoyance, (laughter) not because it was 
you but because I wasn’t given the assignment in the Court of Appeals.  
 BILL YEOMANS: As I recall, you came along. 
 DAVE ROSE: I did. (chuckles) I felt much better after you spoke than I did 
before.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Tell us what those cases were about for people who 
may not know? 
 DAVE ROSE: Cicero is the exemplar [because] you’ve got one side of the 
street [that] is Cicero and the other side of the street [that] is Chicago. And 
the side that’s Chicago is black and everything, I guess, [that’s] to the east is 
white. So we learned quickly after the Cicero case that there were a heck of 
a lot of other towns that had adopted residency requirements in the ‘50s or 
the early ‘60s and they were all around Chicago. All of Cicero’s neighbors 
had—all of them is a little bit strong, but most of them had—adopted the same 
rule and the closest thing to Cicero in the Cleveland area is Parma, Ohio, also 
a city in Sicily.23 So we went there and we found them springing up all over 
the place so we had a whole group of cases in Illinois, not as many in Ohio, 
and one in East Haven—near New Haven, I believe.24 So, those cases were 
almost cookie cutters; they didn’t involve a lot of intellectual resources but 
persistence, because the mayors were willing to settle those cases because they 
did not want to lose the next election. 
So when I left the Justice Department, there were a whole bunch of cities that 
hadn’t been sued by [the DOJ] and so the Rose Law Firm and ultimately Rose 
& Rose brought a bunch of those. And I have one going right now. There’s 
[a case] called NAACP v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue which has 
hired one black fi re fi ghter out of about 300, and that person was hired because 
we had brought a suit against North Bergen and he was hired as part of the 
settlement of the suit against North Bergen.25 And I think the legal [counsel] 
was the Justice Department. 
22. United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331 (1986).
23. NAACP v. City of Parma, 616 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1981).
24. NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 998 F. Supp. 176 (D. Conn. 1998).
25. 707 F. Supp. 2d 520 (D.N.J. 2010).
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VICKI SCHULTZ: Wow. Okay. There’s so much I’d love to ask you 
but we don’t have all day so I’ll try to skip ahead here, sadly. [S]o skipping 
to the early 1980s, Assistant Attorney General Brad Reynolds argues for 
and seizes on passage of dictum in the Stotts26 case to support the idea that 
Section 706(g) of Title VII prohibits the award of any race-conscious relief 
to anyone who’s not proven to be an individual victim of discrimination.27 
[T]hen relying on this misreading of Stotts, the Section takes the position—
or Mr. Reynolds does—that the government’s fi fty-one consent decrees are 
contrary to Title VII. So, looking back on it in hindsight, did the Reagan 
administration represent a turning point in the Division’s history, one that set 
it on a road to a future, which is now our present, in which time honored 
understandings of civil rights have been undermined in your view?  
 DAVE ROSE: Well, I think it was an effort in that direction. I don’t think 
it had that result. We remember Chuck Cooper, and Mike Carten, and Brad 
Reynolds had no notions of that kind when he came in and for the fi rst couple 
of years w[ere] bringing the same kinds of suits that we always brought. But 
in the later part of the Reagan years—I call them zealots but that’s a little 
derogatory—but people who had very strong views on that began to become 
important people in [DOJ], and Cooper was Brad’s fi rst assistant and then 
became an Assistant Attorney General himself. A very smart guy, a very 
ambitious guy, but his views and mine were not the same. 
So the late ‘80s was when I left and the two or three years before that the job 
had become very uncomfortable for me. I’d had thirty years of service. I stayed 
about a year and a half longer to see some of the suburban litigation programs 
through. That reading of Title [VII] is not correct and was not; I don’t think it 
has become law.
VICKI SCHULTZ: No, it’s repudiated by 
the Supreme Court in the [Local 28] case.28  
 DAVE ROSE: Right. Doug Heron [is] here, and I’m very happy to see him. 
And we talk from time to time, and I believe you’re going to be hearing from 
him in the near future and I’ve got to talk about the case with Frank Johnson 
against the State of Alabama. I did that case before the ‘72 amendments became 
effective.29 And we had a unique theory which I think was mine but I’m not 
sure. Anyhow there was a provision attached to the receipt of federal funds 
from [the Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare] which required all 
the government programs to be nondiscriminatory. And, of course, Alabama 
had not signed that contract, or they may have signed it but they didn’t enforce 
it. So we brought a case based on that theory. The passage of the ‘72 Act was 
imminent, so it wasn’t a secret to Frank Johnson, but he took our complaint 
26.  Firefi ghters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (2006).
28. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codifi ed as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(e-17)).
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and acted on it before the enactment of the ‘72 Act and that was 
another sort of exciting day to fl y down to Montgomery and fi le 
a case. But he was delighted to see a representative of [DOJ] there.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Wonderful. Okay, so I’m going to turn to a few sort of 
broader questions about the work of the Section now. One thing that I read in 
Brian Landsberg’s excellent book Enforcing Civil Rights30 is that John Doar 
began training Civil Rights Division lawyers in what he called the immersion 
method, in which lawyers were expected to know everything there is to know 
about federal law, all the precedents, all the local customs, and especially 
all the facts digging very deep as we conducted our own investigations. 
And it seemed to me that you were training lawyers in this same method 
when I joined the Section many, many years ago. So I wanted to ask if you 
self-consciously set out to train lawyers in the Section in that way? 
 DAVE ROSE: Well, I did because what John Doar was doing and what the 
Civil Rights Division was doing was really almost unheard of for lawyers. We, 
John fi rst, but I fi gured out what the Division did, and I thought it was exactly 
the right thing to do. So yes, we tried to train because there’s no better way to 
fi nd the facts than to talk to the people who are harmed, many of whom were 
afraid to act by themselves, and talk to the employer also if you can to get both 
sides and get the information you need to decide whether you’ve got a lawsuit. 
That’s very extraordinary. That’s a lesson, I believe, that our friends at EEOC 
had not learned. I’m not saying none of them had learned it, but that, I think, 
is one of the strengths of the Division and certainly it was one of the strengths 
of the Employment Section. Richard’s getting very uncomfortable. 
RICHARD UGELOW: Okay, Vicki has one more question. 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: All right, since I only have one more it’s hard to choose, 
but as a workplace the Section was, for me, hands down the best place I’ve ever 
worked. Things weren’t always perfect all the time, but we were reasonably 
well integrated along race, sex, age lines. We had wonderful leadership in 
which lawyers got the help they needed but also had some autonomy, and we 
had an amazing esprit de corps where everyone worked hard but also played 
hard together. So, I guess, it seems to me that the Section was a model of 
the kind of equality that we wanted other employers to create. And I think 
probably everyone here would be interested in knowing how you created such 
a wonderful, welcoming, and model workplace? 
DAVE ROSE: Well, I don’t think I created it. I think the people who came 
to work for us were an exceptional group. We had an embarrassment of riches 
in terms of able people willing to work hard and doing something important. 
And probably the easiest time was the fi rst fi ve or ten years; easiest not 
physically or mentally, but easiest to do. But once the attitude was established, 
30. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997).
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I think it is somewhat self-perpetuating because when a new lawyer came in 
I’d typically send him or her off with an experienced lawyer to work on an 
investigation, or something of that kind, and to see and experience what we 
were doing. And so I didn’t create it. We were fortunate to have a time when a 
lot of intelligent people wanted some change made. The change is slow—very, 
very slow; embarrassing[ly] slow; was and is. There was dramatic change and 
things are [continuing to change]—I never thought I’d see a black president in 
my lifetime. I’ve got to say, not due to us, that the fact that we’ve had it shows 
that a lot of progress has been made, but some of the traditions are very, very 
fi rmly in place and very hard to detect and overcome. So I don’t think the 
battle’s won by any means, but I think that what the Section did was something 
we all can be very proud of. 
END TRANSCRIPT
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
ELS ENFORCEMENT 1965–1974
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RICHARD UGELOW: We have a great panel to discuss the early cases 
brought by the Section, and Dave’s interview is a nice segue to this panel. I will 
introduce the moderator, who is Joel Contreras, [w]ho will then introduce the 
panel. And I would like two things: one, everybody should use the microphone; 
and two, we will try to leave a few minutes for questions at the end, okay?
[Joel] has a distinguished record in employment discrimination litigation, 
and today he is an administrative law judge with the State of California, so Joel? 
 JOEL CONTRERAS: I would like to begin by pointing out that when 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 he 
had present with him people that had worked long years and he gave out pens: 
Clarence Mitchell; Whitney Young; Roy Wilkins; Ed Randolph, who headed 
the Porters—Pullman Porters—for many, many years; and Martin Luther 
King, Jr. 
In his remarks, [President Johnson] specifi cally stated, “It provides for the 
national authority to step in when others cannot or will not do the job. . . . [W]e 
have come now for a time of testing. We must not fail. Let us close the springs 
of racial poison.”2 
He did not know—and we did not know at that time—how long this 
time of testing would endure. That time of testing during these early years, 
litigation of Title VII, continues. What we realize now is that there is an 
ebb and a fl ow to it. When the opportunity presents itself, you have to seize 
that opportunity and make [the] most use of the resources and the time 
afforded; that time came to us in the early years—1965 to 1974.  In one other 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codifi ed as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
843–44 (Jul. 2, 1964). 
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footnote I would like to mention, since I am from California, at this point 
was in the vote on cloture, there was a fi rst-term Senator from California, 
Clair Engle. Unfortunately, Senator Engle had suffered brain cancer 
and had surgery in April of 1964. He was unable to speak, but he was present 
in the Senate chamber for the vote on cloture. When his name was called, he 
made a gesture which was recorded as “aye,” and his “aye” vote was part of 
historic vote for cloture. So we remember him, among others, who are able to 
step forward and provide these opportunities. 
Starting our panel discussion this morning is Frank Petramalo, Jr., a 
1969 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center. He now represents 
approximately 1,800 thoroughbred horse owners and trainers who race at 
Colonial Downs in New Kent, Virginia. Should you need that assistance to 
recoup your retirement losses, Frank is available for consultation.  
 FRANK PETRAMALO: Let me start by saying I have several horses 
that are for sale if anybody would like to see afterwards. But I would like to 
talk about the fi rst fi ve years’ worth of litigation by the Employment Section; 
probably from [19]65 to 1970. It was not technically the Employment Section 
until the later part of [19]69. 
But in the fi rst fi ve years, the [Department of Justice] (“DOJ”) brought 
a number of lawsuits against building trades unions.3 And by building 
trades unions I mean the electrical workers, plumbers, sheet metal workers, 
ironworkers, et cetera, who work on large commercial structures, not homes. 
[F]or example, building a law school like this would include operating 
engineers, ironworkers putting up the structural steel, the plumbers and sheet 
metal people putting in the air conditioning and the water, and of course the 
electricians. 
Now, the government looked at those unions as targets for a couple reasons; 
one, in those days, [19]65 to [19]70, the urban areas in the country were highly 
organized by unions and had large minority populations, and the jobs in the 
unionized construction sector were very high paying. 
Now, the other factor is the inexorable zero. Those construction unions 
were virtually all white. Dave mentioned the Philadelphia Plan.4 In the City of 
Philadelphia, and the area around it, about thirty percent of that population was 
black. Only one percent of the membership in about fi ve or six unions that did 
all the work on construction were black, so that was what it looked like in the 
period from [19]65 to [19]70. 
So the [DOJ] brought suits against isolated local unions in various cities like 
New York and in the Midwest—Indianapolis, Cincinnati, St. Louis, East St. 
3. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 36, 280 
F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968), rev’d, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 189, United 
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int’l 
Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
4.  See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163–64 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (explaining that the Philadelphia plan was introduced to force the ironworkers, 
plumbers, pipefi tters, steamfi tters, sheet metal workers, electrical workers, and elevator 
construction workers to abide by the Department of Labor’s affi rmative action mandate).
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Louis—and even in places that you would not expect, like Las Vegas, which 
had a small minority population.5 But it soon evolved into taking a more broad-
based approach rather than suing an odd union here or there.
So what we did was [to] start moving city by city to attack all of the 
building trades in a particular city; one of the fi rst ones that we undertook 
was in Seattle. Seattle at that time had a population [that was] about seven or 
eight percent black, and this kind of explains a little also as to how the [DOJ] 
often got into suits. In Seattle, there were a number of large public projects 
underway, including a hospital and a community college, and I think maybe 
even the predecessor of the current football stadium out there, the Kingdome, 
or whatever it was called. 
Anyway, a number of community organizations picketed those jobsites 
because there were no minorities working on the jobsites, and it got rather 
heated and there were arrests and injunctions and things of that sort. So the 
chief federal judge out there, William Lindberg, called up the Attorney General 
and said, “Do something about this.” Well, the doing something about it was 
fi ve lawyers from the Employment Section going out to Seattle to fi le suit.6 
And we eventually sued fi ve local unions out there: [the] ironworkers, sheet 
metal workers, plumbers, electricians, and operating engineers, who among 
them had 6,000 members. [A]nd of that 6,000 membership there were only 
three black members. 
We then went on to replicate that same pattern in other cities like New 
Orleans and East St. Louis.7 [L]ater on, we even spread out statewide. We 
brought suit against all of the ironworker locals in the state of California.8 And 
then we brought suit against an operating engineers’ union that cut across three 
states: California, Nevada, and Utah. 
And it is important to understand why we were suing the unions. Normally 
you think what has a union got to do with anything? All they do is sit there 
and negotiate on behalf of the employees for wages and terms of conditions. 
Well, that is not really the limit that unions have in the building trades industry, 
because, in the building trades industries, the unions really functioned more 
as an employer in the following respect: employment in the industry is 
transitory; workers go from job to job. [After] they build American University 
[Washington College] of Law, then they go downtown and put up a government 
building, et cetera, and you have the workforce constantly changing and you 
have probably dozens and dozens of contractors involved in the process. Well, 
to simplify things, what happened in the industry is all of the contractors got 
together in an association and they bargained with a union; for example, let us 
take the electrical workers. And they set up a collective bargaining agreement 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Local Union No. 212, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 
Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); Unites States v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 
Local Union No. 520, 476 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1973).
6. United States v. Local No. 86, Int’l Ass’n of Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202 
(W.D. Wash. 1970), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 554 
(9th Cir. 1971).
7. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Union, Local Union No. 36, 280 F. 
Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968), rev’d, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 53, 407 F.2d 1047.
8.  United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (1971). 
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that provides that the union will supply the workers; it is called an exclusive 
hiring hall. So if you need an electrician, you do not go and advertise in the 
newspaper if you are an electrical contractor, you call the union, and the union 
sends out its members. 
So our reason for attacking the unions initially was because they really 
control the employment. And probably, through the years, the pattern has 
been lessened somewhat because there is more and more competition from 
non-union segments. So where you had a city like Washington, D.C., which 
probably in the [19]60’s and [19]70’s was ninety percent union, at least in 
terms of construction, today it is probably forty percent union, but at that time 
it was very important. 
Now, we had to go about proving discrimination under Title VII. We had to 
prove a pattern or practice, and we always ran up against the initial argument 
from the defendant unions that this was not a pattern or practice. So we had 
some interesting cases early on that defi ned what a pattern and practice was; 
that it is something that was usual, pervasive, and not an isolated incident. 
Now, in proving the pattern and practice, we kind of followed the [theory of] 
we win with our witnesses and the defendants’ records, and this is part of what 
Dave had alluded to earlier. From early on in the Division, it was drummed 
into us that it was important to know all of the facts, and that meant if you had 
a thousand pages of union records you read the thousand pages and knew what 
was in them. But our proof really broke up into probably about four different 
areas; the fi rst thing was the statistics. I mean it did not take a rocket scientist 
to convince a court that it was meaningful to look at a minority population of 
thirty percent and compare it to building industry unions that had zero percent 
minorities in it. But again, we had to litigate this issue in terms of whether or 
not statistics had any probative value, and, of course, they did. 
But the next thing that we did in putting together a case was look for 
witnesses. Now, this was not always easy for a number of reasons. These 
unions were well known in the communities, and they had discriminatory 
reputations, so it was not unusual to run into very few minority electricians or 
plumbers who [didn’t have] anything to do with any of these unions because 
they knew it was a waste of time to go there. 
But we always did manage to fi nd individuals who themselves had 
experienced discrimination, and we went about doing this in a number of
 . . . interesting ways. First of all, we of course had complaints, either through 
organizations like the NAACP or the Urban League; even [the] EEOC would 
refer complaints of individuals to us, but that was just the starting point. We 
would [also] comb through [the] unions’ records to look for indications that 
blacks or Hispanics had sought union membership, and it was not always easy 
identifying who was a minority. 
I remember taking a deposition of the business agent in Seattle and I asked 
him whether Joe Albertosi was black because the businessman claimed he 
was. And he said, “Well, you know, he is either black or Italian; I can’t tell 
the difference.” Yes, that is true. That is true. Turns out he was one of my 
tribesmen; he was Italian. 
But in any event, we also used to look for other ways to defi ne people who 
had contacts with these unions. For example, in Los Angeles, when we sued 
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ironworker locals there, ironworker locals used certifi ed welders. In order to 
be certifi ed, you have to be licensed by the city. So we went down to city hall, 
pulled all the licenses, and lo and behold they have a picture on them. So you 
go through a thousand licenses, you come up with 100 black applicants or 
black licensees. And then we had the luxury of sending out the FBI to talk to 
these 100 people to see whether or not they had ever had any contact with the 
ironworkers local and then we would follow up. 
But the bottom line is we were always looking for live victims of 
discrimination to give some context to the all-white statistics. And then 
we would couple that with the records of the union, which were absolutely 
invaluable and gave all trial lawyers their thrill. Because [when] we have 
always put on a black witness, he would say, “Well, I went down to the union 
and ask to be referred out to work and they told me there was no work,” and 
we put on a string of people like that. “Or they told me the membership rolls 
were closed and I could not join.” And lo and behold, the business agent from 
the union would take the stands and, “Yup, we did not have any work, the 
books were closed.” But, by gosh, you pull out their records, and the fun of 
being a trial lawyer is when you catch somebody in a lie. And you pull out their 
records, and bingo, when they were not taking any applicants, just turns out 
there w[ere] twenty-fi ve whites who were accepted into membership. 
There was one case I [will] never forget. The business agent was swearing 
up and down that there was no work in Seattle and he could not fi nd new jobs 
for electricians. At the same time, we had him telling his local union, which 
was refl ected in the minutes, that they were in tough shape because they did 
not have enough workers to supply the employers’ needs for electricians, so I 
mean, that is what we went through in terms of proving a case. 
And the last thing that we always threw in there was the evidence about the 
reputation of the unions in the community, and you say, “Hmm, what’s that?” 
That and a dollar will get you a cup of coffee at Starbucks. Well, it was very 
helpful, because there were times when we had few live witnesses, and we 
would have to explain why it was not unusual for minorities to have nothing 
to do with these unions, and that was because it was well known that you were 
wasting your time. So we would bring in community people and they would 
testify that this was what the reputation was. 
But during the course of all this litigation, this initial stuff in the fi rst fi ve 
years, we had a number of interesting legal issues: Whether or not evidence 
of pre-Act discrimination—that is discrimination occurring before July of 
1965—was admissible, and also what types of statistics were admissible, and I 
had said before what constitutes a pattern or practice. All very interesting, not 
particularly diffi cult to win; but the other side would always argue vigorously 
that all we had here was perhaps an isolated incident of discrimination. 
But the real challenge in the litigation came not so much from proving 
discrimination, but rather from remedying discrimination. It was quite easy 
when you had individual victims who were denied work referral or denied 
membership. Fine, the court orders that they be given membership or be given 
work referral, and in some cases even be given back pay—although that was 
another legal issue as to whether or not the Attorney General was authorized 
to seek back pay. 
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But the real problem with the relief went to systemic relief. Once you get 
beyond the specifi c discriminates, the issue is what do you do going forward 
with respect to the operations of these building trades unions?  Early on, some 
of the early cases that were decided simply said, “Well, do not discriminate, 
and publicize that you do not discriminate, and make efforts to recruit minority 
members or minority individuals who want to take part in training programs.” 
But not surprisingly, that did not yield much of a change; you still had all white 
unions. 
So what we did was seize upon the notion set forth in the Philadelphia Plan; 
that is, in the Philadelphia Plan, because it was federally-assisted contracting, 
under the Executive Order at 11,246.9 The Executive Order already said not 
only should you not discriminate, but you have to take affi rmative steps to 
bring minorities into the work force. And what they did was set goals so that 
over a fi ve-year period those contractors had to have twenty-fi ve percent 
minority in their work force. 
And what we did was seize upon that notion of goals and put that into our 
request for relief in these building trades cases. And we were successful—
ultimately the courts did conclude, in the face of arguments, that this violated 
Section 703(j) of the Act, which says no preferential treatment because of a 
racial imbalance.10 The courts concluded that that did not limit the remedial 
authority of the court once there was discrimination found. So that was fairly 
interesting and that kind of got us through into the mid [19]70’s and really was 
the precursor to the forty-year-old debate now still going on about affi rmative 
action and racial[ly]-conscious relief.  
Now, there are a bunch of other issues involving unions, but most of those 
the other panelists are going to deal with, because those are the industrial 
unions. They don’t really play any role in hiring, but their role has to do with 
seniority systems and whether or not the seniority systems that the unions 
have negotiated had to give way in light of past Act discrimination, pre-Act 
discrimination. That [was] my hook; I ha[d] to keep going. 
 JOEL CONTRERAS: Our second panelist, Bob Marshall, joined the ELS 
in January of 1970, and he transferred to the criminal section of [the] Civil 
Rights [Division of the DOJ] at the end of 1971 and left in 1973. After leaving 
Washington, D.C., he became an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Colorado and 
since then has been in civil litigation with various fi rms and is presently a civil 
litigator with the law fi rm of Carpenter & Klatskin in Denver, Colorado. Bob?
 BOB MARSHALL: Thanks, Joel. I would like to start out by saying a couple 
years ago I came back [for] the anniversary of the Civil Rights [Division] 
reunion and I got to see a lot of my compatriots and talk to them, and every 
one of them, without exception, had become very successful in whatever fi eld 
they [were] in. And I talked to several of them and asked them what they 
attribute that to, and they said, “To being here, [in] the Civil Rights Division.” 
9. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), superseded in part by Exec. 
Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e note (2006).
10.  42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006).
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They learned how to prepare, how to investigate, and how to try a case. They 
learned how to work hard and that taught them how to become successful. And 
so working here I think was the core attribute to get us all started in our legal 
careers. 
When I started here, we had . . . much latitude to go anywhere in the United 
States and take on any industry, because, you know, discriminatory practices 
were rampant everywhere. And my fi rst case was actually a case that already 
had been brought, and Bill Finton and I took over and it was against the St. 
Louis-San Francisco Railroad.11 And with railroads, there was a position called 
train porter. If a white man or black man came in [and] applied for a job, they 
took a physical, they took a written exam, and the white man would be hired 
as a brakeman and the black man would be hired as a train porter. 
Now, the train porters are often confused with chair car porters. Chair car 
porters were the guys that rode in the passenger trains and sold pillows or 
rented pillows to the passengers. The train porter, while the train was moving, 
assisted the chair car porter, [but] whenever it stopped he had to run to the 
front of the train and brake the train and throw the switches, and he did all of 
the same work as a brakeman did, but the brakeman rode in the caboose while 
the train was moving. 
Well, the case had already been brought, and you’ve already been told we 
were taught to prepare everything we possibly c[ould]—look at every record. 
I [heard] a rumor that there existed a document that actually put [the 
discriminatory practices of the railroad union] in writing. I went over to the 
National Archives and went down in the basement, and found in a box an old 
charter of the National Brotherhood of Trainmen which said that coloreds can 
only be hired as porters. It was actually in writing, and we used that in the trial. 
It was no longer in effect, it started in the early 1900’s, but it remained in effect 
for [twenty] or [thirty] years. And they offi cially changed the charter, but they 
still follow[ed] the same practices.
Well, we had a trial coming up just a few months after I started, and so under 
Dave Rose’s instructions we had to meet our witnesses; we had to talk to them, 
we had to fi nd out what they are going to say. 
So I went out, up and down the railroad line from Birmingham, Alabama 
to Tupelo, Mississippi to Springfi eld, Missouri to Kansas City to St. Louis to 
Tulsa . . . and interviewed these train porters. Because what had happened is 
the passenger trains had slowly gone out of existence and there were not jobs 
for train porters anymore, and brakemen were just switched to a freight train. 
Well, the train porters were laid off; they did not have jobs anymore, because 
even though they had done all the jobs of brakemen, they could not go over 
to the freight trains. And they loved the railroad; they loved everything about 
it. And I would go and interview them in their homes and talk to them, and I 
would have to ask them to come and testify. And this was asking [them] to do a 
fairly dangerous thing, because they love[d] the railroad and they did not want 
whatever happened to them to happen to the next generation. So they took on 
the dangerous task, in this case the testifying, and also it had economic impact, 
too, because it meant they were not going to be offered any other jobs. 
11. United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).
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But we had a strategy, because we knew from prior hearings with this judge, 
Roy Harper in St. Louis, Missouri, who was the Chief Judge, that he was a 
racist—[he] just told it to us; used words that left no doubt about it. So we 
knew that we were going to lose. It was a matter of putting a case or a record 
in that we knew could win on appeal. 
So we took like [thirty] depositions, and we made a decision that we would 
only call four or fi ve of the train porters to testify, and we put the rest of them 
in under preservation of testimony and put their deposition testimony in where 
the railroad lawyers could not do anything about it. 
We went into a three week trial in St. Louis, Missouri [with] Judge Harper—
the defense lawyers did not have to do anything. Every time we had a witness 
on that was making any point, he would start screaming at us. And I fi nally 
said, “Well, are you ruling that I cannot ask this question?” And he would yell 
at me some more, and so I would ask the question again, because he never said 
I could not ask it. And so we just kept going and it became a real struggle, but 
we got the entire record in, we got the evidence in, everything we needed. 
Their big defense was that train porters did not really do all the work as 
written and that they only did thirty or forty percent of it, where my own 
witnesses were saying, well, they did like ninety percent of it. And they could 
not do anything about the written testimony, but they did put on some witnesses 
that were train porters [who] were afraid. And so they said, “Well, now, maybe 
I only did thirty or forty percent of the job of the brakeman. But I had a rebuttal 
witness that I put on that came in and testifi ed that, yes, he did ninety or 100 
percent of the job of the brakeman, and Judge Roy Harper almost came out of 
his seat, but it still got in. 
And at the end of the trial we waited for months, and he fi nally issued a 
long opinion, ruling against us, and we appealed it to the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and the appeal was affi rmed. And so we took it in a petition for 
a hearing en banc, and—Bob Moore, I see is coming in—argued the case, 
and the entire Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit reversed and gave the 
judgment to the United States and ordered that these train porters could have 
jobs on the freight trains and they would have their seniority. And we could 
not get them back pay in those days, but we did get them the seniority and any 
jobs that came open, and in fact, they were great jobs for some of them, and we 
fi nally did get that relief, and that was the     . . . railroad story. 
I was going tell one additional story because I had a little extra time, as 
Frank was talking about trade unions. You could pick any trade union in the 
country; [they] had to be almost all white. And I went down and selected the 
electrical union in New Orleans, and it was an all-white union; there were no 
blacks in it. 
And when we brought a case, the case was prepared to the point where we 
should win it as soon as we got it, because we had all the documents together, 
we had all the statistics together. We found witnesses who had applied for the 
union and had not gotten in, and so then all we had to do was bring it and try it. 
In this particular case, as part of the preparation after I brought the case, we 
took the deposition of the president of the electrical union. And I was asking 
him: “You know, sir, I understand that you have had black applicants that have 
passed the physical, they have passed the written test. When they come in for 
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the interview, the subjective part of the application, they never score as well. 
Why is that?” And this president of the electrical union looked at me and he 
said, “You know, I have thought about that a lot, and to tell you the honest truth, 
it is because I believe that blacks are afraid of electricity.” His attorney’s head 
hit the table and the deposition was over and the case was over. They signed 
a consent decree the next week which provided for affi rmative action for the 
program. Another attorney in our session, Joel Selig, then brought together all 
the trade unions in New Orleans and they all signed consent decrees. 
And right after that, and within a few months is when they signed the 
contract to build the Superdome, and all these unions all had jobs and they are 
all required to only hire black workers in order to go on the jobs, so that was a 
pretty good turnout. And I guess you will see in the summary they said about 
my time there, I value my time at the [DOJ] probably as the most productive 
time—the best time—I have [had] in my legal career. I have made a lot of 
valuable friends and I have learned how to try cases, and it has been something 
that has helped me through the rest of my career and I appreciate it. 
JOEL CONTRERAS: Thank you, Bob. Our next panelist, Squire 
Padgett, who is in private practice in the District [of Columbia], has 
cards available. He began his work with the Employment Litigation 
Section in June of 1970, and he served there until July of 1982. So 
he covers this initial time of testing and then some. Squire? 
 SQUIRE PADGETT: Thank you. I want to start off by following up on 
something that Vicki Schultz said about immersion. I came there June 1st, and 
subsequently you learn if Dave Rose shows up at your door [at] about fi ve 
o’clock in the evening, [it is] either real good news or real bad news. 
The fi rst day I was there, and that afternoon, he told me that I was going to go 
down to Birmingham, Alabama with three other lawyers: one was named Jack 
Razeko, the other named Mike Thrasher, and . . . another lawyer named Susan 
Reeves. Razeko and Thrasher—you did not work with [them], you worked for 
[them]. Their egos did not allow you to do [work with them]. Susan Reeves 
[and I] had to go home and tell our family from the fi rst day of work that we 
are going out of town and we d[id] not know [for] how long. At that point in 
time, we went out for weeks at a time. 
Well, those two guys wanted to investigate and make the litigation. They 
wanted to do it by Monday. We got down there on a Wednesday. We came 
back Friday night. They wanted us, Susan and I, to be in the offi ce by 8:30 on 
Saturday morning to put the evidence together, write the justifi cation memo, 
and they turned the justifi cation memo in on Monday, and that became U.S. 
Steel—United States v. United States Steel12—which was the fi rst of those steel 
cases that subsequently became the nationwide steel litigation. That was my 
very fi rst immersion. 
I ended up in June of 1982 with—I was the lead lawyer in Bazemore v. 
Friday,13 which went to the Supreme Court and established the precedent as it 
12.  United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
13.  Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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related to use of regression analysis in establishing employment discrimination. 
The case was turned over to me by one of those meetings with Dave saying, 
“Squire, I think you ought to look at—you may want to take [a] look at this 
litigation.” And it was something that had been started three or four years ago, 
and as everybody knows, you do not want a case that three or four lawyers 
have had, because no matter what it is there are some traps there.
But we started the trial on December 7th, 1981, and the judge was a Judge 
Dupree, down in Raleigh, North Carolina, who I won’t say he was like Judge 
Harper, but he was close. And he kept saying, “if you do not like what I am 
doing, take it up Route [One],” which meant throw it up to the Fourth Circuit, 
which was no picnic either. 
We tried that case from December 7th with a day and a half off for Christmas, 
a day-and-a-half off for New Year’s, until February 28th. We lost in the trial 
court, and then I decided it was time to leave, and it was appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit through the good work of David Marblestone, who is here today. Then 
it was a rehearing involved, it went up to the Supreme Court, and they reversed 
a [nine to zero] morality opinion. And one of the things they said about the 
evidence [was that] it was very persuasive in a number of ways.
But the case was litigated on the way back down to the Fourth Circuit and 
all the way back down to the trial court. And I can remember very distinctly at 
the Court of Appeals argument on the way back down, the lawyer was arguing, 
and he kept making the same argument he made before. And Judge Russell, 
who if you know anything about the Fourth Circuit, was not a friend of ours, 
but he at least said he was with Howard Manning, Jr. He said, “Mr. Manning, 
we heard you say that and gave you that on the way up, but the Supreme 
Court told us that [would not be] acceptable, “so I think you ought to tell us 
something a little different with this argument, all right?” 
But that was the way I ended it; that was the twelve years.  It was really very, 
very intense, and not only in terms of the litigation, but the people you travel 
with. I was fortunate enough to travel with both of these guys on either side 
of it. But if you have ever traveled with Joel Contreras—Joel does not ship 
his luggage. He does not check his luggage; he carries everything, so I started 
carrying it. And if you want to see security appear very quickly, you have Joel 
carrying everything and me carrying everything walking through the airport. 
Yes, we knew what the [Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”)] was 
before the TSA knew what it was. 
But to start off, very briefl y, [with] a [discussion of a] couple of the other 
cases. Other than [the] railroad cases, I was able to try and be lead lawyer 
in literally [almost] every kind of case they had including trucking cases 
[and] trade union cases. And I can remember very distinctly a case—that Bob 
developed before he left—against the sheet metal workers in Cleveland [in] 
the Northern District of Ohio; where we fully litigated the case and it was 
before a Judge Kopanski who became a very good judge on the Sixth Circuit. 
And we won, and he was giving us relief, as Frank was talking about the 
remedies, like two for every three referrals—two of them were going to have 
to be African-American. [A]t the time, [we had] some other issue; we thought 
that wasn’t good relief and we appealed to the Sixth Circuit. How we would 
like to have that now, right?
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And then I went from there to a number of other kinds of cases, including 
a case in the state and local governmental area against the City of Miami in 
Dade County, and I will tell you about development of [that] litigation in just 
a second.
But we ended up negotiating a consent decree, United States v. the City of 
Miami,14 that I am very pleased to say is still in force and effect right now; 
went up to the Fifth Circui[t]—and then we ended up having to argue it en 
banc, and I think that is probably the highlight of my legal career. It was just 
before the Fifth Circuit split up into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit, and there 
was an en banc argument that I had. And if you ever had an en banc argument, 
fi rst of all, you know how stressful that could be. But it was twenty-three 
judges, and Dave Rose had the argument right behind me in another case. But 
they were sitting in rows, and you hear a question, and you would look over 
there, and everybody is just kind of looking at you. 
But it ended up they preserved the consent decree and [it] went back down. 
And it went back up again to the Eleventh Circuit and it was still preserved, 
but I still view that in terms of the legal argument. I am one of the few lawyers 
who probably ever argued before that many judges and consider that to be 
very, very fortunate. 
And one other kind of case that involved the state and local governments 
which we subsequently took over; we had a case against the State of Texas 
which Lorna Renadeer was very, very helpful [on] as a paralegal. And as 
everybody who was in the Employment Section knows, it was better to have 
a good paralegal than a second lawyer; they did all of the work that for a long 
time I did not know. That was probably the biggest settlement ever reached 
involving a state government for a long time and had about eleven state 
agencies; and . . . we were able to settle that. It was very, very taxing—it was 
kind of like herding cats; you did not quite know who you were going to be 
dealing with from time to time—but it was incredibly intense and fun. 
And what we would do—and the part that I want to kind of emphasize—here 
in terms of developing the litigation; we heard some of the things Frank said 
and you heard some of the things that Bob said. [I] don’t know how many of 
you have ever heard of [standard metropolitan statistical abstracts (“SMSAs”)], 
but it is put out by the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of the Census, 
every ten years, and it is going to happen again; the viewer of the census will 
put out these—the SMSA . . . is a breakdown of these metropolitan areas. For 
example, and [the] D.C. metropolitan area at one time included D.C., Prince 
George’s County, and Montgomery County. I believe now it is expanded to 
include Baltimore [and] Howard County and whatever Baltimore is.
But they do a breakdown, and it gives very, very detailed information about 
the ethnic and sexual makeup, the economic income, whatever-have-you. [W]
ith the state and local governments and these county governments and police, 
fi re, and all these, it is very important to look at that because you get a real 
clear idea if there is [let] us say . . . a police department. Let’s say the Prince 
George’s County Police Department, which includes at one time I remember, 
twenty-fi ve to thirty percent African-Americans. And if you look at the fi re and 
14. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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police department and school board and whatever-have-you and it comes out to 
be like a great statistical difference, it is at least an initial targeted instrument. 
And you would also use such things as Frank was talking about, union 
contracts and other indicia to develop a theory, or at least to target who you 
were going after. Once you targeted them, then you would have to do what 
Frank was talking about and Dave always wanted. He was very nice about it, 
but they always said they wanted warm and bloody bodies, and so we would 
have to go and get these victims. And I have one delightful story about trying to 
get a victim related to East St. Louis.15 We were looking for an applicant—any 
applicant we could fi nd—to the electrical union. And I learned from someone 
that they said that they knew a guy who was an applicant, and this is one of the 
things all of us know. Half of the people in the neighborhood of the community 
do not know people’s real names; could be men, women. And they said that, 
“This guy”—I said, “Well, what is his name?” They said, “I do not know.” I 
said, “What do they call him?” They said, “light bulb.” I said, “Well, how can 
I fi nd him?” He said, “You know, he always hangs out at a bar right there at 
St. Claire and 26th Street” or wherever it was. And I said, “What time?” He 
said, “He will be there about fi ve.” I said, “Well, how will I recognize him?” 
He says, “You will know.” 
And so you were hooked to have some fun. I walked in this bar and sat there, 
you know, trying to look—and looking in that government suit, with the Ford 
Fairlane parked out front. And in walks this guy with a head that you would 
not believe. 
And then my next problem was how to introduce myself and what to call 
him, you know, and I just started in the middle of a conversation. I said, “Hey, 
I understand that you may have tried to get a job with the electrical union 
and I am kind of look[ing] at the electrical union.” I mean that turned out to 
be an incredibly bright guy who had been a good app[licant] and with the 
whole thing, but that was one of the kind of little ways that you did it. And 
if you showed up on the east side of Cleveland with Bob and me in some of 
these housing projects, trying to fi nd applicants, and you say [you’re] from the 
[DOJ], that just did not work. But it was intense, it was fun, and I do think we 
made a difference, and I still think it has made a difference. 
 
JOEL CONTRERAS: Thanks, Squire. Our next panelist is Doug Huron. 
He has been practicing employment law for [forty] years. He began in 1970 
with the [ELS]. He is currently with [the] D.C. fi rm of Heller, Huron, Chertkof, 
Lerner, Simon & Salzman. [He] is married to Amy Wind, the Chief Mediator 
for the D.C. Circuit. Doug.
DOUG HURON: This is a true story. About fi ve or six years ago, this 
neurological disease really set in and I started using this machine to talk. I 
would tell people who had not seen me in a while that I am not as bad as I look 
or sound, but I gave that up after I said [that] to an old friend whom I had not 
15. United States v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union No. 520, 476 F.2d 
1201 (7th Cir. 1973).
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seen in several years. He replied without missing a beat: “You were never as 
bad as you looked.” 
More than anything else, today is a tribute to Dave Rose. That is appropriate 
for many reasons.  Not only for his unparalleled leadership [in] advancing [the 
concept of] fair employment, but also for his work [in] training young lawyers 
to emulate him and to be diligent, doubtful, and unfl appable. I am personally 
indebted to Dave in a host of ways. 
I am speaking last on this panel because this is a segue to the panel after 
lunch, which deals with police and fi re cases and the testing guidelines, [and] 
among other things, of course, the trade bar for the guidelines was the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power.16 And my fi rst assignment from 
Dave after I started in July 1970 was to write the legislative history of Section 
703(h) of Title VII for the Solicitor General’s read in Griggs.17 And to do that, I 
had to read a legislative history of the Senate debate on what became the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Today the debate is probably easily searchable, but we did 
not have computers back then, so I had to read all the debate to make sure that 
I was not missing something. 
Congress stood tall back then, and no one stood taller than Hubert Humphrey 
of Minnesota, the born leader for the civil rights bill for the Democratic 
majority in the Senate. Humphrey was everywhere, answering questions about 
the bill’s provisions, responding to quorum calls, scheduling the Republican 
leader, Everett Dirksen, and fi nally bringing him around. 
And in the end, Humphrey orchestrated the book breaking the southern 
fi libuster. That was harder in those days, because back then it took two-thirds 
of the Senate; sixty-seven votes, not sixty. 
Humphrey was masterful as the winter of [19]64 turned to spring and fi nally 
to summer, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed and was signed. He was at 
the peak of his powers. That came through the normally dry legislative history, 
but something else came through, too. The seeds of Humphrey’s downfall four 
years later in 1968. Two lonely senators repeatedly interrupted the debate. 
Wayne Morse [of] Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska, addressing the 
chair, would ask, “Mr. President, what about the war in Vietnam?”
The day after New Year’s Day, in 1972, January 2nd, the Alabama NAACP 
fi led suit against the Alabama State Troopers in Montgomery, the seat of the 
[big old] history [of] Alabama, which had only one judge, Frank Johnson.18 
The troopers had never had a black offi cer and were the instruments used by 
governors such as George Wallace to enforce segregation. 
Judge Johnson, in contrast, had been desegregating Alabama institutions 
ever since he was fi rst appointed by President Eisenhower. In 1956, he had the 
Fifth Circuit Judge, Richard Reeves, form the majority on a three-judge district 
court that struck down the Montgomery arguments requiring segregation on 
buses, against which Rosa Parks and a young pastor, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
had led a boycott. And in [e]arly 1972, Title VII did not yet cover state and 
local agencies, so the trooper suit was brought under Section 1983 and the 
16.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
18. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Fourteenth Amendment, and there was no law allowing the Attorney General 
to enforce the Amendment sequel, “protection guarantee.”19 
But I am convinced that Judge Johnson knew what he wanted to do with 
the state troopers, and to do it he needed a solid record. So he appointed the 
United States as amicus curiae, with all the rights of a party. It turned out 
that the United States [meant] me. I had done some enforcement work upon 
the Frankier case against the Alabama merit system, which Dave talked upon 
and which he tried before Judge Johnson. And Dave sent me to Montgomery 
along with a research analyst, Helen Long. Like the other research analysts in 
this Section, Helen was extraordinary. The private plaintiffs were represented 
by Morris Dees, a self-made millionaire in the direct mail business and the 
founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, [Alabama].
Four years later, in 1976, Morris was the chief fundraiser for an obscure ex-
governor of Georgia who was running for president, and he prevailed on me 
to leave the Division and join the Carter campaign, but that is another story.
The troopers were about to hire a class in January 1972, and Morris moved 
for a preliminary injunction. Judge Johnson set it down for early February, 
which meant that Helen and I had about three weeks to prepare, including 
fi nding an expert in police testing. 
The hearing itself went fairly smoothly, the only glitch coming when I 
momentarily could not fi nd an exhibit Judge Johnson wanted to see. He 
bellowed, “I want that exhibit, and I want it now.” Needless to say, he got it. 
At the end of the hearing, Judge Johnson said he would issue a ruling 
soon. At that point, Walter Allen, the head of the trooper force, spoke up. He 
said that the State desperately needed to hire more troopers and he pleaded 
with the judge to rule quickly. “Well,” replied Judge Johnson, “I can tell you 
what I am going to do,” and he hit the State between the eyes. “Alabama had 
unconstitutionally excluded blacks from the position of state trooper,” he said, 
“and from now on the state would be required to hire one black trooper for 
every white hire until the trooper force was twenty-fi ve percent black.” That 
was exactly the relief requested by the United States. But as I said, Judge 
Johnson was way ahead of us. 
In the [ELS], when I was there, there was one word that we were forbidden 
to use; that word was “quota.” We never asked for quotas; maybe goals, or if 
we were feeling especially daring, affi rmative hiring ratios, but not quotas. 
You know the old saying, “if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then 
it is probably a duck.” Well, what Frank Johnson did to the Alabama state 
troopers sure as hell quacked like a quota. We used to say that quotas were rigid 
and infl exible, and like goals, which were always subject to the availability of 
qualifi ed applicants, but can you imagine what Judge Johnson would have 
done if somebody told him there were not enough qualifi ed African Americans 
to meet his order? “Qualifi ed blacks are out there,” he told Walter Allen, when 
he ruled from the bench. “I want you to fi nd them.” 
The old Fifth Circuit certainly understood that Judge Johnson had imposed 
a quota on state trooper hiring. The court sustained, and I am quoting, the 
conclusion of the District Judge. That quota relief was essential to make 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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meaningful progress towards eliminating the unconstitutional practices and to 
overcome the patrol’s thirty-seven year reputation as an all-white organization. 
I argued the appeal at New Orleans, and Dave went down with me, probably 
to make sure that the word “quota” never [appeared] and it never did. But today, 
I am proud that I had a small role in supporting Judge Johnson’s imposition of 
the quota. Within a decade, the Alabama troopers had more African-American 
offi cers than many highways patrolling the country.  
Now, I have talked about two monumental fi gures in civil rights history: 
Senator Hubert Humphrey and Judge Frank Johnson, but I would be remiss 
if I did not mention another person, one who is known mainly to the people 
gathered here: my dear friend, Jack Davis. I got to know Jack working on 
the new Art Building Trades case in the early [19]70s. I saw him bluff the 
business manager of an Ironworkers local in a deposition, making the guy 
believe Jack had incriminating documents; then he utterly destroyed him. I had 
many friends in the Division, but Jack was the closest. 
Let me say thank you to Senator Humphrey and to Judge Johnson, and a 
special thanks to Jack Davis, who was the best of what we had in the Division. 
Thank you for your attention. 
JOEL CONTRERAS: Thank you, Doug. [A]t this point, I know we are 
going to have a few questions, but I would [be] remiss if I did not mention 
that in this laborious process of examining documents, often the documents 
would be provided. And one of the cases that we had, the attorneys for the 
defense brought [them] to the front. They provided tables very similar to 
this, much like a classroom setting. As we poured through the documents and 
found something that we would like copied, we had to take it up to the front, 
they would examine it, make their notes, then we would return [and] go back 
through more documents. 
I gained an insight into the classroom process followed by Squire 
Padgett. As he sauntered up to the front with his document and handed it 
to the defense attorney who had clerked for Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
and as he took the document back, said, “Well, you know, when we 
have equal employment opportunity implemented in the United States, 
you can tell your grandchildren you opposed it,” and returned and sat 
down. And I refl ect that often, when we had the opportunity to build this 
foundation, we were able to do that. This afternoon you will hear how 
others have built upon this foundation. The work continues. The time of 
testing remains. Now I will take any questions that you might have.  
 MALE SPEAKER: The term “seniority” has been used. I thought 
perhaps some people in the audience might not understand the 
importance of seniority and the different types of seniority. 
 FRANK PETRAMALO: Sure, sure. I love seniority. Seniority is important 
in the industrial sector, because what it does is give an employee an objective 
basis on which to have his career judged. Generally speaking, the employer 
runs the operation, he owns the operation, decides who gets hired, who gets 
fi red, who gets promoted. 
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The union comes in and tries to somewhat lessen that management authority 
by, among other things, negotiating a seniority system, which pretty much 
will set forth the objective standard on which people get promoted or laid off, 
things of that sort. I say objective because seniority just starts when you are 
hired and continues to accrue.
Now, the problem in Title VII litigation is there are various types of seniority. 
Some of the early cases they refer to [is] the Local 189 Paperworkers.20 The 
problem with the seniority system there is it was not a plant-wide seniority 
system. There were blacks in the plant, but they were relegated to one 
department—the least desirable, lowest-paying—and their seniority was pretty 
much limited to that department. And if they wanted to transfer ultimately to 
the white department when they had the opportunity, they would lose all their 
seniority and start at the bottom. 
So one of the early legal issues was whether a seniority system like that 
could survive, and of course it [was] concluded no; that the blacks coming 
over had to be credited with their total seniority with the company and not just 
the seniority in a particular job or a particular department. 
In the building trades industry, it really was not an issue, because as I said 
before, the employment was really transitory; you were not building up seniority 
with a particular contractor. So it really, I think, culminated in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in a teamster case sometime in 1977, where the Court went 
in, and for the last time decided what was lawful and what was not lawful in 
the way of a seniority system that might have a discriminatory impact.21  
 SQUIRE PADGETT: Well, let me just add, if you look at Title 703(h),22 
which says—and that was negotiated on behalf of the unions into the Title—
[that] neutral seniority systems are not to be considered discriminatory. So we 
were dealing with those issues, and in the Bazemore case23 a seniority system 
was one of the issues. We were talking about state agricultural extension 
workers, African-Americans and whites and women; they were all doing the 
same thing. So when they integrated the system, instead of doing it this way, 
just on the basis of who started earliest and who started later, they did it this 
way. And so we—which is great and the way it almost always happened—
ended up having to litigate that. And one of the very fi rst—some of the very 
fi rst—trade union cases and some of the writings talk about how and which 
way to use seniority; Richard Sovell and several others you are talking about; 
concepts such as Freedom Now, which means everybody knows where the 
seniority takes them. Or if you do it by jobs like they [were] talking about with 
city drivers—who may have more company seniority, but may not have as 
much road-driving experience—and how you deal with it. That is what most 
of the litigation was about. 
20.  Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 
(5th Cir. 1969).
21.  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
22.  42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2 (2006). 
23.  Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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 FEMALE SPEAKER: My question is a little forward-thinking. First, 
I want to say thank you to all for your wonderful years of service, having 
literally been a child who was born in the midst of this struggle. What would 
you say to those forty-fi ve years from now who are mounting some of the 
same arguments opposing current legislation, such as the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act?24 What would you say to them in terms of their fi ght 
against it, and would you look at it and say, “Forty-fi ve years from now you 
can tell your grandchildren that you opposed this?” 
FRANK PETRAMALO: Gee, you are asking us to tell you what is going 
to happen in forty-fi ve years. I can’t even pick the winner of the next race. You 
know—I think Dave mentioned—it is incremental progress. I mean, when you 
are young, you expect things to change overnight. But I think as a young lawyer 
what you have to realize is that it is going to take a long time, a step at a time, to 
get to a goal, and, hopefully, you will get there. Now, it is not going to be all a 
straight line; it is going to go up and down, up and down. But I think ultimately 
if you look back over our history, we usually wind up in the right place.  
 SQUIRE PADGETT: I would add one thing. I guess I will say it this way 
as a trial lawyer. I have had several situations where I had tried cases and 
then appellate lawyers were looking at the transcript and were asking me why 
didn’t I ask this question, that I could have made a better record, and I said it 
this way: while I was standing there I was trying to save what I had as much 
as I was trying to move the ball forward. And I think that with the last—since 
Ronald Reagan—much of what we have been doing is trying to save what we 
had as opposed to moving forward, and I think that is still [the] issue. I think 
there are forces out here who still believe that people of color and women and 
others who fi ght for these things [are] inappropriate—these are not the real 
Americans. And I view it very, very differently. I [think that] we are the real 
Americans. It is those who oppose the dreams and hopes of all of us that are 
not the real Americans. 
BOB MARSHALL: I guess I would respond that I think our whole 
life we were fi ghting to do the right thing. We are trying to fi ght for right 
to prevail over wrong, and we were here; when we were doing our 
work, I felt that is what I was doing. I was trying to right past and present 
wrongs, and that battle will always be here. Through your whole life you 
will be doing that, and forty-fi ve years from now they will be doing it, 
too, and I think it is a moral battle that you always will be fi ghting. 
 JOEL CONTRERAS: I also think part of the challenge is that we have not 
seen an effective communication [on] the value of the progress. The South 
would not have been as industrialized as it has been without access to a labor 
force that was better educated, that could compete for jobs—that is part of 
what happened through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
24.  Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1548, 111th Cong. (2009).
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The unfair advantages that people enjoyed came at a cost, and part of 
our challenge is to do a much better job of letting people know that when 
discriminatory testing fails, then, normally, everyone benefi ted. There was 
inside information on those tests. Many of them had been memorized, so people 
had an unfair advantage, because when they went in to take those tests they 
knew what they were taking. So when those tests were thrown out, everyone 
benefi ted. Everyone competing for those jobs had a better opportunity than 
those who were on the inside. If you had a tile-workers’ union, as they did in 
New Jersey, that said you had to be related in order to become a member, there 
were not just minorities and women who were excluded, there were a lot of 
people in the general community that could not compete for those jobs.
We have not done the kind of job that needs to be done to let the people of 
America know how important it was for this country to be able to compete 
on the basis of merit, not only in jobs, education, housing, et cetera, and this 
country is stronger—it has avoided a lot of violence that has occurred in other 
countries—because of the fact that we stepped forward at that time. 
Additional efforts will have to be formulated. There will always be a reaction 
anytime there is signifi cant change. And this has been one of the greatest social 
changes that [has] occurred in the history of the United States. Remember, it 
was over one hundred years after the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1873, and [the] 
Fourteenth Amendment were rendered ineffective by the courts. 
Part of the challenges that we were looking at was [whether] the federal 
government and the people of America [would] support these important changes in 
1964? Fortunately, many of those changes have been implemented. They have not 
been implemented without a reaction, but they have been implemented. 
           END TRANSCRIPT
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45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RICHARD UGELOW: Let me introduce Terry Connors who’s leading the 
next panel, and he too will introduce the distinguished panelists. Terry and I 
share something in common; we started in the [ELS] on the same day. The only 
problem was that Terry came from Air Force JAG, which is an inferior branch 
of the military, and I came from the Army JAG and it was [superior.] Terry 
had a really distinguished career at the [ELS]. He prosecuted cases against 
. . . Maryland, Michigan, and [the] New Jersey State Police for race and sex 
discrimination; and worked on the AT&T case.1 After he left the Section in 
1976, he went into private practice in Florida. He’s now co-head of a labor and 
employment practice, the Miami offi ce of Hunton & Williams. He’s worked 
extensively in employment throughout his professional career and he’s written 
extensively on employment discrimination and [he] participates in many 
professional organizations dealing with employment discrimination issues. 
Terry?  
TERRY CONNORS: Thank you, Richard. The truth is that the reason I 
was invited was because on my fi rst day at the Civil Rights Division I reported 
late for work to Mr. Rose, as I knew him at the time, and he wanted to know 
why. I’d just settled on my fi rst house purchase, so I didn’t need to get fi red, 
but he said “well, we don’t—we haven’t hired many people before that have 
already tried cases, so here’s a fi le involving the City of Albuquerque, and why 
don’t you take a look at it and why don’t you go out and handle it?” So having 
nothing to say, I said, “well, what happens if I lose?” and he said, “we don’t.” 
But I did. Actually, I think Brian Landsberg lost it, because he touched it last. 
1. EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d 1977).
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But in any event, that was the religious discrimination case, and—and I think 
maybe the only one ever brought [there].2 
On the State Police, and building on the very good work you heard described 
this morning, by the time [I] got [to] the State Police agencies, the heavy lifting 
had largely been done on the Griggs3 issues and so forth; and I recall that I 
discovered something that we didn’t have in [the] Judge Advocate’s court, 
which is request to admit. And so I prepared this extensive request to admit that 
essentially meant that we won the case. And to my great surprise, Michigan 
signed it. 
So I didn’t know quite what to do next, except I went out and November 
11th happens to be Veteran’s Day and that year my wife’s 30th birthday. And 
we got to a point in the discussions—Gerald Ford was newly in the White 
House—where the Attorney General of Michigan and the Chief of the State 
Police yelled at me across the room that “Jerry Ford would never require us to 
do what you’re asking us to do in this settlement, and we’re just not going to 
discuss it with you; we’re going to talk to him.” So it was November 10th, and 
I was supposed to be taking somebody to dinner in Washington the next night, 
but I said, “well, I actually don’t know the President, but why don’t we do this: 
let’s adjourn for today and you call Jerry and . . . one of two things will happen. 
Either I will go home and have birthday dinner with my wife, or we’ll be back 
here tomorrow morning talking about this, depending on what he says.” And 
we came back and talked about it the next day, so we did resolve the case, so 
thank you for the heavy lifting everybody.
Our group is—I want to introduce them all at once because I think we’ll 
bounce back and forth a little bit . . . and I’ll start to my immediate right: 
Marybeth Martin, who has held Section responsibilities, having started in 
1970 as a research analyst—and worked on numerous cases—then moved 
on [to] another career, became a lawyer later, returned as a lawyer in the 
Section and prosecuted numerous cases before she retired there in . . .  
 MARYBETH MARTIN: 2003. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Next to her, Jerry George, [who was with the Civil 
Rights Division of the DOJ from] 1969 through . . . 
JERRY GEORGE: 1988. 
 TERRY CONNORS: 1988, and then [he went] to the Environmental 
and Natural Resources Division and off to private practice in San Francisco 
after that, handling many cases involving police and fi re departments in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, St. Louis, and others. Vivian Toler, next to Jerry, was 
a research analyst and worked through the entirety of her career I think until 
[her] retirement  . . .  
2. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff’d, 545 
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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VIVIAN TOLER: [in] 2007. 
 TERRY CONNORS: In 2007, when at the end of her career she was 
responsible for all the research assistants—by then called paralegals—working 
on many cases including the gaming industry, the fi lm industry, and putting 
together the analysis models for the various remedial relief programs that the 
[ELS] sought. And to her right, Mike Middleton, [who was] in the [ELS] from 
1971 to [19]78, currently on [the] faculty at the University of Missouri, and 
we’ll focus, among his many accomplishments, on the City of Jackson4 case, 
if you will. And if I may, Mike, could you start off to talk about that one? 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: Sure. Thanks, Terry. I’m really happy to be here. I 
was at a gathering of the Civil Rights Division a few years ago in Washington 
and I was impressed with that gathering and I’m equally impressed with this 
one and I am very grateful for the experience. What people have said about 
Dave Rose and the folks who taught us all what we were doing; it’s hard to 
express how infl uential they were on us and as I look around the room and see 
all my former colleagues and see all the success they’ve had—I think all can 
be attributed to Dave. His work ethic. His nurturing attitude towards folks. 
And his deep, deep intelligence. And deep, deep commitment to these issues.
Like Terry said, by the time we started working, most of the heavy lifting 
was done. The law had been pretty much established, the seniority systems had 
been—at least the framework for analyzing [the] seniority systems—had been 
worked out. Adverse impact theory had been worked out.5 And it was simply a 
matter of fi nding the right targets and going after them. I had some experience 
in several different areas, and I’ll briefl y describe some of those cases. But 
what I think I really want to say is the pictures that were on the screen at the 
beginning of this session the white/colored bathrooms, the colored only movie 
theater. You may think that that was long, long ago, but the fact of the matter is 
the cases that I worked on, the discrimination was so clear and so in-your-face, 
that it made the cases not only easy to do, but a lot of fun to really challenge 
that kind of stuff.
My fi rst trial I tried with Bob Gallegher and Dave Allen; and Kathy Green 
was our research analyst on that case. It was in Detroit, Detroit Edison.6 [This 
is from when] we began going to the public utility companies. Detroit Edison 
was a major electricity provider in the Detroit area. We also did the Philadelphia 
Electric Company,7 [which was the] same kind of case. The fundamental issue 
there was [that] obviously the good jobs went to whites and the menial jobs, 
if [any] at all, went to blacks. I will never forget the Detroit-Edison trial. We 
managed to fi nd a star witness, a gentleman named Leroy Bell. And by the 
4. United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975). 
5. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
6. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) 
(remanding for further consideration in light of Supreme Court’s decision in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (citation omitted)).
7. United States v. Phila. Electric Co., 351 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D. La. 1972).
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way, the way we found witnesses, I think someone mentioned. You had to 
develop a really good relationship with the local NAACP and some of the local 
organizations because they knew where the people were.
So whenever you would go into a city, you would contact the NAACP 
or [Congress of Racial Equality] or some community organization that was 
involved in civil rights, explain what you were doing, [and] explain what you 
were looking for. [We would] try to develop a trusting relationship with those 
groups because we were the federal government, and of course we’re here 
to help you. They didn’t always buy that. But, they put us in touch with a 
gentleman named Leroy Bell [in Detroit].  
Leroy Bell had been in World War I; he was trained as an electrician in 
the war. He came out of the war and went to his home[town] of Detroit, and 
applied for a job at the electric company. He was told [that] he was black. He 
was told that there was one job at the Detroit Edison Company that a black 
man could have. But they already had a shoeshine boy. And if he were to wait 
around; if this gentleman ever left, they would consider him for the job. Well 
obviously he was our star witness, I mean. But that’s how simple the case was. 
Their policy was you didn’t get to be a lineman if you were black, no matter 
what your qualifi cations. The other interesting thing about that case was [that] 
Damon Keith was our judge. A very distinguished African-American judge, 
and when I saw him I immediately got very relaxed. But somewhere during 
Mr. Bell’s testimony, the question was raised, well, how about black women? 
And he mentioned well, black women could work there, but the job[s] for 
black women [were as] elevator operator[s]. And they had two elevators in the 
building, and there were women in those jobs. Well the defense counsel was 
trying to challenge him and ask [confusing questions]. Judge Keith interrupted. 
And he said, “Well I know something about that; my sister was an elevator 
operator at Detroit Edison.” So it was a good case, and it was a lot of fun. 
Needless to say we won that case.
Some of the other things—someone mentioned the airline cases. I worked 
on three airline cases: TWA,8 Delta,9 and United,10 with Susan Reeves, and 
eventually Doug Huron . . . got on those cases. I don’t want to tell the story 
of how I was second chair on United and Susan left. Dave Rose turned to 
Doug, who had just completed some major case and asked Doug to take fi rst 
chair. I was of course quite outraged, because I thought I was ready for that. 
And I went in and talked to Dave about it, and I was railing about how he was 
mistreating me. It turned out that he was absolutely right. Doug was eminently 
more qualifi ed to do that than I was. The only advice Dave gave me as we 
were arguing in his offi ce was, “Mike, don’t do anything precipitous.” I had 
to go back to my offi ce and fi nd out what he was trying to tell me. I didn’t do 
anything precipitous, and it all worked out. [B]ut Doug, I have always admired 
you and appreciate the leadership you gave on that case, and I confess even 
today that you were eminently more qualifi ed than I to take the lead on that.
But the airline cases are pretty easy too. [B]asically blacks were redcaps or 
8.  Zipes v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
9. Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
10. Lansdale v. United Airlines, 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971).
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baggage handlers, and the big jobs were ramp servicemen. [Ramp servicemen 
were] much more highly paid [and the jobs were] much more attractive. But 
the policies were that, you know, African-Americans simply need not apply for 
those jobs. And there was that inexorable zero in terms of black participation 
in those jobs. 
The other aspect of the [airline] case[s] we were beginning to get into 
enforcing was the gender discrimination portions of Title VII. Women were 
always . . . stewardesses—not fl ight attendants, stewardesses. They had 
stewards and stewardesses and reservations agents. And again, the patterns 
were clear. Women were not in any jobs other than those two. Those were the 
lowest paying jobs. And there were some side issues about appearance, height, 
and weight requirements for stewardesses that were not related to one’s ability 
to get down the aisle and serve passengers but more related to the physical 
attractiveness of the woman. There were age, height, and weight requirements 
for the fl ight attendants. It was fun challenging those because there was really 
no justifi cation other than discriminatory attitude on the parts of people. And 
we—I think—settled all those cases. The other thing about what we did at 
the Division was we really prepared our cases well. And once you had the 
evidence together, a defendant really had to be crazy to go to trial. Because it 
was quite clear what the outcome would be if the judge was going to analyze 
the case properly.
And I’ve got to give credit to Marybeth and Vivian and other research 
analysts that we had in the Division then, because they did all that legwork 
to put the statistical cases together and kept the cases organized. But the 
case[s] I had [the] most fun with [were] the police cases. I think I had one 
of the fi rst local government police cases in the City of Jackson, Mississippi, 
which was my hometown, so I knew something about it. I had two friends, 
Frank Parker, who was the head of the lawyer’s committee in Jackson. He had 
sued the police department, and Mel Leventhal, who was the counsel for the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, had sued the fi re department.11 [Both were] race 
discrimination cases. I wanted to go home and do something in my hometown. 
Dave authorized me to go down and investigate but he told me that if I were 
able to do it by myself with, I think, one research analyst, I could try it. 
So I went to Jackson and, on my way to the city attorney’s offi ce to introduce 
myself, I went by the employment offi ce on a whim. I had a big afro and 
I was about twenty-fi ve years old, maybe. And I asked the lady, I said “I’d 
like to apply for a job with the City of Jackson. May I have an application, 
please?” She said, “Boy, that’s not the way you get jobs in Jackson. If you 
want a job, you have to go stand under the viaduct on Highway Forty-Nine 
before seven o’clock on any morning, and there’s a truck that’ll come by. 
And if there’s work, you hop on the truck. And if there’s not, you come back 
the next day.” I dutifully took my notes, and said “Okay.” I then went over 
to the City Attorney’s Offi ce and announced myself and told him what we 
were doing. Ultimately we settled that case. We focused on the fi re and police 
departments, because there were two private suits in existence at the time. And 
11. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Corley v. Jackson 
Police Dep’t, 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); United States v. City of Jackson, 
519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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it’s amusing, we talk about quotas and goals and timetables; we pretty quickly 
got an agreement out of the City of Jackson to hire—all future hires in the 
police department had to be on a one for one basis—Black/White. And in the 
fi re department, two for one—two blacks for every white. We got that signed. 
Fortunately we didn’t have Judge Cox [on] that. I don’t know if any of you 
know Judge Cox, but I had some dealings with him several years later where I 
had to move to recuse him from some cases because of his racism. And fi nally 
[we] won that [case] in the Fifth Circuit.
But those were the days. The discrimination was obvious. The legal theories 
had been pretty much ironed out by our predecessors on the prior panel and 
others, and it was a great deal of fun to do those cases. Another little anecdote, 
I think I talked about the NAACP, and the research analysts. I have to tell 
you, the FBI was very, very, very helpful during those days. You can imagine 
a young black attorney running around Jackson, Mississippi or Birmingham, 
Alabama and Mobile, Alabama; trying to interview witnesses can be diffi cult. 
It was always very nice to be able to write a memo to J. Edgar Hoover and ask 
him to have his people go do the interviews. And the FBI did a very, very good 
job of following the script and getting vital information from basically anyone 
who was involved in any of these cases. White policemen, black applicants, 
black deterred applicants . . . the FBI had a way of walking around a community 
and getting people to talk, so their expertise was extremely useful. 
Someone mentioned that we should talk about expert witnesses. I don’t 
know that I have much to say about that except that it was often very diffi cult 
to fi nd experts who could do what needed to be done. But I think it was more 
diffi cult for the defendants. In the Philadelphia Police Department case12—
which was a sex discrimination case—[they] had about eight women on the 
police force. They were all assigned to the juvenile unit and they were all 
denied the ability to be patrolmen. The juvenile unit obviously paid less. To 
show you how blatant it was, on the way up to Philadelphia, when we got 
there in fact, Mayor Rizzo was on television saying that women would patrol 
the streets of Philadelphia over his dead body. That kind of motivated us on 
that one, too. But the point is that the City of Philadelphia hired an expert who 
did a study that pretty much confi rmed the stereotype on some trumped-up 
psychological basis that women just were not cut out for police work. And that 
was their expert witness, and that was amazing to me that they thought that 
they could convince anybody with that kind of testimony. And indeed, they 
didn’t. I didn’t stay on there—Richard Ugelow, you took that case on when I 
left, didn’t you? We won it, didn’t we? Alright. Alright.
So those are some of the stories, and I will leave it at that and hopefully if 
there are questions, I will try to help answer them. Thank you.
TERRY CONNORS: I think that’s a perfect segue to Vivian, and I wonder 
if you, Vivian, could explain to this group how you became the expert for the 
City of Cincinnati.13
12.  United States v. City of Philadelphia, 573 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1978).
13. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
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VIVIAN TOLER: I’m not sure how that happened myself. 
 TERRY CONNORS: But perhaps beyond that, [could 
you] talk about the work of your team over the years, 
which was obviously extremely critical to this effort? 
 VIVIAN TOLER: Yes. Paralegal specialists or research analysts—there 
are numerous things in preparation for trial for the attorneys. A lot of our work 
involved xerox. That was a majority of it in the beginning. We xeroxed our 
hearts out, going to various cities, going through personnel fi les and applicant 
folders. Trying to identify—this was before people were identifi ed by race and 
sex—people by looking at their high school or their college, to see if they went 
to a predominantly black school, and then we would make the identifi cation 
that way. And [then compared] their qualifi cations with the white majority.
Paralegals summarize[d] depositions and went out and searched for 
witnesses; I guess that was after the FBI stopped doing it for us. We used to 
go out there to fi nd witnesses for . . . particular cases. We had one case against 
the Florida Department of Corrections, [w]e had about [sex discrimination] 
and we had paralegals, research analysts [a]t that time, going all over the state 
to the different correction facilities trying to locate witnesses, and we’d do the 
preliminary interview and come back to the attorneys with people we thought 
would make good witnesses and give them that information. 
We’ve had a paralegal . . . go out to a fi re department and take the agility 
test to see how diffi cult that was. A female had to go out and take that test. We 
had one in which a male paralegal had to go into the shower at a Department 
of Corrections, because they said they weren’t letting women be correctional 
offi cers because it would interfere with the privacy of the male prisoners. So 
he had to go out there to show that the guards wouldn’t see the males’ private 
parts while they were taking showers, and it was just a variety of different 
things. 
And in the Chicago police case, I—along with other paralegals in 
the Section—had to go through the disciplinary actions to compare the 
discipline given to white offi cers compared to that given to black offi cers, 
and that was also before we had everything on computer, so we had to go 
through by hand and compare information and jot down our fi ndings. And 
testifying at trial when necessary—I had to testify at that trial in Chicago.14 
I think I spent almost a year off and on in Chicago and I believe the entire 
summer of 1975 I was in Chicago. And I think that about covers it for 
right now. I think I worked on the Cincinnati case with Marybeth, so she 
knows[.]   
 MARYBETH MARTIN: Right. I know the strain. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Then go ahead. 
 
 
14. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
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 MARYBETH MARTIN: Oh, I’ll do it. Vivian Toler was the paralegal 
assigned by the [DOJ] to work on the case. She never was an employee of the 
City of Cincinnati. However, the concentration that we wanted to enter there 
was something that the City had agreed that they needed to do some work 
on and that was basically hiring—hiring black females and Hispanic police 
offi cers. So what we needed to do—and this was even before . . . Adarand15 and 
other decisions that talked about having the factual predicate or the fi ndings—
[was] we put together fi ndings that would show how badly the City needed to 
have goals and timetables; so this was entered into the record. The City took 
about four years to hire anybody. They went into a layoff status. It was not for 
purposes of avoiding the decree as other places had done, but this was simply 
because they were in an economic downturn. So when the City started hiring 
again, that brought on a rush of reverse discrimination cases. One of them was 
the Vogel case.16 We wanted to intervene, but Mr. Turner had some reason that 
we weren’t allowed to intervene. I can’t remember the specifi cs. 
So this was a private case against the City, [and they were] saying these 
goals and timetables needed to be off the books. Vivian’s affi davit was all of 
her standard deviation analysis. This was the bread and butter of a paralegal 
or research analyst’s day, [which] was to sit and do—without a computer, 
remember, this is another time that we did not have computers. So she did 
her analysis, put it into an affi davit, and the Court of Appeals decision came 
out and lo and behold there was Vivian Toler, expert witness for the City of 
Cincinnati. 
So Jim Turner was the fi rst to read this, I believe, and came to my offi ce 
or called me up and said, “We’ve got to object to this. Vivian Toler is an 
employee of the [ELS].” So I called the Court of Appeals clerk’s offi ce, and 
said, “There’s a mistake on this opinion that just came out.” And they said, 
“Are you a party?” And we were—[but] I couldn’t convince the City to say 
that they didn’t hire you as an expert witness. And she had made the case. Her 
affi davit had helped bolster our argument that these goals and timetables were 
indeed needed, so.
TERRY CONNORS: How much did you charge for that, Vivian? 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: I want to know if Vivian is going to get any 
referrals. Have you gotten any calls to serve as an expert witness? Because it 
was an excellent example. Now Vivian is the quintessential research analyst, I 
will say that. She worked—when she did the City of Chicago facts, she was up 
all night. The judge I believe commented—Bob Moore can confi rm this—on 
what excellent work she had done, and ever so quickly. Now my point is that 
there’s a theme underlying all of the discussions this morning and up to right 
now; thank you, Mike, for acknowledging us, and, Doug, you also. 
Paralegals were also on the scene. Secretaries were on the scene. We had 
a big support staff in the Section and nobody knew exactly what research 
analysts did. I think I had an interview with an administrative offi cer in the 
15. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
16. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594.
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Division, and the only question I can remember when I was being hired was: 
are you available to travel? Well, little did I know how job related that was. 
I think I was kind of a hazy fi gure to people around the Section, because I 
spent most of my three and a half years as a research analyst in Birmingham, 
Alabama. Or Inslie, Fairfi eld, or Pratt City. One of those towns in which the 
U.S. Steel’s Fairfi eld worked. Nine mills were located [there]. And I had to 
learn the difference between all the nine mills and the lines of progression 
in each of the mills. They had all been totally segregated up until the time at 
which . . . U.S. Steel thought it would solve its problems by creating a pool 
down at the bottom. So you lost your line of promotion seniority so that you’d 
have the opportunity to hopefully get into another line. Well there weren’t any 
jobs. Or not enough jobs for this to happen smoothly. So that’s one reason we 
got involved. 
Now another thing I will say, because we had paralegals and research 
analysts, and I understand the word just—the title—changed. I’m not sure 
there was any use of something called a research analyst before it was used in 
our Section. I keep hearing that we were the innovators there in the Section, 
and I hope that’s the case, because I think that it was a wonderful job category 
to do anything that was needed to get ready for a case.
Now what this meant was, yes, we did a lot of interviews. We did the 
interviews that the FBI basically didn’t want to do or the lawyers didn’t want 
the FBI to do for some reason. We also went . . . without our government suits 
on—because at that time all the research analysts were female and we would 
be a little bit less intimidating sometimes than some of the lawyers. So we had 
some of our interviewees tell us that they preferred talking to us. And [this] 
worked out well when we got ready for trial. We also had a number of records 
to look at almost every case. This goes to the factual development of the case 
that we’ve talked about being so important, and it was critical; it really was 
critical. [W]ell Kate Green, for instance, in the late [19]70s, I believe had a 
responsibility in a case [called] United States vs. County of Fairfax17—one 
of the wealthiest counties in the nation. The records for applications I believe 
were stored in shoeboxes that were pushed under a table in the personnel 
offi ce, and they were in no order. That’s what we had to deal with.
A lot of records were in any number of different places; they had different 
codes. Charlotte and Logan, I believe in Detroit Edison,18 found a dot curiously 
behind certain names and learned that oh, that means this is the internal code 
for “that’s a black applicant.” I had to deal with a case in which I was seeing 
the word peachy written by some names. That was a little bit more evident, I 
suppose. But anyway we had to learn these records inside out. [Let’s go] back 
to U.S. Steel, 19 where I spent a lot of my time.
17. 629 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1980).
18. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) 
(remanding for further consideration in light of Supreme Court’s decision in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (citation omitted)).
19. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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 We had not only interviewed all the black steel workers; we knew all the 
lines of promotion, who was where, and we had a curious delay in the trial. 
There were fi fty-fi ve trial days over—Lou and Bob could tell me precisely—
[t]wo years, I believe. Well, there was a delay for the defendants after we’d put 
on our case; they were working on some big project over at the law fi rm, and 
it turns out that they brought in an expert witness. We didn’t have any experts 
up until that time on this case. The expert witness had something called a 
regression analysis. We had never heard of a regression analysis at this point, 
so we were curious to see this.  Well it was a big printout and it showed that 
while we were saying race made the difference—ah-ha—you need to look 
further. There are other factors at work. One of those factors was education. 
Now it wouldn’t surprise anybody to know that black steelworkers typically 
did not have the same level of education as white steel workers, but these 
are steel working jobs. And education is not necessarily something that is 
translatable into most of the work in the steel mills. 
But we had interviewed—the paralegals had interviewed—all of 
the black steelworkers. We knew when we looked at this closely, their 
education levels aren’t even right. Some were too high, some were too 
low—they [were] just [in]correct. What did we do? We brought in about 
fi fty steelworkers to testify to the inaccuracy of the data they were using 
for their regression analysis, and the judge, who was very much attuned to 
mathematical analysis, Judge Pointer, tossed out the exhibit. That was their 
major work, I’d have to say—I don’t think they put up any resistance after 
that, but it was just a good example for me of how facts are important. 
 TERRY CONNORS: The Department actually paid 
you for all that time in Alabama? 
 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: No. I got per diem; it was twenty-fi ve dollars a day.
 TERRY CONNORS: Actually—  
 MARYBETH MARTIN: And overtime. 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: [You received] overtime?
 TERRY CONNORS: In 19— 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: We did get overtime. 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: We didn’t. 
 JERRY GEORGE: We didn’t. 
 TERRY CONNORS: [That’s a] good point, because someone brought us 
up to 1974, I believe, in the initial phase, and there was a group of us that 
went over to the EEOC on detail, when the transfer occurred, and were asked 
to put cases together in ninety days in the style we had done at the Justice 
2011]      45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS     219 
Department and I recall going to tak[e] a team to Cincinnati to investigate a 
major consumer products company that will remain unnamed. And my plan 
was that we would go on Tuesday and we would return when we were fi nished. 
And, of course, that we would be fi nding people at home at night and over 
the weekend and so on and so forth, and the team said “wait a minute.” The 
point of this is young lawyers and law students, when you are dedicated [to] 
something like this, [will] work as much as it takes to get this done and I think 
this is the theme throughout all of our lives at the [ELS]. And Jerry, tell us 
about fi re departments and police departments and your experience.
JERRY GEORGE: Well, police and fi re departments, they’re sort of like 
construction unions; they’re kind of my people. I’m from Indiana; I was 
working class. [I went] to Catholic schools. As I say, the guys in the police 
and fi re departments were my people; I knew them. Before I get into that, one 
of the themes I think that’s coming out of this is that in the [ELS], I think in 
the Civil Rights Division generally, [it] wasn’t lawyers; it was a team. It was 
lawyers; it was research analysts and secretaries. We traveled together; we 
worked together; we partied together. We made very effective teams, and it’s 
because we didn’t have any artifi cial barriers between job classifi cations. This 
wasn’t even a consideration. People did. Everybody worked on everything. 
And Dave Rose was key to that. And he always had our back. I always felt he 
had my back and I got one story on that which I would like to tell.
In the mid [19]80s, when I was suing —and had been suing for several years, 
off and on—the San Francisco Police Department,20 there was [a] promotional 
exam coming up and it was no different than the promotional exam that I had 
stopped two years earlier, and [so I] informed the Chief Deputy City Attorney 
and I said, you know, under our consent decree, you guys [can’t] go—I’m 
objecting; I’m writing you a letter telling you to stop the exam. Unfortunately 
there [was] some turmoil in the City Attorney’s offi ce at the time and that 
the person I had spoken with departed without ever telling anybody he 
was supposed to stop the examination. And we came up around in 1986, 
Thanksgiving week. I sent off my letter; I stopped the examination and the 
then mayor, now a Senator, called a friend of hers, George Bush, who was Vice 
President, at his home in Kennebunkport for the holidays; who then called Ed 
Meese; who then called Brad Reynolds. Who then called Dave Rose. And then 
the day after Thanksgiving, when I was at my mother’s house, he called me; 
asked me what was going on, [and] I explained what had happened, and you 
know, nothing ever happened out of that. I understand that the mayor spoke to 
Brad, and Brad—she started yelling at Brad, Brad started yelling at her, they 
hung up on each other and nothing further happened. But I never had to worry 
about political interference as long as Dave was my Section chief, and it made 
a huge difference given the particular dealing[s] with police and fi re litigation, 
which [were] extremely politically sensitive. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco, Nos. C-84-7089-MHP & C-84-
7694-MHP, 1986 WL 68546, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1986).
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 Police and fi re—why did we do so many police and fi re cases? Well, police 
and fi re departments in this country historically were all white and all male. 
There were in some cities [where] you might have had a few blacks, a few 
Hispanics, but often they would have segregated assignments, segregated 
facilities. And these are really well paid jobs that have low entry requirements. 
They hire eighteen year-old kids and they train them to be fi refi ghters; they 
train them to be police offi cers. You don’t need to be an electrician; you don’t 
need to be a sheet metal worker. You start out with no skills at all; they train 
you and it’s a very good living. 
Now, if you’re also wondering why the fi re department [i]n New York might 
have a lot fewer minorities than the police department. Firefi ghters in most big 
cities work eight days a month. They’re twenty-four hour shifts, but they’re 
sleeping in the fi rehouse during most of those shifts. I often thought I missed 
my calling; I went into the wrong profession. It is a fabulous job, and most of 
these guys have two jobs. And they’ll work through their fi refi ghting career 
and then retire and go to their second job full-time. But they’ll have two full-
time jobs. They can easily work two full-time jobs depending on what kind 
of job it was. There were fi refi ghters in Chicago; there’d be four of them that 
would have a union—they would have a union job, a construction job, [which] 
they would work among the four of them. Whoever had a day off would work 
that day—they are terrifi c jobs. They have terrifi c . . . salaries, good benefi ts, 
and very good retirement.
Another element that made these this kind of litigation a little different than 
dealing with the industrial and union cases that I dealt with [was] the fact that 
you have the civil service “merit” system. (I would put quotes around merit.) 
It’s a different kind of process. At a company you can go in any time and apply 
for the job. When you’re talking about police and fi re entry level jobs, they 
all accept applications maybe—they might be doing it once every fi ve years. 
They’ll go out, they’ll rig, they’ll run a selection process, and they accept 
applications, [and] they go take the multiple choice test, the physical agility 
test, they’ll interview, create an eligibility list, that eligibility list will rank 
maybe 500 people, and that will be in place for several years. And they either 
run out of people on the list, [or] it expires. And then they go through the process 
again. So you have to be motivated to get those jobs. And they are politically 
sensitive. I mean, these are the people that are responsible for the protection of 
the community: your homes, your families, [and] your businesses. So people 
are very concerned about the quality of their fi re and police departments. But 
it’s also very important that those fi re and police departments be representative 
of the communities they’re serving, and that they be perceived as actually 
serving that community and not [be]—as many police departments were, and 
maybe still are—occupying forces.
They also were politically sensitive because they have extremely strong 
unions that are very politically savvy. They have a lot of time, they have a lot 
of money, and they have a lot at stake in preserving the status quo. So when we 
fi led these cases, we’re dealing with the cities—and maybe the politics in the 
city might be to resolve this matter, but the politicians in the city had to take 
into account the political threat from the police and fi re unions. So that made 
them a little harder to deal with.
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Now I talk about the myth of “merit” selection. You know, [a] lot of these 
departments were just historically all white. If they had any blacks, they just 
[would]—even [in] some of the northern and western cities [they] would have 
a few blacks, Hispanics—[have] segregated assignments. The city of Los 
Angeles—[the] liberal left coast—had two black fi re houses. And the area of 
all the other fi re houses were whites; all of these departments would have 
male only policies. They would not—just would not—even allow a woman to 
apply for a fi refi ghter job or a police offi cer’s job. On police offi cers—police 
departments—there were no street cops. You might have a policewoman 
category or a matron category to deal with prisoners; maybe to serve undercover 
on vice squad or something, but they were not considered police offi cers.
A story I heard [a]bout the Philadelphia Police Department was that when 
the Director was deposed, he was explaining that there were two badges for 
the Philadelphia Police Department. You had the badge for the police offi cers, 
and then the badge for the dogs, horses, and policewomen. In the L.A. Police 
Department, at a dinner for the policewoman’s organization, there were about 
a hundred policewomen I think at the time on the L.A.P.D. The police chief at 
the time said he thought there was room for about twenty policewomen. And 
I don’t know why he thought that was a good audience to say that to, but that 
was the situation that existed at the time we got authority to start suing these 
employers.
In addition to these policies there [was] a lot of what you would call 
“institutional head-winks.” The standard they were all using—standards 
unrelat[ed] to job performance—[such as] multiple choice tests [that] would 
consistently have adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics. Blacks and 
Hispanics would always score, or not always, well—always—pretty much, 
one standard deviation below the white mean. If you’re using it as pass/fail, 
that’s bad enough, but if you’re using the written test as a ranking device, forget 
it. You’re not going to be hiring any blacks or Hispanics. Physical strength and 
agility tests—they would use those to screen out female candidates once formal 
sex requirements were eliminated. There were minimum height requirements, 
usually in the fi ve-foot-six to fi ve-foot-nine range, which would eliminate 
at least ninety percent of the women, and eliminate Asians and Hispanics at 
twice the rate of white males. And then [there were] background checks; use 
of factors, such as arrest records without convictions that had disproportionate 
impact on minorities, and often they were just subjectively applied. If your 
dad’s a cop they may not even bother to check your background, particularly, 
you know, if he had a bad patch when he was a teenager but he’s fi ne now. If 
you were a minority and you had an arrest record, you’re out of there. 
And then the last thing was just the process itself. Like I said, they might 
have an eligibility list that would exist for fi ve years, [so] then you wouldn’t 
know if you missed that start date; you’re just going to have to wait around. 
And who waits around—unless you’re really motivated to be a police offi cer 
or a fi refi ghter? In addition you have this multiple step process where you 
fi rst apply, then they’ll send you a notice of the written test. Come in and take 
the written test. [We’ll] send you the results of the written test. Then later 
they’ll schedule the physical agility test. They’ll send you another notice. You 
come in for the physical agility test. Then, after that, same thing for the oral 
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interview. And then maybe, then they’ll have the eligibility list, and then if 
you’ve got 500 names on it, they probably won’t run the background [checks 
until] they’re getting ready to hire somebody, so they’re going to hire twenty 
people, maybe they’ll take [the] fi rst sixty names on the list and send them a 
notice to come in and fi ll out the forms for the background check. So if you’re 
in the second sixty names, you might not hear anything for two years after 
you’ve got yourself on the list. 
So none of this is a problem if your dad’s a police offi cer [and] your six 
cousins are all [in] the department. You know, when things are ready to happen, 
they’ll let you know. You need to move, you change your address, you know; 
they make sure civil service knows about it. But if you’re not in that game, then 
it can be a real problem. And people move; they forget to tell somebody about 
the change of address, they don’t get notice, and they’re off the list. Or it’s been 
three, four years, they forgot they even applied for the job. So if you wonder 
why, if you have a merit system, you still end up with situations where the bulk 
of the people on the police or the fi re department are all related to each other, 
that’s how it happens. It’s a merit system. It’s a transparent system, but it’s set 
up in such a way that unless you’ve got a comparable organizational effort 
for the minority communities, they’re going to fall to the wayside. In terms of 
litigating stuff, what we really did [wasn’t]—most of what we actually actively 
litigated—the height requirements and that sort of thing [because those] just 
went. You know, people understood they couldn’t defend them. I only had one 
that ever got litigated.21 They brought in an expert to talk about why the North 
Carolina Highway Patrol [used that type of requirement],  and we had a case 
that only went two days, because the judge had gone to the University of North 
Carolina and he wanted to go to the basketball game that night. He let the trial 
go over to the next day. It took a couple more hours of testimony, and then 
[he] ruled from the bench. But they put their expert on the stand, and the most 
amazingly bad thing about it was that this guy gets on with his report talking 
about why this fi ve-foot nine-inch height requirement was absolutely required 
to be a good, successful State Trooper. And you know, I knew that fi ve years 
earlier, he had a one page report, and I had in my hands this transcript from the 
case fi ve years earlier in California where he had testifi ed for a plaintiff against 
a height requirement, and had gone on at great length about just how you could 
never defend a minimum height requirement for a trooper position.
So it was fun, I [have] got to admit. But it was not diffi cult. In terms of 
challenging written tests—and I think this is still an issue, because we’re still 
doing it, and they’re still giving the same kinds of exams. As I said, they’ll 
always have adverse impact. The evidence of job relation in those early days 
often was not much more than well, of course, it’s a good test; I mean it says this 
is a test for a police offi cer. That’s what it says on the fi rst page. So that’s what 
it does; it tests for a police offi cer. And it didn’t get a lot more sophisticated 
than that. [I]f they did try to validate test performance against job performance, 
they would typically use training academy performance because they had no 
good measures of actual job performance. Everybody was satisfactory. And if 
21.  United States v. North Carolina, No. 75-0328-CIV-5, 1981 WL 232 (E.D.N.C. 
Feb. 17, 1981).
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you’re correlating against a written test against another written test, you would 
expect probably to get about a point three correlation; and that was about the 
best any of the cases I saw ever did, was to get about a point three correlation 
between written test performance and academy performance.
On promotional exams, they didn’t even have that, because they didn’t 
have any job performance data at all. So they would say that they built these 
tests using a “doing a good job” analysis and the content of the test matched 
the content of the job. [That’s what’s] called content validation. And our 
response to these was to fi rst tear apart their job analyses, because these are 
typically very superfi cial job analyses done by inexperienced analysts; nobody 
had ever questioned them before in terms of their ability to do these jobs, 
and if you cross-examined them, you could trip them up fairly easily. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Jerry, isn’t that true in the Ricci 
case,22 as well, but it never got to the record, I think? 
 JERRY GEORGE: I suspect it’s true. I doubt that the test was any better 
than any of the stuff I saw. And test [content], typically would be irrelevant 
to job content, even on the promotional exams. I mean they looked like 
they were relevant, but if you started asking people about [it]—“So what 
would you do with this information on the job?”—[they] typically had no 
idea. It made no difference. And these are highly physical jobs—in terms 
of fi refi ghter[s and] even police offi cer[s]—and on the promotion[s], the 
difference between the guys who were successfully performing at the entry 
level and their offi cers is leadership potential and there’s nothing on those 
written tests that’s going to measure any of those leadership traits. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Jerry, in the interest of time, [would you] run down 
the results on the San Francisco [and] L.A. cases?23
JERRY CONNORS: Well, all right. Well, L.A., as I said, had historically 
segregated fi rehouses [until] 1956. Then the department—the fi re chief—
said the watchword within the department was integrate and eliminate. 
And so they had internal segregation within those fi rehouses. What all of 
us had some experience with [was] the black bed. If you’re at a fi re house, 
you’ve got four, fi ve people on the crew [that] live in [the] fi re house. [I]
f there was a black on the crew, there was a bed he was supposed to sleep 
in, and then when the next crew came in, the black on that crew would have 
to sleep in that same bed. They were not allowed to eat in the supper clubs. 
They all fi xed meals together and [would] eat together in the fi re houses, but 
the blacks were not allowed to eat with the whites [and] were not allowed 
to socialize with the whites. They could only [be] with the whites at the 
22. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
23. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. City of San Francisco, Nos. C-84-7089-MHP & C-84-7694-MHP, 1986 WL 68546, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1986); Offi cers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 473 
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
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fi re scene. And the whites were told that they could not talk to the black 
fi refi ghters, because, the Chief said, “If people talk, they’ll argue. People 
argue, they’ll fi ght, and I’m not going to have any interracial fi ghts.” 
 TERRY CONNORS: And that’s the last word. 
 JERRY GEORGE: And the witness who was going to say all 
this was a black fi refi ghter who went to law school while he was on 
the fi re department, and by the time we were ready to go to trial his 
chief was the head of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission. 
 TERRY CONNORS: [J]ust as a wrap, because I want to do it publicly, 
I endorse completely what a great thing it was, what a great example Dave 
Rose was to all of us and what a great man and a great lawyer he is. 
 RICHARD UGELOW: Before we take a break for the next panel, you’ve 
heard a lot about Dave Rose today and the culture he created and established 
in the [ELS], and I say in the entire Civil Rights Division, particularly in 
the [ELS]. We were trained by Dave. [Since] Dave left, our successors have 
continued that—that same work ethic and culture [w]ill carry on. And as 
you’ve heard Tom Perez say, [the] Civil Rights Division is open for business 
again, and I’m sure the [ELS] is open for business, but hopefully, in the same 
tradition that Dave created, and that will carry on in [the] future, we have 
as a token of our appreciation to you. And I want to give credit to Lorna 
Grenevere who, as you know, was always the heart and soul of the set. 
 
           END TRANSCRIPT
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RICHARD UGELOW: [T]he next panel [will be led] by my colleague, 
Bill Yeomans, who teaches in the Law and Government Program at 
[Washington College of Law], which [Dean Grossman] mentioned at 
lunch, and [who] is a former Chief of Staff, Civil Rights Division, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General. We have three Acting Assistant Attorney 
Generals, people who have acted in the room, and [Bill Yeomans] was in the 
Appellate Section for many years. And were you in the Trial Section?  
 BILL YEOMANS: Criminal Section.
RICHARD UGELOW: And Criminal Section, Deputy Chief in the Criminal 
Section. [He] is going to lead [and] facilitate this panel and [talk] about the 
future, where we are now, and where the future will be. And if somebody 
asked about the next forty-fi ve years of the Civil Rights Division, well 
maybe this panel has some answers or can point us in the right direction 
 
 BILL YEOMANS: Okay, thank you, Richard. I want to say a special 
word about Richard for putting all of this together. He is an exceptional 
colleague, and we interact on a regular basis here, and he really is a 
driving force in this law school; it’s amazing. But he has done us all—and 
done the legal community here—an enormous service by bringing us all 
together today and I think we ought to give him a round of applause. 
 (Applause) 
 BILL YEOMANS: All right, enough with the nice stuff; let’s get on [with 
it]. No, actually we are going to talk about current enforcement and future 
enforcement. And we are building on a day of very wise words and so our 
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burden is heavy because we have some tough acts to follow and, also, we’re 
all that stands between you all and a reception; so bear with us, but we have 
the people here who can keep it interesting. And I’m not going to do extensive 
introductions, but I will do quick ones. 
I think most of you probably know everybody. Everybody here, with the 
exception of Jocelyn and I, served in the [ELS] as a trial attorney, right Jocelyn?
 JOCELYN SAMUELS: I did not. 
 BILL YEOMANS: And served with great distinction. They all fall into that 
category of people, like many of you who came to the Section, who were 
enormously talented, incredibly dedicated, terrifi cally productive, and who 
made an enormous contribution to the country. And so I won’t go through their 
Section histories, and I’m sure they’ll talk about some of their experiences, but 
they have all gone on to do extraordinary things after leaving the Section and 
the Department.
And so just going down [the] line: Bob Libman, who came in from Chicago 
for the tropical weather, and is a partner [at] Miner, Barnhill & Galland in 
Chicago and has been practicing there for a number of years after leaving the 
Department in 2004, I believe, so he’s pretty fresh. 
And next to him is Aaron Schuham, who serves as the Legislative 
Director of an organization that I love dearly, but its name always gives 
me a headache. It’s the Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State; it’s a diffi cult concept to be united for separation. 
 (Laughter)  
 BILL YEOMANS: And then next to him is John Gadzichowski, who, of 
course, [is]—we might want to talk about changing that—[the] current Chief 
of the Section, and we’re looking to him, for the inside view on what’s going 
on inside the building right now. 
And next to him is Jocelyn Samuels, who serves as Counselor to the Assistant 
Attorney General, and has responsibility for both the Employment Section and 
the Education Section. And next to her is Michael Selmi, who is a Professor of 
Law at George Washington University Law School, and is one of the country’s 
leading scholars on employment law.
So we are delighted to have all of you here today. And I’m not going to 
say a whole lot. I did want to just get my chance to talk about Dave Rose 
very quickly. And what I want to say is: Dave, I’m sorry to hear that you’re 
still bitter about the Cicero argument.1 I thought we had gotten over that.
 (Laughter) 
 DAVE ROSE: Respectively. 
 BILL YEOMANS: We won; it’s time to move on. 
1. United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1986).
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(Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: But, no, that was a wonderful experience, because I 
was, at that point, a relatively young attorney in the Appellate Section. And 
when I came to the Civil Rights Division, there were a few people who were 
sort of gods at that point because they had been there from the creation and 
had had just a real fundamental impact on the development of civil rights law 
and—of course, Dave was one of those; Brian Landsberg was another—[I] 
looked up to these people enormously.
And so Brian told me I was going to argue this case; [it] seemed 
like a good idea to me, and, of course, I had to write a brief—and 
by the way, I don’t remember Dave volunteering to write the brief. 
 (Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: And so I wrote the brief and I was going to go to the 
argument. And I knew there was some buzz about Dave being a little unhappy, 
and lo and behold there I am out in Chicago before the Seventh Circuit, and 
he shows up. And it was bad enough that I was going to face Judge Posner on 
my panel, [I] wasn’t really looking forward to that, but there I had the added 
pressure of having Dave in the courtroom, and it turned out really well.  
I think in the twenty minutes, or a total of forty minutes in that oral 
argument, we bonded because, as Dave said, he didn’t feel that good about it 
before I started [talking] but, by the time I fi nished, he felt better.  
 (Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: And I can vouch for that because at the very end of the 
argument—Judge Posner turned out to be very helpful during the argument, 
after sort of the light bulb went on halfway through, and so he was just eating 
the City Attorney alive—[I] wrote sort of a little note to Dave: “No rebuttal, 
right?” And Dave wrote back: “No!” So we had come together. 
(Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: Anyway, we’re going to talk about current enforcement 
and future enforcement. Just to set the stage, I mean you’ve heard a lot about 
the Section’s troubles, shall we call them, during the last number of years, and 
those troubles, we’re all quick to say, came from the political level, certainly 
not from the career level, but it was a diffi cult time. It was a time when, 
from outward appearances, the Section really failed to perform its traditional 
mission.
It pretty much stopped fi ling cases on behalf of African-American victims 
for a while. In fact, there was a long stretch where it fi led more cases on behalf 
of white victims than African-American victims. And I kept standing up and 
saying, “My people don’t need that kind of help,” but I think toward the end of 
the last administration there was some moderation of that. And I think, as we 
all heard at lunch today, it is an exciting new time. 
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And Tom Perez [the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Civil Rights Division] frequently says, “The Division and the 
Section are open for business again,” which is nice—it makes 
me a little nervous because it makes me think they’re taking bribes. 
 (Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: But I think it is true—that it really is the dawning of a 
new age—it’s an occasion! It’s an occasion for all of us to think about where 
we should be headed, because the Section is an enormous resource; as you 
heard, it’s getting more resources.
We are living in an ever evolving society. We are going to be dealing with 
a new economy emerging from this economy’s recent near-death experience 
and we are facing new living patterns. We are facing non-traditional ways 
of living and we need to think hard about how we can use some of the tools 
that we traditionally use, not only to do the work that the Section has been so 
important in doing, but [to think about] how we can expand the reach and the 
impact of the Section. 
So I hope we’ll deal with some of those issues today. And I hope we’ll 
talk, obviously, about some of the legal challenges that Title VII faces. There 
has been mention of the Ricci decision;2 there is some disagreement about 
how serious a blow that is to Title VII, and maybe we’ll talk about some of 
that. And we’ll talk about whether there are changes in the law that should be 
thought about.
So I’m going to stop talking and we’re going to turn fi rst to 
our government witnesses, and we’re going to start with . . .
 JOCELYN SAMUELS: Witnesses? 
 BILL YEOMANS: Yeah. 
 (Laughter) 
 BILL YEOMANS: And we’re going to start—that’s all right—
back in congressional hearing mode. One thing I didn’t say about 
Jocelyn, of course, is that she worked for Senator Kennedy too, 
and so she is a part of that incredible group of uniquely and 
unvaryingly talented people who are also very good looking. 
 (Laughter and applause) 
 
 BILL YEOMANS: So I would like to start with Jocelyn and let her tell us 
a little bit about the current thinking in the Division about the Section.  
 
2. Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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 JOCELYN SAMUELS: Well thanks, Bill, and I’m delighted to be here, 
although I sort of think Bill has now set me up in many ways (Samuels 
and audience chuckling). He started by, after congratulating Richard 
for putting together this great day, which I am delighted to be a part of, 
saying “okay, that’s enough with the nice guy,” follow[ed] by calling me a 
witness, and pointing out that I was not a trial attorney in the [ELS]. 
 BILL YEOMANS: Nor was I. 
 JOCELYN SAMUELS: I’m prepared for some tough cross examination 
here.  
 (Laughter) 
 JOCELYN SAMUELS: But let me make clear at the outset, we are not 
open for business by taking bribes. We don’t take bribes, lest anybody have 
any doubt about that. 
What I think Tom does mean by “open for business,” though, is that he 
and the rest of the Division are now fi rmly committed to really aggressive 
enforcement of Title VII and of all of the other laws under our jurisdiction, [as 
well as] ensuring that the Section is restored to its original mission and role 
as a promoter of real social change and [to being] an entity that really does 
combat employment discrimination against those disadvantaged in . . . society.
Tom often uses the terms “reformation” and “transformation,” and I think 
that’s sort of consistent with what Bill was talking about, because certainly 
reformation plays a part in what we want to do over the course of the next 
three years. Because, as Bill pointed out, we lost a lot of experienced attorneys 
during the last administration; we brought minimal numbers of cases. I think 
Tom referenced in his remarks the GAO report that showed that the pattern 
or practice caseload of the Section diminished signifi cantly; and there were, I 
think, signifi cant issues about morale and direction in the Section. 
So, by “reformation,” I think he really wants to look toward restoring the 
Section to the role that it has played over the course of the last forty-fi ve years 
in promoting social change. But in order to do that, I think, we also—and he 
recognizes—[n]eed to transform; it’s not simply enough to go back to 1999 
or 2000 or 1982. That [is] because the nature of civil rights challenges are 
different than what they have been over time, because the nature of the tools 
that we have available has expanded exponentially, and because the complexity 
of some of the issues that we confront is really enhanced, [so] we need to think 
about new ways of doing business and using all of the tools at our disposal to 
make sure that we can be the most effective employment litigation law fi rm in 
the country. That takes people. 
And I just want to reiterate something that Tom said at lunch, which is that 
we were extremely fortunate to receive a signifi cant increase in our budget. We 
have many different job openings, including fi ve in the [ELS]. So I urge you to 
consult our website to look at the job postings there [or] to refer them to your 
friends. We have—and I want to make [this] clear because this is part of the 
restoration component of our effort—[a] transparent and nonpartisan hiring 
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process in place, and we are really looking for the best and brightest candidates 
from all across the country and all different kinds of experiences, so please do 
spread the word. We need help, and this is an extraordinary opportunity for us 
to really make a difference. 
But let me talk a little bit—and I know Bill had suggested that we each talk 
for between fi ve and seven minutes, and I’m incapable of restraining myself, 
but I’ll be quick—[about] some of the changes in processes that we have 
started to put into motion and that we are planning to expand on.
One is that we’re determined to make better use of the federal government’s 
enforcement resources writ large, because there are numerous agencies, the 
EEOC and [the Offi ce of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”)] 
being the most signifi cant of them, that also have responsibilities for combating 
employment discrimination across the country. We want to make sure that we 
leverage the—albeit growing—still limited resources that each of our agencies 
has and make [the] best use of them to ensure that we’re operating at maximum 
effi ciency and helping each other out where we can. 
So, we’ve begun conversations with each of those agencies about ways that 
we can better collaborate. And that could potentially include joint training 
[and] joint investigations. As Tom said at lunch, it may mean getting involved 
earlier in certain cases to make sure that, as the investigations are conducted, 
they’re set up well for ultimate litigation. We are absolutely open to expanding 
those relationships to the extent useful to ensure that we’re making [the] best 
use of our enforcement dollars and resources. 
We’re not exclusively restricting that [to] EEOC and OFCCP [though]—
Tom recently convened a meeting of all of the federal agencies that have 
civil rights enforcement responsibilities—because I think one of the things to 
recognize, in terms of understanding the complexity of issues that we face, is 
that there is overlap, potentially, between different forms of discrimination that 
previously have been too siloed.
So it may well be that housing discrimination is a signifi cant component of 
education discrimination, and that disability discrimination, as we all know, 
permeates every aspect of whatever is going on—be it public accommodations, 
housing, education, or employment. So we want to make sure that we are 
coordinating in the most effective way, broadly, so that we can use our 
enforcement resources, not simply under Title VII and the ADA, but also under 
the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI and Title IX, so that we can, again, make 
the most effective judgments about how to promote equality of opportunity. 
We also are looking to state fair employment practices agencies and trying 
to fi gure out whether there are ways that we can better collaborate with them to 
ensure that, again, we are using resources in the best way possible. So getting 
our own house in order is something that we are really attempting to do and put 
new energy into. But that’s only the beginning. 
Another thing that we really, really want to do is ensure that we have open 
lines of communication with all stakeholder communities. And I include 
everyone in this room in that. [W]e know that people who are on the ground 
have information about cases of discrimination; about situations that they 
think may be unfair or unlawful; about policy priorities that we ought to 
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pursue; about opportunities for us to come and do public education, technical 
assistance, or other kinds of work in local communities to ensure that we’re 
getting the word out that we’re in business and we intend to protect people’s 
rights. So we welcome getting input from all of you, and from the coalitions 
and groups and communities of which you are a part, so that you can be our 
eyes and ears on the ground.
We’re also trying to work with U.S. Attorneys, and particularly in the area 
of [Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act] cases, 
trying to promote enhanced partnerships so that we can, again, more effectively 
deploy our resources. 
We also are interested in making use of new tools, and our website doesn’t 
yet refl ect that, but hopefully over the reasonably short term we will have a 
website that is more user-friendly and has lots of valuable information. But I 
think that as more social media tools have become available, as there continues 
to be a need for public education and technical assistance, we want to add 
those kinds of activities to the work that we do and to the core litigation that 
will always remain a key priority of the Section.
I guess the other category of things that I would say are about emerging 
issues. To the extent that there are discrimination issues that are presented in 
a new way, or issues as to new communities, or new legal questions that are 
emerging, on which you think the Justice Department could play a helpful 
role, we’d love to hear from you about that.  
As Tom mentioned at lunch, he’s very concerned about re-segregation 
of older work forces as people retire. There may well be issues related to 
immigrants that are things that we need to take a look at. There are obviously 
going to be all kinds of new issues under the ADA Amendments Act, and 
although that’s not in the ELS bailiwick, it is something that the Division is 
quite committed to enforcing in a proactive way.
If there are new legal issues, we hope that you will look to us and ask us to 
weigh in as appropriate. We have begun to fi le more amicus briefs. As many 
of you know, the Lewis case3 is going to be argued in the Supreme Court on 
Monday; that is potentially [the] son or daughter of Ledbetter4 and it concerns 
the statute of limitations that applies to disparate impact lawsuits. I think that’s 
a very signifi cant case, and it’s one [in] which the Solicitor General fi led a brief 
and will be arguing on behalf of the government that the statute of limitations 
runs from every occasion on which an employer uses a test that has disparate 
impact. 
Those kinds of issues are obviously ones that pack a big wallop, and I think 
that one of the clear things that Tom means by “open for business” is that we 
intend to play a signifi cant role in shaping interpretations of the law and [we] 
hope you’ll engage in the continuing dialogue with us about how we can do 
that.
3. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
4. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded 
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2006) 
(codifi ed at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
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 So I think I’ll stop, turn it over to John for discussion of some of the 
specifi c cases that we’re involved in, and then I know that people on 
the panel have a lot of suggestions and are prepared to take me up on this 
invitation immediately for suggestions about ways we can proceed. 
 BILL YEOMANS: Thank you, Jocelyn. Go ahead, John.  
 JOHN GADZICHOWSKI: Thank you, Bill. Good afternoon folks. This 
past year, the fi rst year of this administration, has been a banner year for the 
[ELS]. We fi led a total of twenty-nine lawsuits, which is the largest number 
of lawsuits ever fi led by ELS during any single year; ten of these suits were 
brought under Title VII, and nineteen were brought under USERRA.5 As to the 
ten Title VII lawsuits, four were pattern or practice suits, and the remainder 
were brought under Section 706.6
I know that Tom ha[s] shared with you some of the work we had done, 
referencing a couple of cases, Fire Department of New York7 and Massachusetts 
Department of Corrections.8 I’m not going to repeat what he had said, but rather 
turn to areas of priorities that we may want to address and in that context, [I 
will] discuss the recent lawsuits that we have fi led. 
Probably one of the signifi cant priorities that we ought to be addressing is, 
obviously, increasing the number of pattern or practice suits, especially those 
which are large and complex. There are several reasons for this. [O]ne is to 
have . . . impact and impact cases. And I don’t mean impact verses treatment; 
I’m talking about the large cases that have a lot of relief; in other words, a 
lot of impact on communities and on employers. They can be found only in 
large suits. Second of all, it’s those types of suits, especially where you have 
complex testing cases, where I think the Section can lend its expertise, as well 
as its deeper pocket, to members of the plaintiffs’ bar who otherwise wouldn’t 
be able to take and fund cases of that type. 
A case in point is Fire Department of New York, [United States] v. Fire 
Department of New York. There, we, the United States has—and plaintiff 
intervenors have—alleged that the city had used two written examinations 
for entry-level fi refi ghter[s], which resulted in disparate impact and which 
were not job-related or consistent with business necessity. By defi nition, since 
it’s a testing case, [the case] requires experts in the area of the fi rst prong, 
disparate impact, as well as the second prong, which is job relatedness. These 
are very labor and cost intensive cases, and I think we’ve had a very good 
working relationship and a true partnership with the Vulcan Society, which is 
the plaintiff intervenor there.  
5. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 
U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).  
7. United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
8. Complaint, United States v. Massachusetts, No. 1:09-cv-11623 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/emp/documents/
massachusettscomplaint.pdf.
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 Just last month Judge Garaufi s entered an order on relief in which the court 
. . . determined that the City is responsible [for] provid[ing] 293 priority job 
offers to black and Hispanic victims of the two tests, as well as to award those 
folks retroactive seniority for all purposes. We heard from Frank Petramalo 
and Jerry George earlier today with regard to the real importance of retroactive 
seniority, and, obviously, the Supreme Court also thought so in Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation,9 where it held that (or instructed that) retroactive 
seniority is an integral part of remedial relief. 
Another case that is large and complex is a current case that we’re working 
on, United States v. State of Massachusetts. This case involves our challenge 
to the State’s use of a physical abilities test for the entry-level position of 
corrections offi cer[s] statewide. The examination, or the test, that the State 
administers is not gender norm[alized], so, therefore, it has tremendous 
disparate impact on the basis of gender against women.
Jerry talked a little bit about police jobs, and I’m asked all the time, why 
do we concentrate on public safety jobs, and is that all we do? That is, and 
remains, a priority. Jerry had mentioned several reasons for it; let me add 
another one: and that is [that] especially in the economy that we fi nd ourselves 
in, the employers on the state and local level are not only not hiring but, indeed, 
cutting back and letting folks go. 
One thing we know about public safety positions . . . is that they’re almost 
always going to be hiring cops and fi refi ghters. So it’s a very good job that’s 
got great benefi ts, great pension benefi ts, and a lot of employment decisions, 
which—from a plaintiff’s point of view—are crucial [in order] to make, for 
example, a statistical showing.
The type of job that we’re looking at currently involves a police promotion 
exam. We want to focus; we want to continue our efforts in the area of 
public safety, but we want to expand those efforts in public safety to go after 
promotional practices. Heretofore, the Section has concentrated mostly on 
entry-level positions in public safety positions. 
One of the reasons for having done that was because there weren’t blacks 
or there weren’t women or Latinos in even the entry-level jobs, much less the 
promotional positions. Now we’re seeing more and more . . . integration of our 
police and fi re departments but only at the entry-level, and we want to take the 
next step to look at discrimination in promotions in both police and fi re.
An example of this is our State of New Jersey suit,10 which was fi led just last 
month. In this suit, we challenged the State’s use of a written examination for 
promotion to the position of police sergeant. [That] examination is used by all 
local jurisdictions throughout the State that are part of the State’s civil service 
system; so that’s, I would say, about three-quarters of the local jurisdictions 
throughout the State utilizing this exam. We’re in the early stages of discovery 
at this juncture. 
9. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
10. Complaint, United States v. New Jersey, No. 2:33-av-00001 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/emp/documents/newjerseycomp.pdf.
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Jocelyn raised the point, and it’s my third point in terms of priorities.  
 JOCELYN SAMUELS: I didn’t mean to steal your talking point. 
 JOHN GADZICHOWSKI: Not a problem, no—[on] suits to address re-
segregation: we actually have two suits already that are on point here, one 
is Fire Department of New York. Remember, I think Tom had mentioned at 
luncheon that blacks made up approximately only three-and-a-half percent of 
the fi refi ghters in the Fire Department of New York. There was a time, folks, 
when blacks made up about seven or eight percent of fi refi ghters, so we’ve 
actually had a retrenchment with respect to the Fire Department of New York. 
Second of all, in our Massachusetts suit, we’re challenging this physical 
abilities test, which is used without gender norms. But I’ve got to tell you 
something; at one point and up to 2004, the State actually used a physical 
abilities test that was gender norm[alized]. So I don’t know how one defi nes 
the term “re-segregation,” but certainly we have employers that are, shall 
we say, regressing. I think those are the types of employers that need special 
attention, because we certainly don’t want to sacrifi ce and give up the gains that 
we’ve made. A fourth point is that we want to look very hard at employment 
discrimination in our schools and universities. Fifth, we expect that there is 
going to be a very substantial increase in the amount of defensive litigation. 
As most of you know—I know Mary Beth in particular, because she worked 
[with] Ann Richard, because they worked on so many of these set-aside 
cases—they’re under attack, and we have the [Associated General Contractors] 
(“AGC”) and other plaintiffs looking to knock out the programs state by state, 
one by one. We’re not going to let that happen. We are going to actively defend 
the set-aside programs that are in place.
Lastly, I see that there is going to be an increase in pregnancy discrimination 
suits. Two of our pattern or practice suits this past year have dealt with 
pregnancy discrimination; one in terms of assignment restriction, and the other 
one in terms of a termination. We’ve also seen it in one of our Section 70611 
suits, United States v. City of Chicago Board of Education12 I think this is an 
issue that we thought some time ago was going to be taken care of and we 
weren’t going to be seeing again, but it seems like we’re revisiting this very 
issue that we thought we had settled and resolved some years ago.
Those are the bold-letter priorities. I’m sure that there are going to be 
suggestions from my colleagues with regard to more. But in working on these 
priorities, we’re going to keep, as a process matter, [doing] three things.
First, as Jocelyn has indicated, we’re going to develop and maintain a very 
close and constructive relationship with the EEOC with the respect to the 
enforcement of Title VII, and with the OFCCP with respect to the enforcement 
of the executive order. [Second], we’re going to develop and maintain effective, 
constructive working relationships with stakeholder organizations and their 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
12. Complaint, United States v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 09-cv-1092 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/emp/documents/chicagoboecomp.
pdf.
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counsel, as we’ve already started doing in the fi re department case[s]. 
And [third], we’re going to be putting more reliance upon the U.S. 
Attorney offi ces for litigating our USERRA suits, thereby freeing 
up valuable resources, both personnel and money resources, to 
further our enforcement program under Title VII. Thank you.  
 BILL YEOMANS: Thank you, John. That’s a very heartening agenda, and 
I think . . . the part about bringing more complex pattern or practice cases . . 
. raises . . . one of the Section’s biggest challenges. As most of us know, the 
Section has lost some of its most senior [and] most experienced attorneys in 
the last few years; it’s lost an enormous amount of intellectual capital. So it’s 
going to be a challenge, and at some point we’d like to hear what your plans 
are for restocking that capital. I know you’re hiring.
But, our next speaker, Bob Libman, is a classic example of 
the kind of resource that the Section lost, and really tragically, 
and I want to ask him to speak next. Bob?   
 BOB LIBMAN: Thank you. And as the only member of the panel who 
lives outside the beltway, I think I have perhaps a different perspective; also, 
[I am] the only panel member currently in private practice. But I wanted 
to start fi rst by also thanking Richard. Whether by design or otherwise, I 
think what Richard has done here is really develop and lay out the fi rst oral 
history of the [ELS], and that, in and of itself, is quite an accomplishment, so 
thank you, Richard, for that. [W]e could applaud Richard for that. 
 (Applause) 
 BOB LIBMAN: And I can tell you that I’ve learned many things here today 
that I didn’t know before. I was in the Section from 1991 until 2004—actually 
about 2002, [when] I was sent elsewhere, but that’s another story. And I do 
also want to just publicly acknowledge and thank those who came before me 
and built the foundation upon which I hopefully did something during my 
thirteen years in the Section.  
I did want to reiterate what John said about the importance—maybe the 
why—why the [ELS] and its work in Title VII enforcement is so important. 
Again, given my perspective in the private sector, at least for the last six years 
now—I’m in a small, primarily plaintiffs’ public interest law fi rm, where we 
can brag that Barack Obama used to be in our offi ce, actually, he worked 
there—and it is very diffi cult for the private sector to bring the kinds of cases 
that the [ELS] has historically brought and is uniquely qualifi ed to bring 
because of the expertise. Historically, the Section has had the resources, as 
John mentioned, both intellectual and dollars wise; and the horizon, if you 
will, the time horizon for resolution of these cases, which can take decades, as 
many people know.  
The Lewis case13 is a perfect example. Our fi rm actually fi led the EEOC 
charge that is at issue in the Lewis appeal, and that charge, I believe, was fi led 
13. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
236        THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM                 [Vol. 1:1
in [1997], so that’s thirteen years ago. Along the way, the resources necessary 
to litigate that case were tremendous; it’s not only our fi rm working on that 
case. But the [ELS], from my time there, served the critical role of bringing 
the large pattern or practice cases against the public employers in a way that 
the private bar can’t do.
The private bar has other challenges as well in bringing these cases, including 
class certifi cation under Rule 23,14 which the [ELS] thankfully doesn’t have 
to worry about. So the point there simply [that] is there is a real need for 
aggressive enforcement of Title VII from the [ELS]. I’m very encouraged and 
have reason for great optimism in light of what we’ve heard already. 
I do also want to just, for those law students here or Section attorneys who 
are of the more junior in terms of experience, [give] you a few words to have 
hope as well, even [regarding], what somebody called, the “dark days” that 
[preceded] us. And it really touches on a case I worked on while I was there, 
the SEPTA case,15 [during] which I was fortunate to have Richard Ugelow as 
my supervisor; I was lead attorney.
The brief background—this is the case against the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority, essentially the Transit Police in Philadelphia, [h]ad a 
physical examination [used to screen] transit cop[s]; you had to run a mile and a 
half, I think it was in twelve minutes; never mind the fact that incumbent police 
offi cers were failing this repeatedly and being promoted and commended and 
doing heroic things. The test was developed by a test developer, Paul Davis, 
who was the expert for the Virginia Military Institute [case].16 [H]is testimony 
in that case, which we tried to offer—I think we did in the SEPTA trial, trial 
number one—[t]hat the only area of physical performance in which women 
outperform men was in having babies and making milk. He did a validation 
study to justify the need to run fast as a transit cop by conducting a study at the 
University of Maryland.17
[I] believe Aaron went out there actually and talked to folks at the track 
where he had folks running to show how fast you needed to run to be a cop, 
and he put together a class of folks he called the perpetrator class, simulating 
the perpetrators that had to be tracked down by the police. 
And I think Aaron talked to the Maryland track coach, [who] just 
happened to be on the track that day, and Aaron asked them if they 
knew anything about this study that had been done. He said, “Sure. 
In fact, some of my track team members were in that study.” And it 
turned out that all the track team members were the perpetrators . . . 
 (Laughter)  
 BOB LIBMAN: . . . who ran as fast as the typical criminal in the Philadelphia 
transit system, I’m sure.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
15. Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
16. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
17. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d at 491–92 n.18 (describing Dr. Davis’s 
Maryland study).
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(Laughter)
BOB LIBMAN: The trial judge did not like our case, and said to me on 
the fi rst day of trial with three attorneys and our counsel, “Who is running the 
country today now that you’ve left Washington?” We lost that case at trial. We 
appealed and established a very important principle about the use of a cutoff, 
or actually the meaning of the “consistent with business” assessing language 
of the Civil Rights Act of [19]91 in the context of a cutoff score; it was a 
tremendous victory in the Third Circuit. 
The case went down for a second trial and eventually it became a casualty 
of the last administration; we were asked to withdraw from the case, strangely 
enough without any consultation of any person who worked on the trial team. 
And the case actually was—eventually—the test was found to be not unlawful, 
so it persisted.
That’s a long intro, but the coda to it—which is the reason I started the 
story—is that just last year, within the last six months, SEPTA abandoned the 
test—the very same test that we challenged—and replaced it. 
 (Applause and laughter) 
 BOB LIBMAN: And [SEPTA] replaced it with essentially what we had 
been arguing should’ve been done all along. So the theme of incremental 
change and waiting to see the results, I think, certainly rang true for me there.
I want to speak just briefl y also on this issue of the resource—the new 
attorneys that will be hired. The challenge I see for the [ELS] is not just 
bringing in new attorneys, but training them. As I viewed the work in the 
[ELS] when I was there, the day-to-day work of the line attorneys, with whom 
I have particular affection, is about gathering facts. That’s what it’s about; it’s 
about gathering facts and presenting the facts. 
We’re not typically, on a day-to-day basis, making new law. We know what 
the legal standard is; we need facts that can meet that standard; and so the 
new attorneys coming in need to be trained. They need to be trained by senior 
people who have experience, who know how to develop Title VII cases, know 
how to take depositions. It’s not enough just to get them in the door; they have 
to be trained.
One story I’d like to share with you, and it also recognizes Bill Fenton, who is 
here today, who is, again, one of my mentors, a Deputy Chief who retired last year, 
quietly, as we expected, but who[m] I think should be publicly recognized. He was 
one of my mentors and [a] mentor [to] many people I think who are here today.
 (Applause) 
 BOB LIBMAN: And on the question of training—and on the theme of 
immersion—I wanted to share a story which I believe is true, Bill, and if not, 
it should be. The fi rst case I was handed to work on, when I got to the Section 
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in 1991, was against Hancock County Board of Education;18 and I was on the 
road within a few weeks doing an investigation, and found myself suing them 
and taking depositions within a few months.
I went in and talked to Bill about my fi rst deposition, and as I recall it, 
Bill said, “Well you haven’t taken depositions before?” And I said, “No.” 
And he said, “Have you attended any depositions?” “Uh, no.” “Have you 
read deposition transcripts?” “No.” “Have you read any of the practice guides 
on how to take depositions?” I said, “No.” He said, “Have you ordered the 
court reporter?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “You’re going to be just fi ne!”  
 (Applause and l aughter) 
 BOB LIBMAN: And in closing, I want to say that I do think the line 
attorneys are the real treasure of the [ELS], certainly during my time there, 
and for that reason I just want to reiterate that getting new folks in the door is 
not going to be enough; they have to be trained. And there’s been a real loss of, 
as Bill says, intellectual capital. I think the challenge against this, facing the 
Section, is very large; not one that’s insurmountable, but I do believe that it’s 
going to take time to get the line attorneys to a place where they can effectively 
and vigorously enforce the law as the political appointees and the Section 
management want them to do. Thank you.
BILL YEOMANS: Thank you, Bob. Aaron, time to put your track shoes on.
 AARON SCHUHAM: Okay. Well, thank you, Bill; I mean it’s a 
really great honor to be on this panel. And this has been bothering 
me all day; can I actually ask, who are the current line attorneys in 
the Section? We want to know who you are, can you tell us?  
 BILL YEOMANS: Current. 
 AARON SCHUHAM: Thank you, current, yeah. I want to spend my time 
advancing a few ideas and raise actually a few questions about how ELS, I 
think, could help to sharpen its focus in the months and the years to come.
When I worked at ELS, some of my friends in the civil rights community 
would often kind of chide us and tell us that we were sort of DOJ’s Title VII 
shop or the government’s Title VII shop, and that always really irritated me. I 
don’t think that ELS is just another Title VII shop or even just another Title VII 
shop with a lot of resources. That really, as we have learned today, is not what 
ELS has been in the past and I don’t think—and my guess is that many of you 
don’t think—that that’s what it should be in the future either.
The Section has vast power as an arm of the federal government; it has 
vast prestige, credibility, and resources. And I think that it should be using 
these resources and these assets strategically to provide the most vigorous and 
aggressive Title VII coverage as possible. 
18. United States v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 91-0149-W(S), 1993 WL 
436490 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 1, 1993).
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And basically what I think this means is that ELS should really continue its 
past practice, to develop its past practice about being self-critical about what it 
uniquely brings to the civil rights table when it’s deciding how to set priorities 
and deploy its resources. The mission really should not just center around 
investigations or cases that have merit, rather I really think that ELS should 
think carefully about putting in additional screens on top of these pipelines in 
order to prioritize work in a way so as to maximize its future impact.
And I want to note that in my view, there is no doubt that disparate 
impact cases are incredibly important for all the reasons that have already 
been described. But I am someone that really believes that the [Section] 706 
docket—the individual discrimination docket that Bill used to manage—is part 
of this whole thing; that the development of that docket strategically would 
allow the [ELS] to develop its impact even more. [I]’ll try to describe a few 
ways very quickly. 
So the fi rst kind of broad point that I wanted to make, in raising some 
considerations for you all to think about who are in the Section for the future, 
is basically that ELS should address important enforcement gaps where the 
private bar may lack resources; as Bob and I guess John noted earlier, [w]here 
resources basically aren’t available. So let me ask some questions.
Will ELS continue to deploy major resources towards Title VII investigations 
and cases that are simply too complex or expensive for private attorneys to 
develop? We really have already talked about that, and I think it’s wonderful 
to hear about all the great work that you’re leading the Section in doing on 
that. Private civil rights law fi rms—many of them, most of them—don’t have 
the resources or even the organizational resources, or even, frankly, the sheer 
attorney power that ELS has to investigate these cases, carry them on for a 
long time, as Bob said, and move them forward. 
Second, how can ELS work to eradicate forms of discrimination that seem 
most important now in this time of severe unemployment, which we all know 
has had even a greater impact on minority communities? Let me give you a 
couple of ideas. Can the Section expand its past work? And I think it’s really 
amazing work that the Section did in the past to protect women’s rights to 
full equal employment opportunity after pregnancy, or even adoptive parents, 
when they return to work.
A lot has been written—go and Google some Law Review articles—[a]
bout whether Title VII could ever be used, [t]hrough the antidiscrimination 
principle, to get at childcare; to get at the fact that many people, in order to 
walk into a place of employment [in] the fi rst place, must have childcare. It’s a 
really interesting area of law; DOJ could look at that. 
Third, will ELS then continue to make an impact in geographic areas, 
where access to private attorneys is very limited, even including . . . cases 
that seem to be very routine, straight-out violations of existing Title VII law? 
Here, the Section could continue what I really view to be a past critical role 
in: (a) providing relief for victims of discrimination in these areas who can’t 
access local representation, and (b) in educating the public and employees and 
employers in specifi c geographic areas about their obligations [under] Title 
VII.
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 Let me give you one super-quick example right here; and I think someone in 
an earlier panel, and I apologize if I’m duplicating them, talked about the fi rst 
set of fi refi ghter cases. I worked on a fi refi ghter case in southern Georgia; you 
remember that we pluralized and found multiple victims.
Well, I never realized, when I worked on this in the early [19]90s, that the 
origin of this whole thing really was 1972. Do you know that before 1972, 
when Title VII was amended to apply to public employers, in 1972 there was 
not a single woman paid fi refi ghter in the United States?19 I truly think that’s 
a remarkable fact; that’s an amazing fact. And it really was through the fi rst 
iterations of disparate impact litigation then, that you all then carried out, that 
those kinds of barriers were broken down. ELS should do that in the future; 
looking at these geographic areas where people are totally disenfranchised 
from work, and especially for government jobs, which, as John said, are very 
high paid jobs and often come with very good benefi ts.
Second, then I will move it along, ELS really should not just fi ll gaps. I 
mean, that’s sort of what I’ve talked about thus far, at least in my mind. I think 
that ELS really should continue to make a very conscious, focused, deliberate 
decision to lead in the development of Title VII law, as Jocelyn referenced, in a 
way that would really provide for the most robust protection of American civil 
rights in employment as possible. 
I know there are institutional impediments in this process. I experienced 
them and I think many people in this room, at different times, did. It is 
hard sometimes to cleanly work with EEOC and OFCCP. I think what you 
all talked about today and what Tom talked about earlier, about improving 
your relationships with these agencies, is amazingly hopeful and amazing[ly] 
important.
Private attorneys may not take up cases that really result in the development 
of the law. They’re risky cases to bring, they require tremendous investment, 
even in individual discriminations, to develop that kind of law, and I think 
that ELS is very capable of doing that. So here is, very quickly, by no means a 
comprehensive list of objectives, but some good examples.
First, we’ve talked about the disparate impact theory all day today and cases 
and Ricci;20 can DOJ look not only at its own docket, but at private litigation 
involving disparate impact and get involved there, even at the District Court 
level, to weigh in on the constitutionality of disparate impact for the future? 
The [DOJ] has a role in defending the constitutionality of all federal statutes, 
we all know this; this is a very good example of where ELS, even at the District 
Court level, could do that.  
Second, working to strengthen Title VII’s sex discrimination and sexual 
harassment protections; if DOJ wants stronger protections in this area, and 
it certainly should and I’m sure it does, then the Section should look at 
developing some areas of Title VII law that really would do that. Here are 
three quick examples.
Pushing back on sex stereotyping and gender rules in the workplace; 
19. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
20.  Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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could ELS work with the EEOC to look at specifi c potential cases, potential 
investigations, that involve sex stereotyping under the Price Waterhouse21 
theory? Or even, aside from the Price Waterhouse theory, could ELS work 
to address other minority communities that the Section could impact through 
Title VII straight-out sex discrimination provisions? 
Here’s a great example. Do people here know about the recent Schroer 
case?22  This involved a transgender employee, a colonel, in fact, who used to 
brief Vice President Cheney on national security issues, and then applied as a 
male to the Library of Congress for employment for a [Statistical Reporting 
Service] job—a congressional research service job—obtained employment 
and then, after telling the supervisor at issue that this person was going to 
change genders, that offer of employment was then retracted.
And I would assume that the Civil Division of DOJ played a role in 
defending that litigation, the case, ultimately before a District Court Judge 
here in D.C. [T]hat the court there determined that, even though Title VII 
doesn’t cover transgender people—there’s a specifi c exclusion for it—that 
there was nevertheless a straight-out sex discrimination violation; not even a 
Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping violation there, but the fact of the change 
of gender was a literal violation of the statute. 
You all could go and look at those kinds of cases. You could look at cases, 
of course, that don’t involve sexual minorities but that get to traditional gender 
roles, just as Price Waterhouse did. You could look at cases that were really 
under-enforced on same-sex harassment, which was established as totally 
viable in the Oncale decision;23 that’s something that we did in the past.
A couple of more quick points, or do you want me to stop? 
Do you want one more? 
 BILL YEOMANS: One more. 
 AARON SCHUHAM: One more, okay. Can I mention something about 
the amicus [brief] role that Jocelyn brought up? Some of you who were 
involved in the Section back in the [19]90s and early in 2000 know that we 
got involved in a case there that looked at, really for the fi rst time, having the 
Justice Department weigh in on the constitutionality of state and local anti-
discrimination laws.
When Congress passed Title VII [in 1964] and extend[ed] that in 1972, 
Congress explicitly recognized that Title VII, as important as it is, really 
is meant to set a fl oor and not a ceiling to employment anti-discrimination 
principles; that it expected, specifi cally, that States and localities would 
provide for more expansive employment protection than Title VII itself does.24
21.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
22.  Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
23.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
24.  See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974) (“Moreover, 
the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to 
pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal 
statutes . . . . Title VII was designed to supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and 
institutions relating to employment discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
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A lot of those provisions have been under attack in recent years. There are 
people raising free exercise claims and other First Amendment claims to the 
constitutionality of these kinds of laws. And I think that DOJ could play a 
very specifi c role—in its broader role of protecting the civil rights régime of 
providing equal employment opportunity—[c]oming in and weighing in on 
the constitutionality of those kinds of laws, just as we did in a very specifi c 
context in Kentucky and in Louisville back in 2000.
So I will stop with my ideas. But I really think what it comes down 
to is the fact that ELS has a very unique role. It may not feel like that to 
you every day. You have tremendous power and resources. You have 
access to other lawyers in the [DOJ], in other discipline areas, that 
allow you to really solve problems holistically, in a way that I truly 
don’t think any other private attorney could, and so I hope you use it.  
 BILL YEOMANS: Thank you, Aaron, for a lot to chew on. 
Michael, you get the last word. 
 MICHAEL SELMI: Thank you, and I am, I guess, literally the 
last thing between you and your drinks at this point.  
 (Laughter) 
 MICHAEL SELMI: And I have to start by saying that it is just an absolute 
pleasure to be here and I really appreciate Richard having invited me. I was 
only at the Department for two years, from 1989 to 1991, and it was a great 
experience that, in some ways, has never left me, because I still use my 
anecdotes from those two years in class all the time. And as many of you 
probably know, whenever a professor starts off by saying, “I had a case once,” 
they usually mean, “I had one case.” 
(Laughter) 
 MICHAEL SELMI: I actually had lots of cases at the [DOJ], and I had just 
a fabulous experience. And I later went to the Lawyers’ Committee [for Civil 
Rights Under Law] and I never really felt like I had changed much; it did feel 
a little bit different in terms of the side that we were on. 
There was one case that I was doing when I was at the [DOJ], with the 
City of Birmingham,25 [where] I went to do a hearing and because of the past 
history of the [DOJ], having switched sides a couple of times, it wasn’t at all 
clear where I was supposed to sit; and I ended up sitting behind everyone in the 
middle. And then when I went to the Lawyers Committee, it was different in 
that respect; we always did know what side we were on, but the work was the 
same for the most part. And I think that it’s an important aspect to emphasize; 
that the work in the Civil Rights Department is important and it needs to be 
civil rights work again, I think.
25.  McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1990).
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 And I did want to just share one quick anecdote, sort of everybody else 
who has had, and one of the things that being here reminded me of was, just 
the wonderful experience I had at the [DOJ]. And the very fi rst case I’d got 
when I arrived there was Bazemore v. Friday,26 on remand from the Supreme 
Court, and within two weeks I was down in North Carolina arguing a summary 
judgment motion about the regression analyses that were present in that case. 
And my favorite experience in that is, when I was making an argument in 
that case, one of the defense counsel tried to cut me off, and the judge stopped 
him and said, “Wait, wait, wait! Mr. Selmi,”—I was going to say professor—
“he’s the expert on this.” And I was just thrilled. I’d been there all of two 
weeks and I was already the expert. I never quite knew whether the judge 
was being sarcastic or not and I didn’t bother to ask him. And I’ve kept that 
transcript, highlighted, to this day; in large part, because it was the last time 
anyone referred to me as an expert on anything. 
(Laughter) 
 MICHAEL SELMI: But it really was a terrifi c experience, and I hope that 
comes back to you. I’m not going to have too many comments, because a lot 
of what the [DOJ] can do has already been discussed, but I’m going to have a 
few suggestions. One of my very fi rst articles that I wrote suggested that we 
ought to abolish the EEOC, and I’m not going to go that far with respect to the 
[DOJ], and I actually don’t think the EEOC should be abolished, but I do think 
it’s important for the [DOJ] and the EEOC to have a plan and to make sure that 
they’re doing something distinctive and different. 
From what I’ve heard—I wasn’t here this morning—but from what I’ve heard 
this afternoon, it seems that there’s a lot of emphasis on how the last eight years 
changed the [ELS] dramatically. My sense was this began before that, from the 
outside at least, and from my watching and writing about the [DOJ] and the 
enforcement of these statutes. During the Clinton administration, enforcement 
also declined—not nearly like it did with the Bush administration—but it 
didn’t seem to be the priority that it should have been [f]or a variety of political 
reasons; and I hope that doesn’t happen this go [a]round.
The rhetoric was very much the same at the beginning, although I think 
that the experience with Lani Guinier may have changed things signifi cantly. 
And it is wonderful to have an Assistant Attorney General who has civil rights 
experience and knows that Title VII is an anti-discrimination statute and not 
a tax statute or something, and I think that should make a difference. But the 
rhetoric won’t carry you through; we’ve heard the rhetoric before and we need 
to see, not just a budget, but I think we need to see actual results. 
And that’s one thing I want to say . . . the work of the [ELS] needs to be 
publicized. There are no longer annual reports. It is very hard to fi nd out what 
the [DOJ] is doing. You do list complaints, but it needs to be public, and I think 
that’s true for the EEOC too; so that we can, those of us on the outside, [h]ave 
better oversight of what the [DOJ] is doing. And we should be able to see the 
kinds of cases you’re bringing. 
26.  Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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And I think the other thing, in terms of a plan for the [DOJ] to be doing 
something distinctive, I think it should think about how it can contribute to the 
law. There is very little case law on the business necessity test after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1999; the SEPTA case is really it, and that’s just one case and we 
could use more case law. 
Now that doesn’t mean you don’t settle cases in order to develop law, but 
it does mean more amicus briefs; it means you want to look for cases that 
could have an impact. The fi re department case in New York seems like a 
perfect example of what the [DOJ] ought to be doing, and it’s getting publicity. 
And the fact that it occurred—it’s actually not a post Ricci case, it was fi led 
before—and the fi rst decision, if I remember, came just on the heels of Ricci 
and is being pushed forward; that is a great example of what the [DOJ] should 
be doing. But it’s still that old testing case, police and fi re department[s], which 
has been going on since the 1970s, and that correctional offi cers case that you 
mentioned, with the physical agility test—the same thing—and it seems that 
there should be something different. 
When I was at the [DOJ,] one of the initiatives was the suburbs cases. So 
that you had done the police and fi re department cases before in the cities, 
and then we moved out to the suburbs and started doing all the Los Angeles 
suburbs, the Detroit suburbs, Chicago [suburbs] . . . and that made sense. That 
was a good plan, I think, and a lot of good work was done on those cases. And 
they were easy cases, for the most part, because so little had been done in 
them; they were really just a second generation of those initial cases.
The ones today are less easy; [t]here were the prison cases, too, and those 
turned out—you know when we were doing the prison cases with respect to 
women, some of which are still going on, it sounds like; with the women, some 
of us thought these were sort of silly cases because we were just suing about 
prison jobs—and they didn’t sound like very good cases until we went out and 
did them. And I did a number of those cases involving women correctional 
offi cers in prisons, and you realize pretty fast, those are the best jobs around; 
they’re not glamorous jobs, but they were the best jobs in those rural areas, and 
it made sense to be trying to get women access to those jobs; and . . . I think 
something along those lines.
And you’ve had lots of suggestions today . . . [o]ne of the things that’s 
different from academia and practice [is that] in academia we focus on how 
much discrimination has changed, how it’s more subtle, harder to prove, 
implicit, and these structural components; but the cases that people are 
bringing really don’t involve those issues. And I think one area where you 
might be able to fi nd them is in the schools; schools are still overwhelming[ly] 
female in terms of teachers [and] overwhelming[ly] male at the principal 
levels. Those might sound like individual cases, but you might be able to do 
them structurally and think about going out and searching for cases and trying 
to make a difference in some of these.
When you look at areas that are growing—and it’s hard to [know] what 
areas are growing, where there is job growth today—[w]e used to look at North 
Carolina. You know, we would go and look at the data where it was a growing 
area and see if African-Americans—and now Latinos—were getting the jobs 
in those growth areas, too. Trying to fi nd the big cities, sometimes some of the 
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rural areas might make sense, too, but really trying to look, with all the data 
the [DOJ] has, going out and trying to fi nd cases to integrate the Latinos in the 
areas or African-Americans, trying to get them into the higher-level jobs; as 
opposed to doing the cases that come forward, and making it more like sort of 
a branch offi ce of the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in some ways, which it doesn’t 
sound like they’re doing anymore; it sounds like [they]’re starting to go out 
and do those pattern or practice cases. 
I don’t think the [DOJ] should be doing individual cases or should be putting 
resources into them, and I’ve written about that, but that’s also just a statutory 
issue; but I think the pattern or practice should be the focus. I think the publicity—
and I think the other thing, and this I’m saying to the two people to my left, and 
then I’ll stop—[and] the leadership has to support the attorneys. The attorneys 
want to do the civil rights work, but Bob’s experience, when you have a case 
that’s taken out from under you, you know you don’t want to spend four or 
fi ve years working on a case and then fi nd out you’re on the other side 
 BOB LIBMAN: Yeah. 
 MICHAEL SELMI: And you won’t have the incentive to do those cases 
if that might happen, and the only way you’re not going to have that is if you 
have support from the front offi ce, which I always had. Jim Magnus hasn’t 
been mentioned—from when I was here, he was my chief. He supported me, 
and Richard did, too, and Bill, and it made huge difference to the work that 
we did. [I] think that it’s easy to forget the importance of that, because the 
attorneys want to do the work and hopefully they will be able to do so. And I 
think we’re all looking forward to a new day, but we’ll be watching, too.
 (Applause)
END TRANSCRIPT
*  *  *
247
NOTE
$0.77 DOES NOT EQUAL $1.00:
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT 
IN A DUKES V. WAL-MART WORLD
JESSICA B. CLARKE*1
I. Introduction .........................................................................................266
II.   Background .........................................................................................267
A.  What Wage Inequality Really Looks Like ................................267
B.  Legislative Background .............................................................268
C.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear ...............................................................269
D.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act ......................................................272
E.  Paycheck Fairness Act ...............................................................273
III.  Discussion ...........................................................................................274
A.  Congress Should Reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act or 
Otherwise Remedy the Issues the PFA Sought to Address ......274
B.  Application: Dukes v. Wal-Mart ................................................275
IV.  Conclusion ...........................................................................................277
*    J.D. Candidate, May 2011, American University Washington College of Law, Bachelor 
of Arts in Linguistics, 2006, University of Pennsylvania, College of Arts & Sciences. 
   This Note builds upon a lecture of the same title that Fatima Goss Graves, Vice 
President for Education and Employment at the National Women’s Law Center, delivered 
at Washington College of Law on October 28, 2010. THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM 
and the Women’s Law Association co-sponsored the lecture.
248        THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM                 [Vol. 1:1
I.  INTRODUCTION
November 17, 2010 started and ended like a normal day for most people. 
For working women across the United States, it was another slap in the face. 
The defeat of the Paycheck Fairness Act (“PFA” or “Act”)1 in the U.S. Senate 
delivered a strong blow to the pay equality movement and women across 
the country.2 Among other objectives, the Act sought to provide for punitive 
damages for sex-based pay discrimination and to limit the ability of employers 
to assert that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.3 Ultimately, 
the Act sought to rectify pay discrepancies between the sexes; on average, 
women in the United States make seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned 
by a man.4 
In today’s world, fair and equal pay for equal work should be the norm, 
but, sadly, that is not the case for most American women.5 Although the 
wage gap between men and women has decreased, there is still work to 
be done to bridge that difference.6 The death of the Paycheck Fairness Act 
should not, and cannot, be the end of the fi ght for wage equality.7 This 
Note will contextualize the Paycheck Fairness Act’s importance in the 
1. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009). The Act was reported to 
committee in January of 2009 and then had no movement until it was reintroduced in 2010 
as S. 3772, 111th Cong. (2010) by Senator Reid. Ultimately, despite being approved by the 
House of Representatives, the Senate voted down the bill in November 2010. Pay Equity 
Information, NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-leg.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Pay Equity Information]..
2. See Mark Gruenberg, Senate Kills Paycheck Fairness Act, INT’L LABOR COMMC’NS 
ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2010), http://ilcaonline.org/content/senate-kills-paycheck-fairness-act 
(stating how the Act was defeated along party lines, with the two female Republican 
senators from Maine voting against the Act). 
3. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., HOW THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT WILL STRENGTHEN 
THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT], available 
at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Broad_Paycheck_Fairness_Fact_Sheet.
pdf (noting that the Paycheck Fairness Act would strengthen the remedies available under 
the Equal Pay Act by allowing for liquidated damages and back pay awards, in addition 
to limiting the “factor other than sex” affi rmative defense only to situations where the 
employer can show that the pay differential is related to job performance and consistent 
with a business necessity—and not merely caused by the gender of the employee). 
4. Id.
5. See generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES WORSEN THEIR 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN A DIFFICULT ECONOMY 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER 
WAGES], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/lowerwageshurtwomen.
pdf (observing that while other civil rights laws have helped narrow the wage gap, issues 
still exist in the enforcement of wage equality between sexes).
6. See Closing the Loophole: The Paycheck Fairness Act and Eliminating Caps on 
Damages, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/closing-
loophole-paycheck-fairness-act-and-eliminating-caps-damages [hereinafter Closing the 
Loophole] (stating that “[u]nlike most anti-discrimination statutes, the [Equal Pay Act] 
does not currently allow the award of compensatory or punitive damages” and limits lesser 
paid women to “unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation” and  “an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).
7.  See Gruenberg, supra note 2 (announcing that the leading women’s rights 
organizations would be meeting to discuss future strategy after the defeat of the PFA).
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pay equality movement and for all working women in the United States. 
To that end, Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the pay equality 
movement. Part III will analyze why the Paycheck Fairness Act should be 
enacted and why a remedy is necessary to rectify the current issues in wage 
inequality.
II.  BACKGROUND
A.  What Wage Inequality Really Looks Like
Wage inequality exists not only between the sexes but also across racial 
and national origin lines, state lines, and even among members of white-collar 
professions.8 Census data from 2009 shows, on average, American women 
earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar their male counterparts receive.9 
African-American women make sixty-one cents for each dollar earned by 
white, non-Hispanic men, and Latina women make fi fty-two cents for each 
dollar earned by white, non-Hispanic men.10 The District of Columbia shows 
the smallest wage gap between men and women; with women earning 88.2% 
of what men earn.11 The largest wage gap is seen in Wyoming, where women 
make 65.5% of what men make.12
In October 2010, the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) 
and the NAWL Foundation released a national report on the retention and 
promotion of women in law fi rms.13 In this report, the NAWL found that 
women, while representing approximately 50% of all law school graduates, 
still do not earn as much as their male colleagues.14 Women equity partners 
8.  See, e.g., Kevin Clark & Patrick Maggitti, How Women Can Reduce Their Wage 
Gap, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/women-
compensation-pay-leadership-careers-ceiling.html (discussing a study among white-collar 
professionals enrolled in MBA programs that looked at, among other factors, compensation 
among men and women).
9.  NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1 & n.2 (utilizing U.S. Census 
Bureau income data for persons aged fi fteen and older of Hispanic origin). 
10.  See id.; NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009, at 1 
(2009) [hereinafter NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/Ledbetter%20Fair%20Pay%20Act%20of%202009%20-%20Summary%20
of%20case%20and%20Bill.pdf.
11.  See Wage Gap Persists in All 50 States Fact Sheet, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/wage-gap-persists-all-50-states (citing U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EARNINGS BY STATE: 2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-3.pdf).
12.  Id.
13.  See STEPHANIE A. SCHARF & BARBARA M. FLOM, THE NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS 
& THE NAWL FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION 
AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3–4 (2010), http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.
com/fi les/NAWL%202010%20Final(1).pdf (fi nding that women are underrepresented in 
law fi rm leadership, as they only account for 15% of the equity partners, are not listed as 
major rainmakers, and earn less than their male counterparts). 
14.  See id. at 2, 3–4 (observing that, despite the fact that women make up fi fty percent 
of the law school graduates, women only account for fi fteen percent of equity partnership 
in law fi rms and earn less than their male counterparts). 
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make 85% of what their male counterparts make.15 Moreover,  although 
associate pay is generally “on a par” for both men and women, wage gaps 
begin to appear as women move higher up in the law fi rm hierarchy.16
B.  Legislative Background
The Civil Rights era saw the passage of two important pieces of legislation 
related to sex-based discrimination: the Equal Pay Act of 196317 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,18 signed into law by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
(respectively).19 The Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA);20 among other requirements, the Equal Pay Act 
established a minimum wage for employees.21 The primary aim of the Equal 
Pay Act was to prohibit the payment of unequal wages between men and 
women for equal work.22 At that time, women were earning fi fty-nine cents to 
every dollar earned by men.23 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 
1964 in an effort to continue President Kennedy’s civil rights legislation after 
President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.24 Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act covers employment-based discrimination of protected classes, one of 
which is sex.25 
The Equal Pay Act mandates the payment of equal wages to men and women 
in the same establishment when they perform equal work; provided that their 
15.  Id. at 4.
16.  See id. at 21–22 (emphasizing that even though the survey found that the associate 
compensation appears to be equal, differentials begin to appear at the counsel, non-equity, 
and equity partner levels, with female counsel earning eighty-eight percent, non-equity 
partners earning ninety-four percent, and equity partners earning eighty-fi ve percent of 
what their male counterparts earn).
17.  Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codifi ed as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).
18.  Pub. L. No. 88-325, 78 Stat. 241 (codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2006)).
19. See Overview of the Equal Pay Act, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN http://www.
aauw.org/act/laf/library/payequity_epa.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (stating the Equal 
Pay Act extended wage protection to women, while Title VII broadened protections to all 
employment actions based on protected classes—including sex).
20. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201–19 (2006).
21.  See § 206(d) (prohibiting discrimination based on sex in the payment of wages).
22.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (noting that President Kennedy signed the 
Equal Pay Act into law, making the payment of unequal wages illegal because he thought 
of the Equal Pay Act as an essential component of the civil rights movement).
23.  Id.; see Albert H. Ross & Frank V. McDermott, Jr., The Equal Pay Act of 1963: 
A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (claiming that the 
Equal Pay Act was a result of the call of the War Labor Board for adjustments to equalize 
the wage and salary rates of men and women that was later adopted by the Commission on 
the Status of Women, created by President Kennedy). 
24.  See RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART 
OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 14 (2001) (recalling President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
comments  to Congress that “no ‘memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor 
President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for 
which he fought so long.’”).
25.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (providing that it is “unlawful . . . to apply 
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment [on the basis] of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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jobs “require[] equal skill, effort, and responsibility;” and they work under 
similar working conditions.26 However, the Act allows differences in wages 
if an employer bases the wage differential on “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”27
Nevertheless, despite the passage of both of these important pieces of 
legislation, women still receive less pay than their male counterparts for 
doing equal work.28 Loopholes in both laws allow employers to justify paying 
different wages to male and female employees doing equal work.29
C.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Lilly Ledbetter was a female manager at Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama.30 She worked for the company from 
1979 until 1998.31 By the time Ledbetter retired in 1998, she had attained 
the position of Area Manager.32 She was one of a few female supervisors at 
the Gadsden plant and she faced many instances of sexual harassment while 
working there.33 At one point, her male supervisor allegedly told her that 
“‘women didn’t belong in the company.’”34 This supervisor consistently rated 
her near the bottom of all Area Managers each performance year.35 Another 
supervisor offered her a better evaluation in exchange for sexual favors.36
26.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
27. Id.
28. See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (highlighting the fact that although the 
wage gap has narrowed there is a substantial need to change the current law to ensure that 
the wage gap between sexes ceases to exist). 
29.  See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS: CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER 
THAN SEX” GAP IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS], 
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/FactorOtherThanSex.pdf (noting 
evidence of employers using the loopholes provided under § 206(d)(1) to justify otherwise 
illegal practices and stating the need to readdress the gaps of the law). 
30.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (observing 
that during Ledbetter’s nineteen-year tenure at Goodyear, salaried managers received—or 
were denied—“raises based on their supervisors’ evaluation of their performance”).
31.  Id.
32.  See Bindu George, Note, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: A Court Out of Touch With the 
Realities of the American Workplace, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 253, 256 (2008) 
(stating that although Ledbetter was an Area Manager, in 1997, on the advice of her male 
supervisor, Ledbetter applied for and received the non-supervisory position of Technology 
Engineer, but she still functioned as an Area Manager).
33.  NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1.
34.  Paula A. Monopoli, In A Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & 
U.L. 555, 560 (2008) (indicating that the supervisor that made this comment refl ected his 
opinion of women not belonging at Goodyear by making sure that she received lower pay 
increases than her male counterparts over the years).
35.  See George, supra note 32, at 255 (noting that Ledbetter was ranked twenty-third 
out of twenty-four salaried employees).
36.  Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 499, 508 (2010) (detailing the sexual harassment that Ledbetter faced from 
several male employees at her time at Goodyear, when she complained to management 
no action was taken, and when she fi nally complained to EEOC, after which she faced 
retribution from her coworkers). 
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During her employment, Ledbetter was unaware that she was being paid 
less than her male counterparts.37 While some of her male co-workers bragged 
about how much they made working overtime, the company had a policy that 
did not allow employees to discuss their pay among themselves.38 Ledbetter 
had received raises throughout the years but had no idea that the difference in 
pay was signifi cant.39 It was not until Ledbetter received an anonymous note 
informing her that she was being paid less than her male colleagues that she 
suspected pay discrepancy.40 At the conclusion of 1997, Ledbetter was earning 
$3,727 per month, in contrast with the lowest paid male area manager who 
made $4,286 a month, and the highest paid male area manager who made 
$5,236 a month.41 Consequently, Ledbetter fi led a formal charge alleging sex-
based discrimination with the EEOC in July 1998.42 In November 1998, she 
fi led suit in federal district court and alleged violations of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act.43
The district court allowed Ledbetter’s Title VII claim to proceed to trial 
but granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear for the Equal Pay Act 
claim and several other of her claims.44 A jury found for Ledbetter on her 
Title VII discrimination claim and awarded her back pay plus damages.45 
37.  NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1. 
38.  Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (describing how, when Ledbetter fi rst began 
working for Goodyear, all of the supervisors were paid the same but as time passed, 
Goodyear adopted a subjective performance-based system in which employees were told 
that the amount that they were paid was strictly confi dential). For more on the illegality 
under Title VII of employer pay scale schemes which allow management to base promotion 
and wages on characteristics other than on their performance, see, for example, Carpenter 
v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 706 F.2d 608, 613, 633 (5th Cir. 1983), which held 
that a pay plan that arbitrarily assigned predominantly blacks and women to lower paying 
job classifi cations would be illegal under Title VII and affected employees would be 
entitled to back pay.   
39.  See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (recounting that some of Ledbetter’s pay 
raises were “pretty good, percentage-wise,” which led her to believe that there was not a 
substantial disparity between her pay and the pay of male employees doing the same job 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
40.  See id. (observing that after Ledbetter found out she was paid substantially less 
than her male counterparts, that discovery provoked her to quickly go to the EEOC and fi le 
a formal claim against Goodyear). 
41. See Monopoli, supra note 34, at 563 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
42. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621–22 & n.1 (2007) 
(majority opinion), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
43. Id. at 621–22.
44.  Id. at 622.
45.  Id.; see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003 
WL 25507253, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003) (stating that Ledbetter was awarded 
approximately $3.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the back 
pay award), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded 
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; see also 
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508–09 (stating that the jury awarded Ledbetter three million 
dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, but “the trial judge reduced the damage 
award to $300,000” due to the Title VII statutory damages award cap).
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Goodyear appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and contended that Ledbetter’s 
pay discrimination claims were time-barred before her EEOC contact.46  The 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that a plaintiff 
“can state a timely [Title VII pay discrimination claim] for disparate pay only 
to the extent that the ‘discrete acts of discrimination’ of which she complains, 
occurred within the limitations period created by her EEOC questionnaire. 
Any acts of discrimination affecting her salary occurring before then are time-
barred.”47
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ledbetter sought review of the following 
question: 
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination 
when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, 
but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred 
outside the limitations period.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on November 
27, 2006.49 Then, on May 29, 2007—nearly ten years after Ledbetter fi rst 
contacted the EEOC—the Supreme Court, in a fi ve to four decision, affi rmed 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the discriminatory acts claimed by Ledbetter 
were untimely and that her claim was time-barred.50
D.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
In 2009, in one of his fi rst acts as President, President Obama signed into 
law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009—which superseded the Court’s 
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear.51 The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restored the 
rights taken away by the Court’s decision in Ledbetter and established that 
“pay discrimination claims on the basis of sex, race, national origin, age, 
46.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), 
Ledbetter’s claims of discrimination were time-barred under the statute of limitations 
created by her EEOC questionnaire), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
47.  Id. at 1180. 
48.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 548 
U.S. 903 (2006) (No. 05–1074).
49.  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618.
50.  The majority of the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, upheld the 
decision of the Eleventh Circuit and held that because a pay decision is an act that is made 
at a particular point in time, an EEOC statutory period begins when the act occurs. Id. at 
621. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, authored a dissenting 
opinion that claims that the majority is incorrect and that the 180-day statutory period 
should be combined for each offense, rather than run for each offense individually, because 
pay disparities accumulate over time. Id. at 646–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
51.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (2006)); see Carolyn E. Sorock, Note, Closing the Gap Legislatively: 
Consequences of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2010) 
(noting that several Republican Senators feared that, without deadlines for fi ling, suits over 
pay discrimination would be unduly burdensome for businesses).  
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religion, and/or disability ‘accrue’” with each discriminatory act.52   Qualifying 
discriminatory acts include the receipt of a discriminatory paycheck, the 
adoption of or an employee’s subjection to a “discriminatory pay decision or 
practice.”53 Whenever such an act occurs, a pay discrimination claim can move 
forward under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.54  Moreover, the Act is effective as 
of the day prior to the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision.55
Since the enactment of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, several cases have applied 
the expanded statutory time limitations period.56 Courts have confi rmed 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s greater statutory timeframe by allowing each 
discriminatory paycheck to renew the limitations period for pay discrimination 
claims.57 As such, each time an employee receives a paycheck based on a 
discriminatory pay decision, the time period in which an employee mayt fi le 
an EEOC complaint starts anew.
Despite the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, other issues still exist in 
the fi ght for equal pay. One issue concerns the meaning of the clause:  “when 
an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice.”58 Courts have interpreted this phrase in different ways and have 
reached different outcomes.59 Additionally, what qualifi es as a “compensation 
52.  NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009: ONE YEAR 
LATER 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER], available at http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Ledbetter_FPA_One_Year_Later.pdf.
53.  Id. 
54.  Id.
55.  Id. 
56.  See, e.g., Mikula v. Alleghany Cnty. (Mikula I), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that each discriminatory paycheck renewed the time for fi ling a pay discrimination 
claim under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act), rev’d, 583 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009); Hester v. N. 
Ala. Ctr. for Educ. Excellence, 353 F. App’x 242, 243–44 (11th Cir. 2009) (fi nding that 
the plaintiff’s claim was timely under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Johnson v. District of 
Columbia, 632 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2009) (reinstating the plaintiff’s claims after 
the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and stating “there can be no dispute that, under 
the Fair Pay Act, plaintiff may seek relief under” the relevant federal laws); Goodlett v. 
Delaware, No. 08-298-LPS, 2009 WL 585451, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2009) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s pay disparity claim survived after the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
and “the 300-day clock for fi ling a Title VII pay disparity claim starts anew with each 
discriminatory pay period”). 
57.  See NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 52, at 1.  
58.  42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
59.  Compare Mikula I, 320 F. App’x at 136 (holding under Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that plaintiff’s claims were untimely, due to 
the fact that they were not fi led within 180 days of the occurrence with the EEOC), with 
Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty. (Mikula II), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter 
and holding that the plaintiff’s claim was timely). See, e.g., Schengrund v. Pa. State Univ., 
705 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432–33 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (articulating that plaintiffs “may recover 
for each and every paycheck received from the present dating back to 300 days prior 
to their fi ling with the EEOC”). But cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1973 
(2009) (holding that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not apply in the calculation of pension 
benefi ts calculated, in part, under an accrual rule). See generally Sorock, supra note 51, 
at 1212–13 (discussing, in detail, the various judicial responses to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act).
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decision” under the Act varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.60
E.  Paycheck Fairness Act
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) 
introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act in January 2009 to remedy some of the 
shortcomings of the Fair Pay Act.61 One aim of the bill was to strengthen the 
amount of damages a prevailing plaintiff could recover; another goal was to 
close a loophole in one of the four affi rmative defenses available to employers 
under the Equal Pay Act.62 Nevertheless, despite approval by the House of 
Representatives, the Senate rejected the Paycheck Fairness Act on November 
10, 2010.63
III.  DISCUSSION
A.  Congress Should Reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act or Otherwise 
Remedy the Issues the PFA Sought to Address
While the Fair Pay Act restored the rights the Ledbetter decision removed, 
there are still problems that persist with the enforcement of equal pay for equal 
work.64 First, the Equal Pay Act provides an employer with an affi rmative 
defense when the employer can show that it based the allegedly discriminatory 
pay differential on a factor other than sex.65 Many employers use this defense 
to defeat plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act claims by asserting the reason for differences 
between two employees’ pay is not sex.66 The Paycheck Fairness Act would 
have closed this loophole by requiring the employer to show the following: 
that it used a “bona fi de factor . . . not based upon or derived from a sex-based 
60.  See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009: 
CURRENT STATUS AND EMERGING ISSUES 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES], 
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Ledbetter_Act_Current_Status_
and_Emerging_Issues.pdf (showing different types of claims that have been raised under 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and how different jurisdictions have ruled).
61. Pay Equity Information, supra note 1.
62.  See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (stating that other 
aims include: improving the remedies available; facilitating class action claims; prohibiting 
employer retaliation, modifying the “establishment” requirement; improving the collection 
of pay information by the EEOC; and reinstating pay equity programs and enforcement at 
the Department of Labor).
63.  See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Pay Equity 
Information, supra note 1 (stating the vote was 58–41, mostly along party lines).
64.  See NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES, supra note 60, at 2–3 (discussing problems of 
interpretation that have come before the courts, including problems with retroactivity and 
problems with the actual reach of the Act).
65.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (providing four exemptions to the general 
prohibition of pay disparity); see also NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 24, at 2–3 
(noting that a number of courts have allowed “factors other than sex” exemptions in their 
decisions, resulting in employers’ being allowed to pay male employees more than female 
employees).  
66.  See NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 2 (asserting that judicial 
misinterpretation of the “factors other than sex” defense would be remedied with the 
Paycheck Fairness Act).
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differential;” that the “factor other than sex” was “job-related to the position 
in question;” and that use of a “factor other than sex” to distinguish pay was 
“consistent with business necessity.”67 Under the Paycheck Fairness Act, if the 
employee could show that “an alternative employment practice” could have 
served “the same business purpose without producing a pay differential and 
the employer refused to adopt” the practice, then the employer would not have 
prevailed on the “factor other than sex” defense.68
A second aim of the PFA was to increase the amount of damages awarded to a 
prevailing plaintiff.69 Unlike awards under Title VII or the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, awards under the Equal Pay Act do not include 
compensatory or punitive damages.70 The prevailing plaintiff in an Equal Pay 
Act claim is entitled to back pay during the relevant limitations period and an 
additional, equal, amount as liquidated damages.71 Usually, the award of back 
pay and liquidated damages is not very large.72 By not being allowed to receive 
compensatory or punitive damages, victims of sex-based wage discrimination 
receive different treatment than other workplace discrimination victims.73
 B.  Application: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
An example of how wage inequality has emerged in a non-white-collar 
professional setting is Dukes v. Wal-Mart.74 Here, a female employee, Betty 
Dukes, who initially had received an excellent ninety-day review and a 
promotion, alleged that she later experienced discrimination and retaliation 
67.  Id. at 4. 
68.  Id.
69.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (detailing that the Paycheck Fairness Act 
would allow for both compensatory and punitive damages and would eliminate the cap on 
damages).
70.  See also NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that 
the Equal Pay Act does not permit the award of compensatory or punitive damages); cf. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (providing for back pay and reinstatement but no other 
damages).
71.  See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (comparing the 
remedies of the Equal Pay Act with those of the Paycheck Fairness Act and fi nding the 
Paycheck Fairness Act remedies of compensatory and punitive damages superior).
72.  See id. (noting that damage awards under the Equal Pay Act are insubstantial on 
the whole).
73.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (observing that the Equal Pay Act 
remedies are not as far-reaching as those in other anti-discrimination statutes).
74.  603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, No. 10-277 (U.S. argued Mar. 29, 2011).
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for complaining to her District Manager.75 Dukes claimed that her supervisors 
never gave her the opportunity to train for higher-level and higher-paying 
positions and reprimanded her more harshly for mistakes than her male 
counterparts.76 Dukes, along with six other female employees, fi led a class 
action suit on June 8, 2001.77 The plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart pays women 
less than men in comparable positions, even when the lower-paid women have 
higher performance ratings and greater seniority than their male counterparts, 
and that women “receive fewer—and wait longer for—promotions to in-store 
management positions.”78 In addition, they allege that Wal-Mart’s corporate 
culture encourages “gender stereotyping and discrimination” and that this 
treatment “is common to all women who work or have worked in Wal-Mart 
stores.”79
One issue is whether it was appropriate for the district court to grant class 
certifi cation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 On December 6, 
2010, the Supreme Court granted Wal-Mart’s petition for certiorari and heard 
oral argument on March 29, 2011.81 
This case is important because of its potential social ramifi cations.82  Wal-
Mart, a large corporation, is one of the largest employers in the United States.83 
A favorable outcome for Dukes and the other plaintiffs would send a strong 
message not only to Wal-Mart, but to other employers as well; discriminatory 
promotion and compensation policies toward female employees are 
75.  See WAL-MART WATCH, BETTY V. GOLIATH: A HISTORY OF DUKES V. WAL-MART 
5 (2006), available at http://walmartwatch.com/img/blog/dukes_backgrounder.pdf 
(recounting allegations that Ms. Dukes experienced retaliation through “1) discipline 
for procedures regularly used by male employees without being reprimanded; 2) not 
allowing her to train for a department manager position; 3) demotion to cashier and being 
falsely accused of violating company policy while performing a transaction that had been 
performed many times by Ms. Dukes and other employees in the past without incident; 
4) a reduction in hours and hourly wage; 5) not being informed of at least four un-posted 
promotional opportunities (department and/or support manager positions) for which she 
would have been eligible but were each fi lled by males; and, 6) being discouraged from 
applying for future department manager positions”).
76.  Id. at 5. 
77.  603 F.3d 571, 577–78 (noting plaintiffs’ class alleged rampant Title VII 
violations).
78.  Id. at 577.
79.  Id. at 577–78.
80.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring commonality of facts for all members of 
the representative class in order to permit certifi cation); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting certiorari to the question of “[w]hether the class 
certifi cation ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a)”).
81.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). 
82.  See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4–5 (discussing the potential important 
implications of Dukes for consumers, investors, and employees alike, such as, risk to the 
“Wal-Mart ‘brand’ in the public eye”).
83. See WALMART, CORPORATE FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at http://www.
walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf (stating that Wal-Mart is one of the largest 
private employers in the United States).
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intolerable.84 As one attorney, who represents the Dukes class, explained the 
crux of the issue, “People keep shopping at Wal-Mart because they don’t con-
nect the fact that the low price they’re paying is effectively subsidized by the 
woman at the checkout counter.”85 
IV.  CONCLUSION
D espite the existing laws protecting wage equality, wage inequality 
remains. Savvy employers are able to defeat many legitimate EPA claims 
simply by asserting that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.86 
When employees do prevail, the damages they obtain are generally a drop in 
the bucket for their employers.87 Given the tough fi nancial times that most 
Americans have been facing during this recession, women suffer harder hits to 
their wallet than men do as a result of the pay disparity.88 
However, the political makeup of the 112th Congress makes it unclear 
whether any member of Congress will reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act 
and put it up for another vote before 2013. Regardless, the fi ght for equal 
pay for equal work must continue. Forty-eight years out from the passage 
of the Equal Pay Act, signifi cant wage gaps between men and women are 
unacceptable. 
84.  See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4, 9 (stating that this litigation is being 
watched closely by competitors while law fi rms are releasing reports to their clients on how 
to avoid similar class-action employment litigation).
85.  Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
86.  NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 1. 
87.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (“Employers would gamble that it costs 
less to pay damages than to create workplaces free of discrimination.”).
88.  See NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1–2. At least one reason 
that wage gaps continue—and are exacerbated—in a bad economy are cultural perceptions 
that women are only secondary contributors to household income. See e.g. Steger v. Gen. 
Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (detailing that one of the reasons that 
management told Steger that she could not have a wage increase was because she did not 
“need” one since she could rely on her husband’s salary).  
*  *  *
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